Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory by Miller, Binny
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
1994 
Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case 
Theory 
Binny Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Law Commons 
GIVE THEM BACK THEIR LIVES: 
RECOGNIZING CLIENT NARRATIVE 
IN CASE THEORY 
Binny Miller* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the concepts of lawyering as storytelling and cli-
ent voice as narrative have come into vogue.1 As a practical matter, 
lawyers have always seen their work as in part "storytelling,"2 but 
only recently has legal scholarship framed lawyC?ring in these 
terms.3 By and large, legal scholars have -approached storytelling 
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1. See Symposium, Lawyers As Storytellers & Storytellers As Lawyers: An Interdiscipli-
nary Symposium Exploring the Use of Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 18 VT. L. REv. 565 
(1994); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989); Symposium, Speeches 
from the Emperor's Old Prose: Reexamining the Language of Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 
1233 (1992). 
2. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Lan-
guage, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2459, 2463 (1989); Steven Lubet, The Trial as a Persuasive Story, 14 
AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 77, 77 (1990); Sharon Creeden, Telling Your Client's Story to the Jury, 
TENN. BJ. May-June 1991, at 10, 10. 
3. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, ill, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship 
as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2278 (1992); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling 
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2073 (1989). The relationship between law, storytelling, and 
progressive lawyering is brilliantly portrayed by Gerald L6pez, perhaps the foremost propo-
nent of this genre, in his path-breaking work Rebellious Lawyering. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, 
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). 
For a thoughtful analysis of L6pez's ideas, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 
107 HARV. L. REv. 1747 (1994) (book review). The idea of voice and narrative is also the 
focus of much academic literature from other disciplines, including literature, anthropology, 
political science, and history. See, e.g., JAMES McPHERSON, BATILE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE 
CIVIL WAR ERA at ix-x (1988). For a critique of the legal narrative movement, see Daniel A. 
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 
STAN. L. REv. 807, 840-54 (1993) (arguing that objective standards should be used to evalu-
ate narratives and that much narrative scholarship falls short of these standards). 
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and narrative from the standpoint of theory - critical race theory ,4 
critical literary and legal theory,5 feminist theory,6 lesbian and gay 
theory,7 and ethnographic theory.8 In contrast, clinical theory has 
long grou11ded narrative in the actual practice of lawyering.9 The 
emerging theoretics of practice literature draws on all of these van-
tage points in looking at the intersection of theory and practice in 
legal advocacy.to 
Although these approaches differ in some respects, they share 
enough in common that they can be grouped under the rubric of 
"critical lawyering."11 These critical theorists posit that client 
voices have been muted by the narratives that lawyers tell on their 
behalf, and urge lawyers to set aside their own stories in favor of 
client stories.12 They follow in the footsteps of the client-centered 
4. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED (1987); Lawrence, supra note 3, at 
2278. 
5. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
6. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991); 
Carol Weisbrod, Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments and Questions on Law and Narrative, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 143, 143-46. 
7. See, e.g., William N. Eskrldge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994); 
Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereo-
types, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511 (1992). 
8. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: To-
wards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1298, 1339-57 (1992). 
9. See generally Symposium, The Many Voices of Clinical Legal Education, 1 CLINICAL L. 
REv. 1 (1994). 
10. Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 
1731, 1748 (1993) (calling this work a "growing body of work that attempts to unite theory 
and practice"); Lucie E. White, Seeking " •.• the Faces of Otherness .•• ": A Response to 
Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1499, 1503 (1992) (defining the-
oretics of practice as "a new field of critical reflection on advocacy and pedagogy"). For 
examples of works in this genre, see Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of 
Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 717 (1992), and sources cited supra in 
note 1. Much of this literature tilts toward theory rather than practice by drawing broad 
conclusions about the attorney-client relationship. Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on 
the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 971, 983-85 (1992). For a discussion of the differ-
ence between theory and practice, see Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 
96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1779 (1987) (defining theory as a "formulation that guides or governs 
practice from a position outside any particular conception of practice"); Gary L. Blasi, 
What's A Theory For? Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. (forthcoming May 1994). 
11. See Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1013 n.64 
(1992). These approaches are not mutually exclusive, nor do they exhaust the possibilities of 
critical theory. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 17 CORNELL L. REv. 1233, 1235 (1992) 
(describing this body of scholarship as "inchoate and perhaps irresolvable"). 
12. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Tum: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEo. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 619, 632 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Mrs. V.] (urging lawyers to "overturn 
lawyer narrative and install a self-proclaimed client narrative"); Anthony V. Alfieri, The An-
tinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 659, 665 (1987-88) [hereinafter Alfieri, Dialogic] (arguing that traditional legal ap-
proaches to poverty law silence clients in favor of attorneys). When the notion of "excluded" 
or "suppressed voices" is extended to legal educators, see, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Poli-
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movement, which has argued that clients. should play a greater role 
in their own cases. 
The critical and client-centered movements add to our under-
standing of the role that client voices can and should play in legal 
representation. But in the rush to embrace client voice, these schol-
ars have virtually ignored the critical role that case theory can play 
in linking client stories to the narratives that lawyers tell on behalf 
of clients. 
Case theory - or theory of the case - can be seen as an ex-
planatory statement linking the "case" to the client's experience of 
the world. It serves as a lens for shaping reality, in light of the law, 
to explain the facts, relationships, and circumstances of the client 
and other parties in the way that can best achieve the client's 
goals.13 The relevant reality combines the perspectives of the law-
yer and the client with an eye toward the ultimate audience - the 
trier of fact. 
Despite the view of many lawyers that case theory is central to 
the task of lawyering,14 and despite its prominence in highly publi-
cized trials,15 most accounts of lawyering do not explore the rich-
ness of case theory.16 For writers of trial advocacy texts, case 
theory is an important lawyering "skill," yet their works contain at 
best only skeletal analyses of the concept. For client-centered theo-
rists, case theory plays little role in client decisionmaking; at best, it 
is one of a number of decisions that permit some client participa-
tion, and at worst, it is a task for lawyers alone. For critical theo-
rists, both the concept of case theory and the role of clients in 
decisionmaking about case theory remain partially obscured. 
tics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. See. L. REv. 7, 7 (1990), the concept loses much of its 
force. 
13. This definition captures my reformulation of case theory, described infra in Part III, 
in contrast to the traditional concept, set out infra in section I.A. For a provocative analysis 
of the relationship between client life experience and criminal responsibility, see Abbe 
Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a 
Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming 1994). 
14. See sources cited infra note 30. For excellent accounts of the pedagogical role of case 
theory in a law school clinic, see Nancy Cook, Legal Fictions: Clinical Experiences, Lace 
Collars and Boundless Stories, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 41 (1994); Dinerstein, supra note 10; and 
Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. 
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109 (1993-94). For a description of the importance of case theory to 
trial advocacy courses, see Edward D. Ohlbaum, Basic Instinct: Case Theory and Courtroom 
Performance, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1 (1993), and Steven Lubet, Ethics and Theory Choice in 
Advocacy Education, 44 J. LEGAL Eouc. 81 (1994) (criticizing Ohlbaum for not focusing on 
ethical issues in theory development). 
15. See infra notes 308, 320-57 and accompanying text. 
16. See Ohlbaum, supra note 14, at 16-17 (noting the absence of scholarship examining 
case theory). 
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This article is about case theory and its implications for incorpo-
rating client narratives in litigation.17 In seeking to understand the 
connections between voice, narrative, and case theory, I look not 
only to theory but to my experience as a clinical teacher and crimi-
nal defense attomey.18 I explore how the practice of lawyering can 
be reconstructed to embrace a greater role for clients in construct-
ing case theories, both through the images of the client the lawyer 
presents in the case theory and through active client participation in 
developing and cho'osing the case theory.19 Although one aim of 
case theory is to persuade the trier of fact, my focus is not on the 
sorts of inferences and arguments that might persuade a jury but 
rather on the role of the client in shaping case theory. 
In Part I, I explain what case theory is, what it does, and how a 
lawyer develops a theory for a particular case. I then discuss the 
limited role clients play in developing and choosing case theory in 
the eyes of both trial advocacy writers and the client-centered 
movement. Finally, I consider how the critical theorists' emphasis 
on power dynamics and client narrative can be translated to case 
theory. Although these three models offer some important insights 
into case theory,20 I conclude that they are ultimately unsatisfying 
in weaving clients' stories into case theory or in giving clients power 
to make decisions about" how their cases are presented. 
17. Although case theory is an equally important tool in the context of negotiation and 
transactions, see ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSEL-
ING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 201 n.3 (1990), I concen-
trate on its use in trial preparation and trial. Case theory considerations may be similar in 
trial and nontrial contexts, id., but to the extent that they vary, focusing on a single context 
avoids overbroad conclusions. 
18. I have taught for the past seven years as a clinical teacher in a criminal defense clinic 
and have thought a great deal about the importance of case theory to the work of defending 
our clients. These insights, gained from this practice and my experience as a poverty law and 
civil rights attorney, are an important piece of my understanding of case theory. For an 
eloquent explanation of the relationship of experience ·to theory in a different context, see 
MYLES HORTON, THE LoNG HAUL 140 (1990) (noting that the philosophy of the Highlander 
Folk School challenged the traditional practice of "coming from the top down and going from 
the theoretical to the practical"). 
19. Although this article is intended primarily to describe a view of case theory that in-
forms both theory and practice, it also speaks to the question of how to teach case theory, as 
any effort to teach a subject begins with the question "What is this thing that I am trying to 
teach?" For an interesting account of the need to incorporate client stories in legal pleadings, 
see Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 
104 YALE LJ. 763 (1995). 
20. Although these models are characterized by important differences, they also overlap 
to some extent. See Alfieri, supra note 11, at 1233-35 & nn.1-2 (describing lawyering models 
as falling along a "modem-postmodern" spectrum). For a thoughtful analysis of how tradi· 
tional legal education leaves clients out of discussions of how to frame legal arguments, see 
Shalleck, supra note 10, at 1736. 
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In Part II, I tell the story of a criminal case in which the issue of 
race played a key role in my clinic students' development of the 
case theory. Our client, a black man, was charged with disorderly 
conduct, resisting arrest, and assault and battery after he was 
stopped and wrongly accused of shoplifting by three white security 
guards.21 The case raised provocative questions about the rele-
vance of our client's life experience to the various case theories that 
we, as his lawyers, could construct on his behalf. 
I use one client's story as the backdrop to my discussion of case 
theory; this choice creates a tension between the story and the 
theory.22 Few articles in the story-theory genre find comfortable 
ground in the often awkward fit between story and theory, where 
stories either serve as a perfunctory reference for "theoretical" con-
clusions,23 or instead carry the entire weight of the article.24 I seek 
to integrate the two by using the theory to explain the story and the 
story to critique and revise the theory. Through this back-and-forth 
interplay, theory can inform practice, and practice can give meaning 
to theory.25 
In Part III, I offer my conclusions about how to reconstruct case 
theory to capture more fully the perspectives of clients. Although 
the context - both the situation of our client and criminal practice 
more generally - is crucial, my conclusions about case theory ap-
21. The racial connotations make it tempting to compare this case to the Rodney King 
case. Although King was a victim and a prosecution witness, the defense portrayed him as a 
criminal defendant first and foremost, as is common in police brutality cases. Like King, our 
client is a large black man, who was alternatively portrayed as soft-spoken or hostile and 
dangerous in his encounter with the police .. See Bill Girdner, Different Result in New Cop 
Trial, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 16; infra sections II.A, 11.B.2.a. Yet this analogy is both over-
stated and understated. In our case, the stop of our client was less justified than in King's 
case, but the subsequent police conduct was less outrageous. 
22. See Jane Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), at cover memo (Mar. 13, 
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting the difficulty of moving from 
client narrative to a theoretical construct). 
23. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Leaming Lessons 
of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991). 
24. See Spinak, supra note 22, at cover memo. 
25. See Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Scholarship, 
43 HASTINGS LJ. 1187, 1194 (1992) (proclaiming the need for more clinical scholarship that 
relates theory to experience); see also L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 65 (arguing for more "theories 
from the ground up"); Dinerstein, supra note 10 (arguing that the theoretics of practice 
movement has much to offer legal practitioners); Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: De-
veloping a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992) (exam-
ining the relationship between the clinical and critical legal studies movements in the ·context 
of theory and practice); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism 
and Clinical Education, 15 MINN. L. REv. 1599 (1991) (exploring the relationship between 
theory and practice from the standpoint of the clinical and feminist movements). 
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ply across a wide range of lawyering.26 In reimagining client partici-
pation in case theory development, I draw from images pioneered 
by the critical lawyers and return to the story from Part II to offer 
some new images our client's story suggests. In coming full circle 
from the perspective of race to sexual orientation and back again, 
this concept of case theory as life experience demonstrates the elu-
sive truth of what happened in any case. It also reveals how our 
own experiences as lawyers shape - for better or worse - the 
stories that we perceive and elicit from our clients. 
I. THE ROLE OF CASE THEORY IN LAWYERING 
There is little empirical evidence about the role case theory ac-
tually plays in the practice of law.27 The lone published study, 
whose participants were criminal defense attorneys, suggests that 
fewer than half of the attorneys surveyed typically develop a case 
theory before negotiating with the prosecutor.28 The wording of 
the survey question, however, makes this conclusion suspect,29 and 
the participants may not be representative of criminal defense law-
yers as a group or of lawyers in other kinds of practices. In con-
trast, anecdotal evidence - including articles in practitioner-
26. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 
32 ARIZ. L. REv. 501, 583 n.372 (1990) (explaining that the interests of clients facing abuse 
and neglect charges are similar to those of clients facing criminal charges); William H. Simon, 
The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1721-22 (1993) (rejecting traditional 
justifications for ethical differences between criminal and civil practices). But see Fred C. 
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351, 357-58 nn.26-27 (1989) (sug-
gesting ·that ethical considerations in civil and criminal cases differ). 
27. This mirrors the absence of empirical evidence generally about what lawyers actually 
do. Dinerstein, supra note 10, at 987 ("Ultimately the theoretics literature must forge links 
with empirical work about lawyers and lawyering to fully ground its observations about the 
world of practice."); see also DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A 
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 269 n.30 (1991) (noting the absence of empirical work in this 
area). 
28. See Robert L. Doyel, The National College - Mercer Criminal Defense Survey: Pre· 
liminary Observations about Interviewing, Counseling, and Plea Negotiations, 37 MERCER L. 
REv. 1019, 1027 (1986) (finding that criminal defense attorneys conduct a thorough investiga· 
tion, do legal research, and develop a case theory before plea bargaining only 43% of the 
time). 
29. The survey likely understates the role of case theory in the practice of survey partici-
pants, who responded to a three-part question worded in the conjunctive: "In what percent· 
age of your cases did you conduct a thorough investigation, do legal research, and develop a 
theory of defense before plea negotiations?" Id. at 1027. The lawyers who developed a ten· 
tative theory before negotiating would have answered "no" to the question unless they also 
fully investigated the facts and conducted legal research. 
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oriented publications30 and media accounts of trials31 - suggests 
that case theory plays a prominent role in legal representation. 
While lawyers often disparage their opponents' cases as "just" the-
ory,32 their own case theories are almost sacred. 
Despite its importance, case theory has received little attention 
in standard texts on lawyering.33 Some authors make only passing 
reference to the idea,34 while even those authors who see case the-
ory as a key piece of case planning, strategy, and analysis do not 
explore the idea in any detail.35 It is easier to explain the function 
of case theory than to define it; as a result, the term often is used 
imprecisely.36 Until we share a common understanding of the 
meaning of case theory, we cannot fully appreciate the importance 
of the concept or of the client's role in developing case theory. 
30. See, e.g., James W. McElhaney, Focus, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 78 [hereinafter McEl-
haney, Focus] (illustrating the need for a focus or theory during cross-examination); James 
W. McElhaney, Working the File, A.B.A. J., May 1994, at 84, 86 [hereinafter McElhaney, 
File] (noting the role of depositions in educating legal opponents about case theory); Paul J. 
Martinek, Bar Braces For Open Discipline: Dynamics Of BBO Advocacy To Change, MAss. 
LAW. WKLY., June 28, 1993, at 1, 32 (noting the need to "have the case theory down" early in 
lawyer disciplinary proceedings); see also Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: 
What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REv. 695, 711 (1991) (noting the need for trial 
and mitigation case theories to be congruent). 
31. See infra section III.A. 
32. See, e.g., Paul Duggan, Trial Begins in Slaying On Capital Hill in '92, WASH. PoST, 
June 23, 1993, at D3 (reporting a defense lawyer's characterization of the government's case 
as " 'just a theory' "). In the novel by former assistant U.S. Attorney William Pease, detec-
tive Christine Boland characterizes police investigative work as "throwing theories around." 
WILLIAM D. PEASE, THE RAGE OF INNOCENCE 140 (1993). 
33. See Ohlbaum, supra note 14, at 4 (pointing out that traditional trial advocacy classes 
emphasize "skills and techniques ••. at the expense of[] case theory"). My review of stan-
dard texts includes traditional pretrial and trial advocacy texts whose primary purpose is a 
"how-to" or skills focus, see MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL AovoCACY: PLANNING, 
ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY (1988) [hereinafter BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL]; MARILYN J. BER• 
GER ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY (1989) [hereinafter 
BERGER ET AL., TRIAL]; THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL (2d ed. 1993); THOMAS A. MAuET, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter MAuET, TRIAL], and more 
theoretical and client-focused texts, see BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17; GARY BEL-
LOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION 
IN ADVOCACY (1978); BINDER ET AL., supra note 27. For an analysis of the contributions of 
the client-centered writers to the question of who makes the decision about case theory, see 
infra section I.B. 
34. See RoGER S. HAYDOCK & DAVID F. HERR, DISCOVERY PRAcrICE 14 (2d ed. Supp. 
1993) (listing notes about case theory among the contents of a litigation folder). 
35. See, e.g., BELLOW & MOULTON, supra note 33, at 305; RoNALD L. CARLSON & 
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OFTRIALPRAcrICE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 25, 
35, 37 (1989); Elkan Abramowitz, Theory and Theme of the Case, in MASTER ADVOCATES' 
HANDBOOK 1 (D. Lake Rumsey ed., 1986). For exceptions, see BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, 
supra note 33, at 8, and BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 7-8. 
36. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
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A. Traditional Model: Where is the Client? 
1. Concept of Case Theory 
Case theory provides a framework for trial preparation and ulti-
mately for trial.37 It has been defined as "the basic underlying idea 
that explains not only the legal theory and factual background, but 
also ties as much of the evidence as possible into a coherent and 
credible whole."38 Case theory is not simply a statement of the ap-
plicable law or of the facts that support this legal interpretation, but 
rather it is the "basic concept around which everything else 
revolves. "39 
Case theory is often described as comprising two separate theo-
ries, a legal theory and a factual th~ory.40 The legal theory is "a 
legal framework developed by a lawyer from interpretation, analy-
sis, and expansion of legal rules and standards,"41 while the factual 
theory is "the party's 'story' justifying relief under the legal the-
37. BELLOW & MOULTON, supra note 33, at 305; BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, Sllpra note 
33, at 18; Abramowitz, supra note 35, at 2. For the role of case theory in negotiation and 
transactional contexts, see supra note 17. 
38. JAMES W. McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK 78 {3d ed. 1994). For similar definitions, 
see BELLOW & MOULTON, supra note 33, at 305 ("a view of how fact, law and circumstance 
can be put together to produce the outcome you and your client seek"); MAUET, TRIAL, 
supra note 33, at 46 ("your side's version of 'what really happened' "); JAMES W. McELHA· 
NEY; EFFECTIVE LITIGATION: TRIALS, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 123 (1974) (hereinafter 
McELHANEY, LmGATION] ("a simple, believable, coherent progression with which you can 
explain all of your evidence and whatever is credible of your opposition's evidence"); J. AL· 
EXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS 51 (2d ed. 1993) ("a 
cohesive, logical view of the merits of the case"); and Ohlbaum, supra note 14, at 4 ("the 
basic, underlying and comprehensive idea that accounts for and explains all of the 
evidence"). 
39. McELHANEY, TRIAL NoTEBOOK, supra note 38, at 78. For similar definitions, see 
DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTIIESIS TO PROOF 
184 {1984) ("describes what happened and why in a way that is persuasive both to the mind 
and to the heart"); JoHN 0. SONSTENG ET AL., THE TRIALBOOK: A TOTAL SYSTEM FOR THE 
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF A CASE 3 (student ed. 1984) ("the central unifying 
concept of a case"); and GEORGE VETTER, SucCESSFUL CIVIL LITIGATION - How To WIN 
y OUR CASE BEFORE y OU ENTER THE CouRTROOM 21, 27 {1977) ("a perspective through 
which you want [the jury) to view the facts and assess what the case is all about"). 
40. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 18 (stating that legal theory and factual 
theory are the two interdependent components that make up case theory); BERGER ET AL., 
TRIAL, supra note 33, at 16-17 (same); BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 184 (stressing 
the importance of combining a legal theory with a persuasive factual theory); SONSTENG ET 
AL., supra note 39, at 4-5 {defining legal and factual theory). 
41. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 18. 
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ory."42 The case theory should be supported by the facts,43 mean-
ing that it should explain the party's version of the facts,44 the 
unfavorable facts,45 and any undisputed facts.46 The theory must 
also be measured against its legal sufficiency47 and in terms of how 
well it responds to the likely theory of the opponent.48 
The theory of the case should be expressed in simple declarative 
sentences49 that combine the legal theory with central factual asser-
tions. 50 Take, for example, a criminal case in which the defendant is 
accused of stealing two car seat covers that the owner last saw when 
he left them in his car, elevated on blocks in front of his home. The 
seat covers were later found in the defendant's car. The prosecu-
tion could assert that the defendant knew that the car seat covers 
belonged to someone else when he took them from the car and that 
he meant to deprive the car owner of his property. The defendant 
might respond that he took the seat covers because he believed that 
the car and its contents were abandoned. The car was stripped of 
its parts after it sat on blocks for over a month without being 
worked on.51 
42. Id.. Factual theories are also referred to as factual "summaries," see ROGER 
HAYDOCK & JoHN SONSTENG, TRIAL! THEORIES, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES 70 (1991), and as 
factual stories, see BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 169, and become "legal stories" 
when they satisfy a legal theory, id. at 175. 
43. See, e.g., BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 19; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, 
supra note 33, at 17-18; CARLSON & lMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 30-33; VETIER, supra 
note 39, at 30-33. 
44. BELLOW & MOULTON, supra note 33, at 305; MAUET, PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 88-
89; MAUET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 46, 380; McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 38, 
at 81. 
45. BELLOW & MouLTON, supra note 33, at 305; VETIER, supra note 39, at 31. 
46. MAUET, PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 88; MAuET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at .46, 380; 
VETIER, supra note 39, at 30-31. 
47. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 19; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 17-18; MAUET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 46. 
48. BELLOW & MOULTON, supra note 33, at 305; BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 
33, at 27-28; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 25-26; see also J. ALEXANDER 
TANFORD, TEACHER's MANUAL, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAw, TACTICS AND Ennes 76 
(1992). Case theory must take into account a grab bag of other variables, including jurisdic-
tional considerations, applicable statutes of limitations, the availability of a bench trial or jury 
trial, and the wording of the relevant jury instructions. See CARLSON & lMWINKELRIED, 
supra note 35, at 32; McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 38, at 79. 
49. HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 42, at 70. 
50. The "plot" is the "skeleton" for the story, which consists of a string of "central asser-
tions" about "what happened." BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 24; BERGER ET 
AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 22. 
51. This example and the applicable case theories are taken from BERGER ET AL., PRE-
TRIAL, supra note 33, at 28-31, and BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 27-31. Given a 
different set of factual assertions, other potential defenses could include a defense that the 
owner fabricated the charge, no asportation (taking), mistaken identification, insanity, du-
ress, mistake, claim of right, or diminished capacity. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 
33, at 29; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 27. 
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Once a case theory is selected,52 it serves as the centerpiece for 
all strategic and tactical decisions in the case.53 The case theory is 
incorporated in the pleadings54 and serves as a guide for conducting 
the pretrial investigation and discovery,55 including client and wit-
ness interviews, formal discovery, and motions.56 Later, case theory 
"dictate[s] virtually every word the attorney utters at trial."57 The 
theory of the cm~e is not only stated explicitly in the opening state-
ment58 and reiterated in closing argument,59 but it also shapes every 
aspect of the trial, including trial tactics,60 witness examinations,61 
52. The lawyer should focus on narrowing the possible theories by the trial preparation 
and trial stages. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 201; BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, 
supra note 33, at 23; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 21-22. Jn many instances, a 
single theory is preferable. BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 167 n.3; MAuET, TRIAL, 
supra note 33, at 380; McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 38, at 84 ("Get a basket 
big enough and strong enough to carry all the eggs you need."). The risk of alternative 
theories is that weaker arguments can dilute the force of stronger ones. See Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983) (discussing the strategic importance of "winnowing out weaker 
arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue"). Moreover, the fact finder may 
become confused or distracted, see CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 31; RooBR 
s. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LmGATION 14 (3d ed. 1994), or view the 
lawyer as not credible, CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 30-31. 
53. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 18; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 16; MAuET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 280; Ohlbaum, supra note 14, at 17; Stephen 
C. Rench, Building the Powerfully Persuasive Criminal Defense, 42 MERCER L. REv. 569, 
578-80 (1991). The distinction between strategy and tactics and its relevance to client deci-
sionmaking is discussed infra in section J.B. 
54. MAuET, PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 89-90. For strategic reasons, lawyers sometimes 
choose not to divulge their theories to their opponents. McElhaney, File, supra note 30, at 
86. 
55. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 18, 194-95; MAUET, TRIAL, supra note 
33, at 380. At this stage, the attorney may be relying on more than one theory, and these 
pretrial activities can serve as the basis for choosing between theories. See, e.g., BASTRESS & 
HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 201; BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 23, 28, 30, 54, 
194-95. 
56. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 28, 30; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 27, 29; BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 163 (noting that "[i]t is nearly 
impossible to question witnesses in the absence of some legal theory"). For a discussion of 
the relationship between a motions theory and a case theory, see BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, 
supra note 33, at 28, 253-58, and BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 27, 96-101. 
57. CARLSON & lMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 35. 
58. BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 27, 30; McEUiANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, 
supra note 38, at 83; SONSTENG ET AL., supra note 39, at 185. 
59. BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 27; SONSTENG ET AL., supra note 39, at 4; 
McELHANEY, LmGATION, supra note 38, at 123; McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra 
note 38, at 83; Stuart M. Speiser, Closing Argument, in MASTER ADVOCATES' HANDBOOK, 
supra note 35, at 235. Thus, trial preparation should begin with closing argument, which is 
the piece of the trial that most explicitly states the theory of the case, and work backwards 
through the other pieces of the trial. See BELLOW & MouLTON, supra note 33, at 305. 
60. CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 35-36; Abramowitz, supra note 35, at 2 
(advising lawyers not to impeach an opponent's witnesses if their testimony supports the 
client's case theory). 
61. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 29 n.4; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 27, 30-31; Christina L. Hunt, Calling Your Attention to the Direct Examination: 
How to Avoid the What Happened Next Question, 42 MERCER L. REV. 619, 621 (1991). Case 
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and evidentiary issues.62 Thus, a trial becomes a contest between 
competing theories of the case.63 
Case theory remains an elusive concept, beyond the seemingly 
simple statement that case theory is the legal and factual framework 
for organizing and presenting a case. Lawyers often mistake case 
theory for narrow tactical decisions,64 and this confusion is com-
pounded by the use of other terms that loosely approximate the 
idea of case theory but are not identical. While the terms theory of 
the case and theme are sometimes used interchangeably,65 they 
seem to mean different things. Theory implies a linear, rational 
concept that drives the fact finder inexorably to a favorable result; 
theme, while geared to the same end, instead suggests a potent mix-
ture of facts and emotion.66 Other efforts to define case theory are 
theory provides a way of looking at each witness as a part of an overall picture of the case, 
making witness examinations a slice of the theory that the attorney wants to convey, rather 
than a series of random questions. McElhaney, Focus, supra note 30, at 78. 
62. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 30; BERGER ET AL., 'TRIAL, supra note 
33, at 27-29; CARLSON & lMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 33 (observing that by choosing 
among possible case theories, an attorney can control which facts become most relevant); 
Ohlbaum, supra note 14, at 23, 44-55. 
63. MAuET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 46, 381. For a colloquial version of this principle, 
see McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 38, at 78 (comparing case theory to a "home 
cave to be defended at all costs unless utter disaster commands that it be deserted in favor of 
some unfamiliar place further up the hill"). 
64. See McElhaney, Focus, supra note 30, at 78 (illustrating that lawyers often mistakenly 
equate the key witness examination points with the broader idea of case theory). 
65. See JOAN M. BROVINS & THOMAS OEHMKE, THE TRIAL PRACTICE GumE 236 (1992); 
STEVEN H. GOLDBERG, THE FIRST TRIAL: WHERE Do I Srr? WHAT Do I SAY? 63-64 
(1982); SONSTENG ET AL., supra note 39, at 3-5. Other terms are slant, JAMES W. JEANS, 
TRIAL ADVOCACY 201 (student ed. 1975), principle, BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra, at 236, and 
simply theory, BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 113-14, 145-64 (describing theory develop-
ment and verification). 
66. See, e.g., CARLSON & lMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 25-28 (explaining that theory 
is the set of specific facts that lead to a favorable conclusion and that theme is the recurring 
motif an attorney uses to show the jury why it should reach that conclusion); Abramowitz, 
supra note 35, at 1-2 (defining theory as "that explanation of the facts which shows logic 
requires your side to win," and theme as "that explanation of the facts which shows the moral 
force is on your side"); Patrick Bennett, An English Point of View, in MASTER ADVOCATES' 
HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 3 (defining theory as the factual explanation for what hap_-
pened, and theme as the explanation for why one party is responsible and not the other); 
MAuET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 380-83 (explaining that theory tells a story while theme 
summarizes key points in an "emotionally compelling" way); see also Charles L. Weltner, 
Thelema: The Desire to Help, in MASTER ADVOCATES' HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 6-8 
(defining theme and theory as the legal construct that presents the trier of fact with the means 
of coming to the desired conclusion, and thelema as that which makes the trier of fact want to 
reach the desired conclusion). 
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colorful and quaint at best;67 at worst, they are cliches.68 The often-
cited admonitions that case theory should be straightforward69 and 
consistent with common sense,70 human experience,71 and the val-
ues of the judge or jury72 add little to these barebones explanations. 
In addition, the structure for classifying case theory reveals the 
lack of clarity in the concept. This structure, as set out in texts au-
thored by Marilyn Berger, John Mitchell, and Ronald Clark,73 and 
by David Binder and Paul Bergman, respectively,74 divides the uni-
verse of case theory into two categories. Affirmative theories state 
one party's version of what happened;75 rebuttal theories respond 
to this version by probing weaknesses in the opposing side's case 
but do not offer an independent version of events.76 
Whereas plaintiffs must offer an affirmative story, defendants 
can offer either affirmative or rebuttal stories, or both.77 Consider, 
67. See, e.g., Abramowitz, supra note 35, at 2 (defining case theory as "the glue which 
holds together the other elements required for successful litigation"); Bennett, supra note 66, 
at 2 ("Before you choose your brushes or mix the paints, you decide first what you want the 
painting to look like and what effect you want it to have on the viewer."). 
68. GoLDBERG, supra note 65, at 66 (defining case theory as "a little bit of law, a little bit 
of fact, and a dash or two of common sense"). 
69. See MAuET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 46; Ohlbaum, supra note 14, at 18-23 (noting ten 
principles of persuasion bearing on case theory). 
70. MAuET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 46; TANFORD, supra note 38, at 51; VETTER, supra 
note 39, at 31 (explaining that a case theory should be "down-to-earth and have a common-
sense appeal"). 
71. MAuET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 46 (stating that a case theory should fit the juror's 
"perception of how life works"); McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 38, at 80 (urg-
ing that a case theory should resonate with what "the jury feels is more likely true"); Rench, 
supra note 53, at 571 (explaining that the theory should be consistent with jurors' belief 
systems, which are developed through life experiences). 
72. SONSTENG ET AL., supra note 39, at 4; McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 
38, at 81. 
73. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 17-51; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 15-61. 
74. See BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 162-89. To their credit, the Berger, Mitch-
ell, and Clark texts and the Binder and Bergman text are the only lawyering texts that pro-
vide any guidance in thinking about case theory in a systematic way. 
75. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 19, 22-23; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, 
supra note 33, at 17, 21; BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 13, 174. Most of the citations 
to Binder and Bergman that follow refer to descriptive hypotheses, which together with ex-
planatory hypotheses, id. at 174-78, and legal theories comprise case theory. Id. at 184. 
Although conclusions about descriptive hypotheses would seem to apply more generally to 
case theory, the conclusions may not be identical. 
76. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 20; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 
33, at 18; BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 13, 174. 
77. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 19-20; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 17-18; BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 13-14, 174-75. Because plaintiffs 
must respond to affirmative defense theories, the assertions about the rebuttal options for 
defendants may also apply to plaintiffs. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 22; 
BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 21; BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 174 n.12. 
For a discussion of the risks of offering alternative theories, see supra note 52. 
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for example, a murder case -in which the State asserts the affirma-
tive theory that the defendant stabbed the victim.78 In response, 
the defendant could assert either the affirmative defense that he is 
not guilty by reason of insanity79 or a rebuttal theory that attacks 
the credibility of the eyewitness who identified him as the killer.so 
Both affirmative theories commit to a story about what happened 
- the stabbing or the reason for the stabbing - while the rebuttal 
theory commits to nothing but simply asks the fact finder to reject 
the opponent's theory. 
Despite its apparent simplicity, this classification scheme does 
not easily account for every kind of theory, nor does it avoid diffi-
cult questions about the category in which a particular theory be-
longs. In many respects, the two groupings overlap as much as they 
diverge.81 If the defendant asserts that he was insane when he com-
mitted the crime, that story both adds a new affirmative dimension 
to the story - the defendant's mental state - and als·o rebuts the 
prosecutor's version - which at least implicitly portrays the de-
fendant as sane_ By the same token, if the defendant attacks the 
credibility of the eyewitness to the crime, he not only undermines 
the State's case but also presents a fundamentally different picture 
of what happened. In the State's version, the crime was observed 
by a credible witness, even if the State does not offer direct evi-
dence of credibility. 
· This structure for classifying case theory also reveals important 
differences both in how the authors assess the relative iffiportance 
of facts and law to theory and in the role they create for defense 
counsel. The Berger, Mitchell, and Clark approach gives legal doc-
trine a greater role in both affirmative and rebuttal theories than 
does the Binder and Bergman approach. For Berger, Mitchell, and 
Clark, a theory must rest on statutory authority or case law to be 
classified as affirmative.82 In the four-part typology of rebuttal the-
ories, three theories - legal insufficiency, factual insufficiency, and 
78. BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 15. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 15-16. 
81. Id. at 15. Even the architects of this classification scheme disagree about how to 
classify some theories. In the murder case defense, the Berger, Mitchell, and Clark formula-
tion of the affirmative-rebuttal dichotomy apparently would classify an alibi theory, or a the-
ory that someone else committed the murder, as a rebuttal theory . .See BERGER ET AL., 
PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 20, 22; BERGER ET AL., 'TRIAL, supra note 33, at 18, 20-21. The 
Binder and Bergman formulation, on the other hand, would characterize them as affirmative. 
See BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 174-76. 
82. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 22-23; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 20. 
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procedural aspects - assume a given set of facts in mounting legal 
challenges.83 Only the persuasive insufficiency theory is analogous 
to the Binder and Bergman notion that rebuttal theories tell a 
story.84 For Binder and Bergman, affirmative theories are found 
not only on the pages of law books but also in stories about what 
happened,85 and rebuttal theories are factually richer. 
The role of defense counsel also differs in the affirmative-rebut-
tal dichotomy. The typical defense lawyer in the Berger, Mitchell, 
and Clark model passively resorts to blunting the plaintiff's attack, 
while in the Binder and Bergman model she is active and challeng-
ing. She has as many stories to tell as the lawyer for the plaintiff,86 
and she offers these stories in both affirmative and rebuttal modes. 
2. Critique - Visible Doctrine and Invisible Clients 
The traditional concept of case theory provides a useful starting 
point for thinking about a case and a skeletal framework for mount-
ing an attack or a defense. If the "facts" do not satisfy a necessary 
legal element, case theory cautions the attorney to focus on that 
element, rather than to attack every contention her opponent 
makes. For example, by focusing on case theory, a misidentification 
defense in a theft case is shown to bear little resemblance to a de-
fense of no intent.87 Legal theories that are clearly inapplicable can 
be discarded in favor of better theories. 
But in other respects this concept of case theory is impover-
ished. The meaning of case theory is not clear, and the concept is 
not explored in any depth. In worshiping the law, this notion of 
case theory ignores context and misconceives the power of impor-
83. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 20 (providing as an example of a 
legal insufficiency theory the argument that a criminal statute is unconstitutional); BERGER 
ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 19 (same); BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 21-22 
(providing as an example of a factual insufficiency theory the argument that the prosecutor 
has not made out a prima facie case); BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 19-20 (same); 
BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 22 (providing as an example of a procedural 
theory the argument that the court lacks jurisdiction); BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, 
at 20 (same). 
84. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 22 (providing as an example the theory 
that an eyewitness to a crime lacks credibility); BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 20 
(same). 
85. See BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 174-77. 
86. Id. The thought process of defense counsel, however, differs from that of plaintiff's 
counsel in that defense counsel tend to focus their attack - whether affirmative or rebuttal 
- on one or more specific elements of the plaintiff's legal stories and typically should de-
velop a theory that places the blame on another culprit. Id. at 175. 
87. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 29-30; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 27-28. 
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tant facts - especially the client's life facts.ss Traditionalists ex-
press too much objectivity about the "facts" and see a limited 
universe of case theory. Perhaps most importantly, this approach 
overlooks the insights that clients can bring to case theory and ig-
nores the possibility that clients have other goals for case theory 
besides winning. 
The heart of traditional case theory is what I call "element-
crunching": case theory is the law with facts playing a supporting 
role.s9 Under this view, case theory is derived from the close study 
of court decisions, statutes, rules, regulations, and treatises. The at-
torney simply turns to these sources of information, determines 
which elements she needs to prove, and then gathers those facts 
that establish each and every element of her theory.9o 
Legal doctrine is especially prominent in criminal cases, in 
which the reasonable doubt standard is heralded as the touchstone 
of a good defense theory. Defense counsel, who are not expected 
to tell a story, are relegated to poking holes in the prosecution's 
case or to suggesting hypothetical alternatives.91 
Although the best of the traditionalists recognize a back-and-
forth interplay between legal theory and "what happened,"92 facts 
nonetheless serve a purpose secondary to legal doctrine. Even 
88. See, e.g., BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 27-31 (making no mention of 
the character or circumstances of the defendant); BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 
27-31 (same). But cf. BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 178-81 {addressing the impor-
tance of emotional and socio-political themes in theories). One commentator recognizes the 
importance of these kinds of facts, which he calls "sex appeal" facts, although he does not 
connect this insight to case theory. See GOLDBERG, supra note 65, at 100-02. 
89. See, e.g., BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 18 (noting the importance of 
legal doctrines in developing a case theory); BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 16 
(same); HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 52, at 13-14 (using the term legal theory interchangea-
bly with the overall concept of case theory); MAUET, TRIAL, supra note 33, at 380-81 (em-
phasizing the importance of legal elements in developing a case theory); TANFORD, supra 
note 48, at 76 (including the identification of legal elements as a key component of develop-
ing case theory). Ironically, this is the "stuff" of traditional legal education, see CARLSON & 
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 29 (analogizing case theory development to taking a law 
school examination), which does not even recognize the concept of case theory. 
90. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 199 (describing the thought process in 
theory development as akin to a computer search). 
91. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 26; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 
33, at 24; BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 16 n.12 & 184 (noting the frequency of this 
strategy in criminal defense practice). But see Rench, supra note 53, at 578 (arguing for a 
case theory that tells "the defense version of how the litigated event or episode happened"). 
For a discussion of the role of defense counsel, whether civil or criminal, see BERGER ET AL., 
PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 20-23, 26-27, and BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 18-22, 
24-25. 
92. See, e.g., BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 27 n.3 (learning that the client 
was intoxicated may lead the lawyer to consider whether intoxication is a defense in a bur-
glary prosecution); BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 25 n.4 (same); BINDER & BERG-
MAN, supra note 39, at 162 (stating that legal theory flows from facts). 
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when "factual theory" is identified as a piece of case-theory struc-
ture, this bipartite structure severs factual theory from legal theory. 
Stories are subsumed in legal theory, which serves as both the start-
ing point and ending point for case theory.93 Facts exist simply to 
be plugged into legal theory, and facts that cannot find a home in 
some legal element are deemed virtually irrelevant.94 The process 
of theory development is quantifiable, neat, and quite sterile. 
For the traditionalists, there are a finite number of possible case 
theories in any case.95 If the lawyer is a good detective, she will 
ferret out all potential case theories, discard those theories that do 
not fit the facts, and from the remaining available theories select 
the one that is most persuasive. Yet even the novel theories she 
derives from creatively reading existing law or discovering new 
law96 lack the boundless possibilities that any one set of facts 
presents. 
But traditionalists do not see these possibilities because they 
picture a world of objective facts in which the lawyer can really 
know "what happened" if only she pushes the right buttons.97 In 
their view, the worst kind of lawyer is one who "desperately 
grop[ es] for anything in order to win, without any regard to what 
really happened."98 In their rush to reject different factual scena-
rios, traditionalists provide no sense that objective facts are often 
93. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 21 (determining factual sufficiency by 
reference to legal elements); BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 19-20 (same). The 
"fact" portion of case theory is typically addressed after the law, and many fewer pages are 
devoted to the discussion of facts than law. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 
18-27; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 16-25. 
94. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 27 (positing that for any given legal 
theory, "there is a somewhat foreseeable spectrum of facts"); BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 25 (same). 
95. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 27, 29; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra 
note 33, at 25, 29. 
96. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 154 (discussing "cutting-edge" theories); 
Charles J. Ogletree & Randy Hertz, The Ethical Dilemmas of Public Defenders in Impact 
Litigation, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 23, 37 (1986) (noting that new decisions and 
statutes "spawn a host of new legal challenges"). 
97. The analogy of case theory development to a computer search demonstrates this: 
A computer operator plugs a request into the computer; the computer scans its informa-
tion bank and selects entries that satisfy the request; the operator then pursues the com-
puter's responses to determine which best fits the immediate needs. Similarly, you begin 
with a set of facts provided by the client; you then plug that information into your bank 
of legal and nonlegal knowledge and scan all potential theories; after identifying the 
possible theories, you pursue additional information to either confirm or reject their 
application. 
BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 199. 
98. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 23; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 
33, at 22. Traditionalists similarly reject the use of multiple legal theories, see supra note 52, 
but fail to distinguish doctrine from facts adequately. Whatever one's view of alternative fact 
scenarios, when a lawyer supplies alternative legal theories for a single set of facts, she 
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few, that perspective is everything, and that what happened may be 
a meaningless concept apart from the lens of the particular viewer. 
Contrast the traditionalist view with the videotape shown in the 
trial of the Los Angeles police officers charged with beating Rod-
ney King. Although at first glance the videotape seemed suscepti-
ble to only one interpretation - a black man being brutally beaten 
by four white officers - the defense relied on the videotape to 
show King as a madman raging out of control.99 Even those jurors 
who were not persuaded that King was a madman experienced a 
"deadening" of facts through the constant replaying of the video, 
which at first seemed horrific. 
Finally, clients are almost invisible in the traditional concept of 
case theory. Indeed, for some traditionalists, the process of defin-
ing the world of available theories begins even before the lawyer 
interviews the client.100 Although others recognize that clients can 
serve as a source of factual "stories" in developing case theory101 
and may be counseled about the impact of a decision on the success 
of a particular case theory,102 this recognition does not translate 
into an active role for the client. The active role belongs to the 
lawyer and her view shapes the case theory. The real challenge for 
the lawyer lies in developing a viable case theory,103 not in under-
standing the client and her world. Lawyers are given the task of 
matching the theory to client goals, and clients are nearly always 
assumed to want to win, whatever the trade-offs.104 Even those tra-
merely suggests what most jurors probably believe - that the law is complicated and there 
may be more than one legal explanation for what happened. 
99. See Girdner, supra note 21, at 16. 
100. See, e.g., BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 18 ("[K]nowing as defense 
counsel that the defendant is charged with robbery will lead you to conjure up in your own 
mind and then research the range of possible theories of defense in that area."); BERGER ET 
AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 16 (same). For other commentators, the client disappears after 
the initial interview, see, e.g., SONSTENG ET AL., supra note 39, or seems not to exist at all, see, 
e.g., HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 34. It is ironic that entire !extbooks are devoted to trial 
practice "skills" in which clients are completely invisible. 
101. See, e.g., BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 39, at 162-63; CARLSON & IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 28-29; SONSTENG ET AL., supra note 39, at 3; see also BAS· 
TRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 17, at 199. 
102. While decisions such as whether the client should testify in a criminal case or un-
dergo substance abuse counseling to assist her in participating in the case, see BERGER ET 
AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 28; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 33, at 27, can affect 
the success of a case theory that relies on the client's testimony, these decisions do not in-
volve the client in decisions about case theory. 
103. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 18; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, supra note 
33, at 16-17. 
104. HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 42, at 70; VETIER, supra note 39, at 21, 27, 30-
33. Even objectives that appear to look beyond winning are framed in terms of their effect 
on the client's chances of winning, see CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 32 
(describing a warranty theory that casts the client in a more winning role than does a breach 
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ditionalists who recognize that an effective case theory should 
achieve the client's objectives give clients only a limited role in 
identifying objectives105 and assign them no role at all in selecting 
or shaping a theory to meet these objectives.106 
The defense lawyer's "lecture" to his client about the law in 
Anatomy of a Murder107 stands as the classic example admonishing 
lawyers not to discuss case theory with their clients. In that book -
and in the movie version as well - the lawyer raises a potential 
insanity theory with his client and, through thinly veiled suggestion, 
deliberately encourages the client to adopt the story. The message 
is that a lawyer should obtain all the "facts" from clients without 
revealing potential theories;108 otherwise, clients will shape their 
stories to fit the theory.109 Although in this example the attorney 
may have overstepped ethical boundaries by putting words in the 
client's mouth to fit the attorney's theory,uo the more unfortunate 
legacy of the story is that clients and case theory do not mix. 
of contract theory), or on obtaining the desired relief, see BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 
39, at 166 (noting that an alibi defense is preferable to an insanity defense if the client wants a 
chance of release); CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 31 (providing an example in 
which a contract theory is preferable to a tort theory if the client wants specific 
performance). 
105. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 18, 27; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL, 
supra note 33, at 16-17, 25; CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 31. 
106. Although a few of the standard trial advocacy texts include clients in the discussion 
of litigation strategy and tactics, see HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 52, at 25, none specifically 
include clients in the discussion of case theory. See supra note 102. Some simply fail to 
mention the client. See, e.g., HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 42, at 74-75 (listing eight 
considerations in selecting a case theory, none of which refer to the client). Others go so far 
as to advise against the client having a role in case theory development. See, e.g., 
Abramowitz, supra note 35, at 2 (warning against "adopt[ing] blindly the theories of cli-
ents"). Even those commentators who suggest that the case should be assessed from some 
perspective other than the lawyer's, such as the opposing counsel's or the judge's, ignore the 
perspective of the client. See, e.g., HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 52, at 14. In one 57-page 
article arguing for an expanded role for case theory in the law school curriculum, see 
Ohlbaum, supra note 14, the client is invisible. 
107. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 35-49 (1958). The book was made into 
a movie, starring Jimmy Stewart as defense lawyer "Polly" Beigler. ANATOMY OF A MUR-
DER (Columbia 1959). The story is widely cited in commentary on lawyering. See, e.g., Mc-
ELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 38, at 79; Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 
UCLA L. REv. 717, 757 n.111 (1987). 
108. For an analysis of whether it is desirable for lawyers to obtain all the facts, see 
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1472-73 (1966). 
109. See McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 38, at 79 (stating that it is imper-
missible to allow "legal theory [to] change any fact"). For a critique of this assumption, see 
infra Part III. For a wonderful account of how in scientific inquiry facts lack meaning in the 
absence of theory, see Lloyd Motz, Letter to the Editor, Kepler's Truth Is Beyond Calcula-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1990, at A24 {letter to the editor from professor emeritus of astron-
omy at Columbia University). 
110. For a general discussion of the ethical limits on constructing case theory, see Lubet, 
supra note 14. See also McELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK, supra note 38, at 79. 
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B. Client-Centered Theory: Who Decides? 
While the traditional model lays out the contours of case theory, 
the client-centered model calls attention to the issue that the iden-
tity of the person who makes the decision about case theory - the 
lawyer or the client - should be critical.111 In the context of a 
particular legal procedure - whether trial, negotiation, or settle-
ment - what role can clients play in conceiving the strategy to 
carry out the procedure? Or more broadly, even outside the con-
text of a particular decision, what role can clients play in simply 
conceiving of the case? What is the case and what does it mean to 
the client? 
1. Theory of Client-Centeredness 
In contrast to the traditional legal counseling model112 - which 
assigns a passive role to clients - client-centered counseling, or cli-
ent decisionmaking, holds that lawyers should interact with clients 
in a way that allows clients to make decisions themselves.113 To-
gether, the lawyer and her client consider the various alternatives 
available in the case and the likely consequences of these alterna-
tives and then weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the alter-
natives in reaching a decision.114 Although the lawyer is an active 
participant in the decisionmaking process, she should ensure that 
her preferences do not override client choices.115 
Client decisionmaking is supported by the principle of client au-
tonomy and by the idea that the client is in a better position than 
the lawyer to evaluate alternatives and consequences.116 Under this 
111. As one commentator aptly notes: "'[T]here are many stories in the naked city' .... 
We do have to make choices about stories and narratives." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The 
Power of Narrative in Empathetic Leaming: Post-Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 
UCLA WoMEN's LJ. '2£,7, 306 (1992) (book review). 
112. See Dinerstein, supra note 26, at 506 {describing the traditional model as lacking 
"meaningful interchange between lawyer and client"). I use the term traditional to provide 
an overview of the typical approaches reflected in case law, practice, and the professional 
codes. 
113. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 17; Dinerstein, supra note 26, at 507; Ellmann, 
supra note 107, at 720. Although this model has many variants, in this section I rely primarily 
on the model set out in Binder, Bergman, and Price's Lawyers as Counselors as the most 
typical model and the one most commonly used in legal education. See BINDER ET AL., supra 
note 27; see also Shalleck, supra note 10, at 1742 & n.22. Some of the sources that I cite refer 
to an earlier edition, DAVID A. BINDER & SusAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH {1977). 
114. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 290-308, 316-46. 
115. Id. at 19-22; Dinerstein, supra note 26, at 507. 
116. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 18; Dinerstein, supra note 26, at 512 (arguing 
that autonomy and socio-historical arguments provide the best support for client-centered-
ness). The "client knows best" argument differs from the autonomy argument, for which the 
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view, the client has the right to make his own choices because it is 
he who stands to gain or lose the most from decisions made in his 
case.117 The client is also more knowledgeable than his lawyer 
about his individual concerns and how they mesh with the available 
legal alternatives.118 Because these nonlegal consequences often 
play a more important role than legal consequences,119 the client is 
better equipped to make decisions than the lawyer. In contrast, the 
lawyer is knowledgeable about the legal consequences of a particu-
lar course of action and is expert in probing client concerns so that 
the client confronts the full range of alternatives.120 
For example, a criminal defense attorney might advise her client 
that if he goes to trial he will probably be found guilty and receive a 
sentence of incarceration, but if he pleads guilty he will be placed 
on probation. A trial, however, would give the client the opportu-
nity to vindicate himself, i:i consequence that he might potentially 
value more than the downside risk that he will be convicted and 
sentenced to prison. Or the client may want to make a political 
statement by challenging the criminal justice system, rather than to 
adopt the posture of a supplicant who simply pleads guilty. If he 
is innocent, he may find it immoral to plead guilty, even in return 
for a more lenient sentence. Only the client can measure the trade-
offs between the choices of plea or trial and their respective 
consequences.121 
Despite their focus on client decisionmaking, many client-cen-
tered advocates do riot discuss the different kinds of decisions that 
clients might make in their cases or how the context of the decision 
might affect how authority is allocated between lawyers and cli-
ents.122 Their inatt.ention to this issue stands in sharp contrast to 
question of who is the better decisionmaker is irrelevant. It is the right of the individual to 
make her own choices that matters, however bad those choices might be. See People v. 
Stansbury, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 183 (1993) (noting that the defendant asked whether his 
status as co-counsel with his lawyer would give him "the right to make any final decisions .•. 
regardless of how foolish they may be," and indicating that the defendant had such a right), 
revd. on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994). 
117. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the 
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41, 73-74 (1979); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised 
Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 
332 (1987). 
118. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 5-9 (giving as examples economic, social, psycho-
logical, moral, political, and religio.us consequences); id. at 17-18. 
119. Id. at 10. 
120. Id. at 13, 20-21. 
121. For a discussion of the trade-offs clients make in assessing legal alternatives and 
their consequences, see id. at 11-13. See also Spiegel, supra note 117, at 100-01. 
122. See John K. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Com-
ment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. RE.v. 781, 783-84, 795 (1987); Robert 
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the vast volume of scholarly work that looks at the process of client-
centered counseling. These works run the gamut from defining 
client-centered counseling and comparing it to other models of 
lawyering,123 to exploring how the process can be improved to en-
sure that decisions are truly those of the client and not of the 
lawyer.124 
Client-centered theory concedes that some decisions must be re-
served for attorneys or the practice of law would become unwork-
able. Because legal representation requires a large number of 
decisions, lawyers do not have the time to discuss every decision 
with a client.125 This approach not only would take too many hours 
but would prevent an attorney from implementing many decisions 
because the time frame for some decisions, especially those in liti-
gation, is too short to permit lawyer-client consultation. Thus, cli-
ents should concentrate their energy on the task of figuring out 
what they want to achieve through legal representation, and law-
yers should implement those objectives. 
With few exceptions,126 client-centered writers analyze the deci-
sions facing the client in generic terms, without distinguishing the 
type of decision at stake. When they discuss the context of a deci-
sion specifically, the most active arena of client decisionmaking ap-
pears to be in the area of legal process, either- in initiating legal 
procedures - by filing a lawsuit or an appeal or invoking an infor-
mal mechanism, for example - or in disposing of a case through 
D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REv. 697, 703 (1992) (book review) 
(criticizing the client-centered model's lack of context). For a notable exception, see Spiegel, 
supra note 117. · · 
123. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 122, at 809 (questioning whether the model reflects the 
actual practice of law); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. 
REv. 1083 (1988) (finding the model inconsistent with moral lawyering); Abbe Smith, Rosie 
O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public De-
fender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 27-37 (1993) (advocating a middle ground between a 
client-centered and a lawyer-centered approach); Dinerstein, supra note 26 (exploring the 
various arguments for and against client-centeredness). 
124. See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 26, at 556-70 (proposing that the model should per-
mit greater flexibility in lawyers giving advice to clients who have not requested it); Ellmann, 
supra note 107, at 744-45 (noting that the model is paternalistic in denying advice to clients 
who want it); Dinerstein, supra note 122, at 709-11 (arguing that the model should be more 
contextual in outlining the appropriateness of lawyers sharing their opinions and values with 
clients). 
125. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 266. 
126. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward 
Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation 
and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. RE.v. 819, 853-76 (1990) (arguing 
that clients should control important decisions about negotiation); see also infra notes 159, 
164 and accompanying text. 
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settlement or trial.127 This focus on process implies that other kinds 
of decisions are relegated to lawyers and thus are excluded from the 
lawyer-client dialogue.128 
2. Lessons for Case Theory 
Despite client-centered theorists' lack of attention to context, 
their critique of the traditional formulation of the allocation of deci-
sionmaking authority articulated in the professional codes, 129 and 
the client-centered response to this formulation, offers promise for 
involving clients in case theory discussions. Although the tradi-
tional standards do not speak directly to case theory, they do set 
out a framework for determining how decisionmaking is allocated 
between lawyers and clients. 
Client-centered advocates assert that traditional standards ar-
ticulated in the professional codes offer little guidance about which 
decisions clients should make130 and leave too many decisions in 
the hands of lawyers.131 One formulation of this traditional stan-
dard is set forth in the Model Rules: the client should make all 
decisions "concerning the objectives of representation," but need 
127. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 135, 147-48 (referring to a decision about whether 
to initiate or settle litigation as an "ultimate" or "basic" decision, not an "auxiliary" deci-
sion). While these choices may be "ultimate" to lawyers because they dictate the formal 
mechanisms lawyers pursue in their daily lives, they mean less to clients, who might frame 
these choices in different terms. 
128. Client-centered lawyers may share more in common with traditional lawyers on the 
question of who should decide than they do on the decisionmaking process, which is a pain-
fully laborious one that little resembles the traditional model. See Ellmann, supra note 107, 
at 720, 750-53 (discussing the Binder and Price model). 
129. The relevant codes are the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, and the state variations on these models. See Spiegel, supra note 
117, at 65-67; Strauss, supra note 117, at 318 nn.11, 13; Dinerstein, supra note 26, at 534-38. 
For the standards in criminal cases, see the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2 
(3d ed. 1993} ("The Defense Function"). In addition, the Constitution may impose duties in 
criminal cases that exceed those imposed by the ethical rules. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 
745, 751, 753 n.6 (1983} (constitutionalizing the right of the defendant to decide whether to 
plead guilty, waive a jury, testify, or appeal); Ogletree & Hertz, supra note 96, at 35-36 (not-
ing the heightened scrutiny of conflict rules under the Sixth Amendment's requirement of 
effective assistance of counsel). 
130. Although scholars disagree about whether the Model Rules or the Model Code pro-
vide a greater role for the client, compare Ellmann, supra note 107, at 717 & n.2 (asserting 
that the Model Code gives clients a greater role) with Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring 
the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1003, 1005-07, 1015 (claiming that 
the Model Rules provide for more client control}, they agree that neither offers much in the 
way of defining the parameters of required client participation, see Stephen Gillers, What We 
Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 Omo 
ST. LJ. 243, 253-54 (1985) (expressing the inadequacies of the Model Rules); Spiegel, supra 
note 117, at 65-67 (showing the ambiguities in the Model Code}; see also Spiegel, supra. 
131. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 271 (citing the ends-means standard as leaving too 
many decisions for the attorney); Strauss, supra note 117, at 317. 
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merely be "consult[ ed] ... as to the means by which they are to be 
pursued."132 Whether framed as a distinction between ends and 
means,133 substance and procedure,134 or merits and tactics,13s this 
standard creates a dichotomy between client goals and the attor-
ney's plan for achieving those goais.136 Clients determine goals, 
while the implementation of those goals is relegated to their 
lawyers. 
Proponents of client-centeredness identify several flaws in the 
ends-means dichotomy. The fluidity of the concept makes it nearly 
impossible to predict whether a client will view a particular decision 
as implicating means or ends.137 For example, if "winning" is the 
objective of most clients, then a decision not to win - to plead 
guilty - is an end and the decision belongs to. the client. But if the 
client also has the objective of receiving a light sentence, then 
pleading guilty is a means to this end.138 
Although this ambiguity could seemingly be resolved by the 
lawyer simply askillg the client whether the decision implicates ends 
or means,139 the reality is that virtually every decision in a case is a 
mixed question of ends and means. But rather than assigning all 
decisions to clients, this standard instead has been interpreted to 
leave most decisions in the hands of lawyers, relegating only deci-
sions such as settlement versus trial to clients.140 Attorneys often 
mistake ends for means because they can only conceive of a stock 
set of objectives, such as winning or escaping punishment.141 This 
132. MooEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.2(a) (1993) (providing in addi-
tion that "[i]n a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consulta-
tion with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the 
client will testify"). 
133. See Strauss, supra note 117, at 324. 
134. See Spiegel, supra note 130, at 1003-04 n.6. 
135. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 266 n.23 (interpreting Model Code EC-7-7 as 
incorporating a merits-tactics dichotomy). 
136. Strauss, supra note 117, at 324 (calling the division a "false" dichotomy). 
137. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 267; Strauss, supra note 117, at 325. 
138. Strauss, supra note 117, at 325. As a matter of constitutional law, the decision about 
whether to plead guilty is reserved for the client. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). 
139. For a discussion of the problems of consultation and waiver, see infra text accompa-
nying note 154. Although these commentators make much of the difficulty of distinguishing 
objectives from means, see supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text, simply asking the cli-
ent, "Is x an objective?" would seem to answer this question. The problem actually lies in 
devising a definition that will allow the attorney to decide in the abstract on which side of the 
line a particular decision falls so as to avoid the need to consult with the client about each 
and every decision that must be made in a case. 
140. Strauss, supra note 117, at 318. 
141. David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 459 n.9 
(arguing that lawyers fail to recognize that ends often implicate questions of strategy and 
tactics); Wiiiiam H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
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limited view ignores what matters to some clients, who may care as 
much about the fairness of procedures as they do about the results 
obtained by their lawyers,142 or who may wish to be involved in 
strategy decisions.143 
Indeed, the ends-means distinction is especially pernicious in 
the area of skills and strategy.144 On the one hand, the decision 
about whether to call a witness who is a close friend or family mem-
ber may appear to be a tactical decision geared toward the client's 
ultimate objective of acquittal. On the other hand, the decision 
may also implicate the independent objective of saving the witness 
from the stress of testifying,145 especially about matters that might 
be devastating to his personal life.146 The client might prefer these 
objectives even if it means that he might lose. 
The result, as client-centered theorists recognize, is that tradi-
tional standards leave clients out of discussions of strategy and 
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. ;REv. 29, 57 n.65, 58 (portraying the lawyer as an advocate with a set of 
ends distinct from her client's). 
142. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 267 (providing an example in which a client has 
twin objectives of protecting her sister from testifying as a witness and avoiding conviction); 
JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE! A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(1975); Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & Socv. REV, 
483 (1988) (analyzing how procedural fairness, as well as case outcome and distributive jus-
tice concerns, contribute to litigant satisfaction). 
143. See Strauss, supra note 117, at 340 (arguing that an autonomy-based theory of client 
decisionmaking favors providing the client the opportunity to consent to strategic decisions). 
144. I use the term strategy to mean the sum of tactics reflecting some overall plan to 
achieve a set of objectives. See CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 35, at 35-37; Richard 
K. Neumann, Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 299, 300 (1990). The term lawyer skills 
means those activities that lawyers undertake on behalf of clients - such as witness examina-
tions - rather than legal process decisions - such as whether to settle or go to trial. 
Although case theory touches on both strategy and skills, it is better understood as a mix of 
client goals and a concrete statement of what happened. See infra Part III. 
145. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 267. 
146. The classic ex~mple is provided by the hypothetical "Long Black Veil" case, based 
on the song written by MJ. Wilkin & D. Dill. Strauss, supra note 117, at 325 n.50. In that 
case, the client chooses not to assert an alibi defense because the alibi witness is his secret 
lover and married to his closest friend. Luban, supra note 141, at 456. 
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skills147 - and, by analogy, case theory.148 Under one formulation 
of the traditional allocation of decisionmaking authority, "means 
are merely strategic decisions"149 reserved for lawyers. Traditional-
ists justify this allocation of authority with reasons similar to those 
established for decisionmaking authority generally, but they also 
cite the greater need for technical legal expertise in strategy deci-
sions and the foreshortened time for making these decisions in trial 
settings. 
Although little is known about the kinds of decisions lawyers 
typically examine with their clients,150 the actual practice of law ap-
147. Ellmann, supra note 107, at 765 (stating that lawyers are granted "startling amounts 
of authority not only to advise but to decide on crucial questions of litigation strategy"). 
Numerous courts have held that the power to control strategy decisions rests with the attor-
ney. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 
1068, 1087-88 (N.D. Cal. 1978); State v. Rodriguez, 612 P..2d 484, 489-90 (Ariz. 1980). But see 
Jones, 463 U.S. at 758-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing this result). As a constitutional 
matter, criminal defendants do not have the right to control the strategy and tactics in their 
cases, with the exception of the decision about whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, or 
testify. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751. Moreover, the ABA Standards provide that defense coun-
sel should make strategic and tactical decisions "after consultation with the client where fea-
sible and appropriate." ABA STANDARDS FOR CruMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 129, at 
4-5.2(b). 
148. Because the Supreme Court has held that defendants do not have the right to dictate 
issues for their lawyers to present on appeal, Jones, 463 U.S. at 751, it would appear that 
there is no constitutional right to control case theory at the trial level. Although one could 
argue that issues are less "legal" at the trial level and thus more appropriate for client in-
volvement, see Lloyd Epstein, Informal Opinion, CHAMPION, Nov. 1994, at 30 (arguing that 
ethical rules and the requirement of effective assistance of counsel mandate that criminal 
defendants have the right to select a case theory), the Court has not adopted this viewpoint. 
Even Justice Brennan, dissenting from the holding in Jones, would allow clients a lesser role 
in trial decisions than in appellate decisions. See 463 U.S. at 760. For a thoughtful critique of 
the Jones decision, see Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old 
Roads, New Paths - A Dead End?, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 9, 28-49 (1986). See also infra note 
164 and accompanying text (critiquing distinctions between decisionmaking in trial and ap-
pellate contexts). Some state courts, following Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), 
have held that a defendant can veto his lawyer's choice of the insanity defense. See, e.g., 
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1994); 'Ii'eece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054 (Md. 
1988); State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216 (Wash. 1983). 
149. See Strauss, supra note 117, at 324 (criticizing this formulation). 
150. See supra note 27 (discussing the lack of empirical evidence about lawyer-client rela-
tions). The bulk of the empirical studies focus on unrepresented clients, see, e.g., William M. 
O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay Expectations of the Civil Justice System, 22 LAW & SoCY. 
REv. 137 (1988) (discussing a study of small-claims plaintiffs), or look at the relationship of 
represented clients to the court system, see, e.g., Tom R. 'fyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice 
in Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SoCY. REv. 51 (1984) 
(discussing a study of traffic and misdemeanor defendants). The latter studies miss important 
opportunities to address issues of the allocation of control between lawyers and clients. They 
ask questions such as "How much control did you have over the way in which the evidence in 
your case was presented?," but they analyze the answers as data about relative allocation of 
control between the client and the judge. Id. at 62, 68; see also Jonathan D. Casper, Having 
Their Day in Court· Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAW & 
SoCY. REv. 237, 248 (1978) (failing to distinguish whether criminal defendants' opportunities 
to tell their stories are restricted by their lawyers or by the court). Those studies that look at 
the question of client control often reflect little sophistication about decisionmaking issues, 
reducing a complex inquiry to questions such as "Did your lawyer listen to what you wanted 
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pears to reflect the lawyer-dominated approach to strategy and 
skills as articulated in the professional codes. Several studies sug-
gest that few lawyers explain strategic alternatives to their clients, 
let alone seek their consent before making decisions.151 Anecdotal 
evidence supports these observations.152 Still less is known about 
the quality of these discussions, although there is some evidence 
that lawyers who engage in strategy discussions with their clients 
dominate those discussions to the exclusion of their clients.153 
Client-centered commentators have proposed several alterna-
tives to the traditional formulation - alternatives that address the 
issue of what role clients might play in strategy and skills decisions 
generally and that raise the question of what role clients can play in 
case theory specifically. The first is the "waiver" approach, which 
allows each client to decide, after consultation with his lawyer, 
which choices require mutually participatory decisionmaking. Cli-
ent-centered theorists view this solution as unsatisfactory because it 
is meaningful only to clients with enough information about the sys-
tem to understand the array of availa,ble choices, and because the 
issue must be revisited often so that clients can revise their deci-
sionmaking guidelines.154 A second approach that presumptively 
assigns all decisions to the client155 has the disadvantage of failing 
to do?," see, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & 
SoCY. REv. 483, 492, 505 (1988), and revealing little about the answers to such questions. 
151. See, e.g., John P. Reed, The Lawyer-Client: A Managed Relationship?, ACAD. 
MGMT. J., Mar. 1969, at 67, 76-77 (discussing a survey of Florida Bar members); Jerome H. 
Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CoNFLicr REsoL. 52, 65 (1967) 
(describing criminal defense attorneys as "players" on questions of strategy and tactics). But 
see BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 269 n.30 {discussing surveys of corporate lawyers, who 
report consulting with their large, corporate clients on a wide variety of matters). 
152. See, e.g., Eleanor Randolph, 4 Guilty in Bombing of World Trade Center, WASH, 
PoST, Mar. 5, 1994, at Al, AS (reporting that the defense lawyer's case theory "triggered a 
strong negative reaction" from his client); Strauss, supra note 117, at 317, 320; see also 
Epstein, supra note 148, at 30 (stating that "[m]ost criminal defense attorneys seem to believe 
that the choice of a theory of defense is theirs"). F. Lee Bailey advises criminal defense 
attorneys to tell their clients that the attorney "alone will control the strategy of the defense, 
decide what legal points are to be raised, determine what witnesses to call, engage in 
whatever discussions [he] deem[s] necessary with the prosecutor." F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY 
B. RonmLATr, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL AovoCACY § 58 {1974). Apparently, Bailey 
practices what he preaches: with respect to one Mafia client who wanted to control his own 
defense, Bailey reports, "I told him that I'm an ex-Marine and that it wouldn't bother me to 
put a bullet between his eyes and eat spaghetti off his face." Stephanie Benson Goldberg, On 
Trial in Foley Square, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1988, at 42, 45. For a more general discussion of the 
problems facing criminal clients in sharing decisionmaking power on questions of strategy 
with their lawyers, see Berger, supra note 148, at 49-50. 
153. Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of 
Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAw & SoCY. REv. 737, 755-63 (1988). 
154. See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 267; Spiegel, supra note 117, at 82-83 
n.160, 84-85. 
155. See Strauss, supra note 117, at 340. 
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to distinguish between those decisions that seem to require greater 
lawyer expertise and intervention and those that do not. 
In a third approach, client-centered advocates have proposed 
standards for determining which decisions belong to lawyers and 
which belong to clients. The best-known of these is the standard 
reserving decisions for clients whenever a lawyer "would or should 
know that a pending decision is likely to have a substantial legal or 
nonlegal impact on a client. "156 The commentators, in applying this 
standard to litigation strategy decisions, also require that the impact 
be "beyond [that] normally associated with the use of professional 
skills and crafts."157 While this standard is preferable to the tradi-
tional formulation because it recognizes that clients can have im-
portant interests in matters that fall into the category of lawyer 
skills, such as whether to call a particular witness or how vigorously 
to defend a lawsuit, it offers surprisingly little guidance about cli-
ents and case theory. 
3. Critique - The Foray into Skills and ~trategy 
Despite their insights into the flaws of the traditional model, 
client-centered theorists do not take case theory seriously. Even 
the "substantial impact" standard, which suggests fairly broad client 
decisionmaking in the context of litigation strategy and skills, leaves 
the question of client involvement in case theory virtually unex-
plored. The proponents of this standard inherit an abstract and mo-
nochromatic terrain where references to case theory are few.15s 
The commentator who argues that clients should control how their 
stories are presented, including whether to waive an affirmative de-
fense and which claims to argue to the trier of fact, stands alone in 
this bleak landscape.159 The client-centered literature fails to pres-
ent even a single example in which a lawyer sits down with a client 
and walks through alternative case theories and their implications 
for the case and the client. In this respect, the client-centered ap-
156. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 268. The lawyer should make this determination by 
using " 'such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly 
possess and exercise.'" Id. at 268 (quoting Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1971)). 
157. Id. at 271. 
158. For example, Haydock and Sonsteng adopt the "substantial impact" standard, see 
HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 42, at 41, but they make no mention of client involve-
ment in selecting a case theory. While other examples, such as choices concerning aggressive 
litigation strategies, see BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 270-71, might on their face seem to 
refer to case theory, this is not what I mean by case theory. See infra Part III. 
159. See Spiegel, supra note 117, at 57-58, 66, 123-26. 
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proach differs little from the traditional approach, which relegates 
virtually every decision about case theory to lawyers.160 
Following in these footsteps, the proponents of the "substantial 
impact" standard discuss case theory in a single sentence and con-
clude that clients should have less control over this decision than, 
for example, over the decision about calling a witness.161 Although 
there may be differences in the perceived immediate impact on the 
client, it is not apparent why case theory development should rest in 
the hands of lawyers, while the decision to call a client's boss as a 
witness requires consultation.162 
It may be that these commentators, like other client-centered 
theorists, recognize that clients should make important decisions, 
but misperceive the nature of decisions that go to the heart of a 
case. All strategy and tactics are not created equal. In the hierar-
chy of strategy decisions, case theory is the decision that drives vir-
tually every other decision in a case. 
In a very real sense, then, giving clients control over which wit-
nesses to call gives them very little unless they are also delegated 
the decision about case theory. While a client might very well have 
reasons unrelated to case theory for calling or not calling a particu-
lar witness,163 this decision is also a strategic and tactical choice 
driven largely by case theory. To give clients input into only a part 
of this equation is to limit the real possibility of client involvement 
in their own cases. 
Perhaps the reluctance to embrace client decisionmaking about 
case theory stems from a failure to understand the real differences 
in the degree to which strategy decisions can be the subject of col-
laboration between lawyers and clients. Indeed, many trial deci-
sions must be made quickly and on the spot. But an understanding 
of the process of case theory development debunks the notion that 
all trial strategy must be left to lawyers because decisions must be 
made quickly without time for consultation. It is the nature of the 
decision, rather than the legal forum, that should determine the ap-
160. Compare Shalleck, supra note 10, at 1745-46 (arguing that in client-centered theory 
the lawyer "conceives and develops alternative case theories" and continues to "confine the 
client to the nonlegal world") with supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (arguing that 
the traditional approach rejects client participation in developing case theory). 
161. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 271. Although the authors use the term case-
in-chief, they seem to mean something similar to the concept of case theory, at least as it is 
framed in standard lawyering texts. See supra section I.A. 
162. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 271. 
163. See id. at 267. 
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propriateness of shared decisionmaking.164 Case theory is the quin-
tessential question that can, and indeed should, be decided in 
advance of trial. It is precisely the kind of decision suited to brain-
storming and collaboration with clients. 
Client-centered theorists need to take the insight that the 
choices lawyers make create the official conception of what the case 
is about in the legal system165 one step further by truly integrating 
the client's perspective. Rather than seeing each case as a series of 
discrete choices, each segregable from the other - should I settle, 
go to trial, make this objection, or call this witness? - lawyers and 
theorists should instead view a case as a unified whole, bound to-
gether. This is the mistake that the traditionalists make in creating 
the ends-means dichotomy, a mistake that client-centered theorists 
quickly call them on. Ironically, client-centered theorists miss the 
opportunity that case theory offers - the opportunity to play out 
the futility of the distinction between ends and means. For some 
clients, case theory is a means to an end; for others, it may be an 
end in itself. 
Moreover, even if the "substantial impact" standard is inter-
preted to comprehend decisionmaking about case theory, by impos-
. ing significant hurdles to client involvement it demonstrates some 
underlying discomfort with clients making these kinds of decisions. 
First, a different standard is imposed for decisionmaking about 
strategy and skills than for other kinds of decisionmaking. For the 
client to make decisions ·about strategy and skills, the impact must 
be not merely "substantial" but "beyond th[ at] normally associated 
with the use of professional skills and crafts. "166 If the impact does 
not reach this level, the client is excluded from the decisionmaking 
picture. 
This approach offers little guidance on how to distinguish the 
typical lawyering skill that calls for lawyer-dominated choices from 
the kind of skill that requires participatory decisionmaking. It 
either provides a laundry list of those skill decisions that seem to 
164. Karen A. Krisher, Jones v. Barnes, the Sixth, and the Fourteenth Amendments: 
Whose Appeal ls It Anyway?, 47 OHIO ST. LJ. 179, 190-91 (1986) (distinguishing decisions in 
the appellate setting that can be made in advance from those that cannot). While a trial 
practice in general requires more spontaneity than an appell~te practice, some trial choices 
can be made in advance. Epstein, supra note 148, at 31. By the same token, some appellate 
decisions must be made on the spot, such as responding to questions at oral argument. For a 
discussion of the constitutional dimensions of client decisionmaking in the context of criminal 
cases, see supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
165. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 762 n.6 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
166. BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 271. 
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require client consultation,167 some of which seem virtually indistin-
guishable from those that do not,168 or leaves lawyers to guess on a 
case-by-case basis the impact of the exercise of their skills on partic-
ular clients. Although the standard on its face seems to create more 
room for client decisionmaking, client decisionmaking in this area is 
still the exception, rather than the rule. 
Second, the decisionmaking process set out for deciding ques-
tions of lawyer skills is not very elaborate or demanding169 and ap-
pears to leave ultimate authority in the hands of lawyers.170 In 
contrast to legal process decisions, in which clients are the deci-
sionmakers, here it seems lawyers need only consult with their cli-
ents when it comes to strategy questions. Because consultation and 
decisionmaking are two different concepts,171 the process is a far 
cry from the lawyer-client partnership envisioned by the theory. 
Given that the context of the choice is critical, no standard could 
obviate the need for the lawyer to make discretionary decisions in 
particular cases about the scope of client decisionmaking in the 
murky arena of lawyering skills. Yet even the standard that seems 
to afford the broadest client involvement is so replete with caveats 
and qualifications that client participation is stifled. By assigning 
clients a role limited to regurgitating the facts and choosing be-
tween procedural modes, client-centered theory has not been car-
ried to its full extent with respect to case theory, and even the most 
client-centered theorists do not include the client in a meaningful 
way. 
C. Critical Lawyering Theory: Whose Story Is It? 
The critical lawyers make a major contribution to the traditional 
understanding of case theory by involving clients in the choice of 
which story to tell and thus recognizing the importance of client life 
experience and strategic skills in this endeavor.172 Because many of 
167. See, e.g., id. at 270-71 (listing calling the client's boss as a witness, phrasing a contin-
gency clause in a purposely vague manner, removing an action from state to federal court, 
and pursuing an aggressive litigation strategy as decisions requiring client input). 
168. Id. at 271 (noting that the development of a case-in-chief should be within the law-
yer's sole discretion). 
169. See id. at 271 n.33. 
170. See id. at 266-71. 
171. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.2(a) {1993) {distinguishing be-
tween the client's right to decide the objectives of representation and the fact that the lawyer 
need only consult with the client regarding the means by which those objectives are to be 
achieved); Spiegel, supra note 117, at 49 n.30. 
172. In offering an overview of an approach whose boundaries are far from clear, see 
supra note 11, I do not discuss every scholar who is associated with the movement or all of 
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these theorists do not talk in terms of case theory,173 I consider how 
their insights about the related concept of storytelling can be trans-
lated to case theory development. 
1. Theory of Critical Lawyering 
Critical theorists view lawyers as tellers of stories or narra-
tives.174 In considering narrative, critical theorists differentiate be-
tween the stories that clients tell about their lives and those that 
lawyers tell about clients' lives in the courtroom. The content of 
client narratives is the fabric of the client's life, not just the client's 
version of "what happened."175 The traditionalists also see story-
telling possibilities in different versions of "what happened," but in 
the eyes of critical theorists, the gap between legal narratives and 
client narratives in traditional lawyering practices is too wide.176 
Critical theorists see legal narrative through the lens of 
power.177 In this picture of power, legal narrative is a battleground 
of competing lawyer and client narratives in which lawyer narra-
the contradictions within the movement. For excellent examples of such analyses in different 
contexts, see Dinerstein, supra note 26 (comparing different arguments advanced by advo-
cates for the client-centered model), and Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 
STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984) (comparing different schools of the critical legal studies movement). 
173. For examples of theorists who stress the importance of client narrative but do not 
discuss case theory in a meaningful way, see Alfieri, supra note 23; Alfieri, Dialogic, supra 
note 12; Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 12; and Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons 
from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wrs. L. REv. 699 [hereinafter White, Drie-
fontein]. For important exceptions, see L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 60 (urging lawyers to work 
with clients to "formulate strategies and remedies in [their] categories and characteriza-
tions"); Cunningham, supra note 2, at 2467 (contrasting the client's theory of the case with 
the lawyer's theory); Cunningham, supra note 8, at 1362 (describing the use of a police report 
as the basis for developing a case theory); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and 
Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 369, 392 n.37 (1982-83) (explaining that in the defense of a Latino political group on 
charges of trespass, obstructing the sidewalk, and resisting arrest, "specific facts must be care-
fully woven into the radical lawyer's overall theory of the case"); and Lucie E. White, Subor-
dination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 
BuFF. L. REv. 1, 29 n.94 (1990) (using the term legal theories) [hereinafter White, Mrs. G.]. 
174. See, e.g., L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 39-44; Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2110, 2119, 2121. 
Critical theorists alternately use the term narrative to mean literally what was said, see White, 
Mrs. G., supra note 173, at 17 n.65, and to describe themes that can be used as building 
blocks for cases, see Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2111, 2130. 
175. L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 65 (describing client narratives as "giving an account of 
themselves and the lives they would lead"); Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2132 (explaining that 
narratives "contain the power to illuminate the client's world"). 
176. See L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 43-44 (explaining that it is a common mistake to value 
"professional lawyering" above "the practice of lay lawyering that constitutes so much of 
everyday life"); Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2139 (arguing for a "more collaborative advocacy 
strategy in which [the lawyer and the client] decide[] together what narratives to present"). 
177. See Shalleck, supra note 10, at 1750 (recognizing the importance of power dynamics 
in theoretics literature); White, supra note 10, at 1501-03 (applying a new "meta-theory of 
power" to the theoretics of practice movement). 
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tives always emerge victorious.178 Lawyers reject client stories as 
implausible unless they fit into lawyer-endorsed strategies in which 
legal doctrine predominates.179 They construct fixed, predictable, 
and unimaginative stories that exclude client experience.180 Lawyer 
narratives drown out the voices of client narratives, marginalizing 
and subordinating them.181 
In seeking to bridge the gap between lawyer and client stories, 
critical theorists offer two competing visions of lawyering. In one 
vision, client stories should be victorious in the narrative contest.182 
In these contests, critical lawyers see the client's story as the only 
story worth telling - as they worship pure, unadulterated client 
narratives over any form of lawyer narrative. Only by "speaking 
out" can clients reclaim their narratives, deviating from prepared 
testimony in depositions and hearings.183 
In the other vision, client narratives inform, but do not over-
throw, legal narrative.184 The lawyer translates the client's story so 
178. See Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2119, 2121, 2123-24, 2128 (explaining how poverty law-
yers' usurpation of their clients' narratives entrenches the clients' subordination and inferi-
ority both in the lawyer-client relationship and in society as a whole); Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra 
note 12, at 629-33 (describing the subordination of clients' voices in poverty lawyers' narra-
tives and client resistance to this process). • 
179. L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 109-10 (describing a particular poverty lawyer's refusal to 
acknowledge the validity of a client's self-help efforts); Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2127-30 
(describing the common practice of poverty lawyers of restricting client speech in legal aid 
offices, administrative hearings, and courthouses); see WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 6 (asserting 
that "legal language flattens and confines in absolutes the complexity of meaning inherent in 
any given problem"); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 
YALE L.J. 997 (1985). 
180. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2123-24 (explaining that narratives are disassoci-
ated from client context); Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 12, at 625 (stating that narratives "re-
strict(], rather than open[], access to the world of the impoverished client"). 
181. Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2127-30 (criticizing strategies that present images of client 
dependence); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 419-20 (1987) (pointing out that law school 
teaches students "to clothe the victims of excessive power in utter, bereft naivete; to cast 
them as defenseless supplicants raising - pleading - defenses of duress, undue influence 
and fraud"). 
182. See Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2134-45 (providing specific examples of client contribu· 
tions to legal narrative, while failing to provide examples of lawyer contributions). 
183. Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2109-10, 2114-18 (recounting specific first-person client 
narrative that constituted self-empowerment in the telling); Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 12, at 
642-43 (describing a client's indignant outburst at a welfare hearing); White, Mrs. G., supra 
note 173, at 29-31, 46-48 (recounting the story of a client who departed from the script envi-
sioned by her lawyer). Examples of "speaking out" can also be found in trial records. See, 
e.g., Robinson v. United States, 897 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing a criminal de-
fendant who was allowed to make part of his own closing argument because, in the defend-
ant's words, "sometime[s] a person has to stand up for himself ... [and] speak out for 
himself"). 
184. L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 49-53 (emphasizing that both the client and the lawyer are 
crucial to developing legal narratives and strategies); White, Driefontein, supra note 173, at 
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it can be heard and understood in the legal system.185 In both vi-
sions, the legal stories ultimately told present vivid images of clients 
and are enriched by client life experience. 
Yet even when lawyers incorporate client stories in their story-
telling, critical theorists see legal forums as ultimately inadequate to 
capture the full range of client stories.186 Thus, client stories must 
also be related both in lawyer-client interactions - when clients 
can be seen as teachers, not as students187 - and in interactions 
between clients.188 The informality of these settings makes it possi-
ble to tell the whole range of client stories, unhampered by the con-
straints legal rules and procedures impose on conveying the life 
experiences of clients in legal forums. 
2. Lessons for Case Theory 
At first glance, the critical theorists' exhortations about clients 
reclaiming their narratives and reworking them into legal stories 
are not easily translated into the concept of case theory.189 The 
term case theory is noticeably absent from critical writing;190 indeed, 
763 (describing third-dimension lawyering modeled after Paulo Freire and consciousness 
raising). 
185. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 2465, 2468, 2482 (recounting instances of and describ-
ing the role of the lawyer as an interpreter intermediary in the dialogue between clients and 
the court system); Cunningham, supra note 8, at 1300, 1331 (describing "the practice of Jaw as 
a kind of translation" in which the lawyer helps the client to be understood by adding her 
own voice to that of the client); see also L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 43-44; Lucie E. White, 
Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 861, 862 
(1990). 
186. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space 
for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 545-46 (1987); White, supra 
note 185, at 861 (explaining that the process of advocacy inherently subordinates the client). 
187. L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 37; Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2132; Cunningham, supra note 
8, at 1382. 
188. Alfieri, Dialogic, supra note 12, at 692-95 (arguing that client empowerment requires 
not only lawyer-client dialogue but also dialogue between clients and community groups). 
189. Although I include the work of Gerald L6pez to inform the discussion of lawyer and 
client narratives in section I.C.1, I do not include him in my critique of the critical theorists. 
Much of L6pez's work concerns lawyer-client collaboration around storytelling. See, e.g., 
L6PEZ, supra note 3; Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984) 
(discussing the importance of stock stories in legal argument); Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving 
Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. LJ. 
1603 (1989); Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1, 10 
(1989) (noting the gap between lawyer understanding of the meaning of client stories and the 
client's actual meaning). Although L6pez's work in this area has greatly influenced the criti-
cal writers, their vision of practice differs from his. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 3, at 1750 
(responding to L6pez's "aspirational vision" wit4 the comment, "I harbor little faith in the 
ability of progressive lawyers to redeem community in their individual and collective meet-
ings with subordinated clients."). It is far from clear that L6pez would locate himself within 
the theoretics movement. 
190. See supra note 173. 
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critical theorists would seem to see case theory as "law-talk" and 
thus to reject it as disempowering for clients. Although critical the-
orists do not make explicit the link between legal narrative and case 
theory, their idea of legal narrative provides several openings to see 
case theory as something more than legal doctrine. 
In composing legal narratives, critical theorists distinguish what 
happened from the meaning of what happened and believe that by 
opening up the client's world, the meaning of what happened can 
be better understood. These narratives not only are stories about 
what happened but also are composed of themes about client 
lives.191 Client life experiences inform "what happened" and 
change the nature of the legal stories lawyers tell. 
The stories of Mrs. G.192 and the villagers of Driefontein, South 
Africa,193 provide positive examples of the critical theorists' impor-
tant insights about how case theory can reflect images of clients and 
the role that clients can play in decisionmaking about case theory. 
Mrs. G. is a thirty-five year old black mother of five daughters in a 
rural North Carolina town. She receives Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) benefits to support her family. After 
her AFDC worker assured her that the $592 she received as dam-
ages from an accident would not count against her benefits, she 
made several purchases, including shoes for her children.194 1\vo 
months later, she received an overpayment notice ordering her to 
repay AFDC benefits in an amount equal to the damage award.195 
Mrs. G. asked Lucie White, a legal services lawyer, to represent her 
at the upcoming hearing.196 
In a separate story, the black villagers of Driefo~tein faced the 
loss of their small farming community when the government an-
nounced its plan to relocate the villagers to remote resettlement 
camps.197 Because the apartheid statutes authorizing the practice 
- a central feature of the subordination of South African blacks -
191. Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2111, 2130 (contrasting client themes of dignity, caring, 
community, and rights with lawyer narratives of client dependence). 
192. See White, Mrs. G., supra note 173. 
193. See White, Driefontein, supra note 173. 
194. White, Mrs. G., supra note 173, at 24 (noting purchases of sanitary napkins, frozen 
food, and dresses and shoes for her children, as well as payments on a furniture bill). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 23-24. 
197. White, Driefontein, supra note 173, at 712-15, 720-23. For a current account of the 
problems faced by Driefontein villagers after their successful fight against relocation, see 
Lynne Duke, S. Africa's Next Battleground: Land, WASH. Posr, Apr. 23, 1994, at Al (noting 
that white landowners stepped up evictions of black labor tenants in the months preceding 
black majority rule}. 
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were legal, the villagers turned to strategies outside the legal system 
to fight the resettlement.19s 
a. Choosing Which Story to Tell. In the first place, Mrs. G.'s 
story illustrates that the choice of which story to tell can belong to 
the client. In preparing for the AFDC hearing, White met with 
Mrs. G. to discuss the pros and cons of two possible case theories. 
The first was an estoppel story about the AFDC worker's errone-
ous advice concerning the cash payment. The second was a waiver 
story categorizing Mrs. G.'s purchases as "life necessities" that were 
necessary to avert a crisis.199 
In the meeting, White framed the choice of theory as one for the 
client to make200 and explained that the two stories posed opposite 
risks.201 Strategically, the waiver story was more likely a winner, 
but Mrs. G. might find the estoppel story more satisfying to tell. 
The estoppel story created a better role for Mrs. G. on her terms, by 
placing her in the affirming role of a finger-pointer, but it also 
presented a risk of alienating the hearing officer. On the other 
hand, the waiver theory, by creating a more passive role for Mrs. 
G., met the hearing officer's terms but forced Mrs. G. to invite the 
hearing officer into the intimate details of her life and to seek ap-
proval for her lifestyle. White does not tell us which role Mrs. G. 
preferred - indeed, White may not have asked this question - or 
how Mrs. G. weighed the strategic value of the two theories against 
the roles they created for her. All we know is that in the meeting 
Mrs. G. chose to tell both stories, although at the hearing she told a 
story that deviated from both theories.202 
b. Valuing Client Life Experienct:. The stories of Mrs. G. and 
Driefontein also demonstrate how client life experience can enrich 
case theory. The Driefontein villagers organized a committee to 
develop a plan for fighting their relocation.203 The committee real-
198. White, Driefontein, supra note 173, at 712-13, 727-29. 
199. White, Mrs. G., supra note 173, at 27. 
200. White recognizes that she had deviated from conventional practice, questioning: 
"Why had I even raised the question of which story to tell? It was a tactical decision - not 
the kind of issue that clients were supposed to decide. Why hadn't I just told her to answer 
the questions that I chose to ask?" Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). 
201. Id. at 28-29. 
202. See infra text accompanying notes 214-15. 
203. White, Driefontein, supra note 173, at 730-32. The villagers recruited a lawyer and 
an organizer to assist them. Id. at 723-24. Although they met with the lawyer every few 
weeks, the villagers were the architects of the negotiation strategy. See infra notes 244-45 
and accompanying text. The organizer assisted on a number of fronts, including helping the 
women of the village establish a support group of residents from other threatened communi-
ties. Id. at 725, 727. 
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ized that its only option - short of violent resistance - was to 
negotiate with the government outside formal litigation, and they 
designed a negotiation strategy that ultimately defeated the 
government.204 
Although no formal law governed these negotiations, both sides 
used a kind of case theory as the central organizing concept for 
their strategies. The government's theory was that resettlement 
was required because a dam being constructed would flood the area 
occupied by the village.2°5 This theory matched the government's 
newly announced public position, in response to public pressure, 
that removals would no longer be based on racial or ideological 
considerations.206 In relying on this theory, the government had es-
sentially locked itself into one version of events. If other alterna-
tives to removal would not interfere with the dam's construction, 
the government's theory would crumble. 
The villagers chose not to challenge the dam story but instead 
countered by devising alternatives built around the underlying 
story. They knew the dam story was a pretext for an ideological 
removal and used this knowledge, coupled with their knowledge of 
their government and the growing outrage over the homelands pol-
icy, to their advantage. The villagers were not trained in the law, 
but they nonetheless understood the government's dilemma. They 
knew that the government would pay a high political price for the 
forced removal if the government changed its story.207 · 
The villagers conceived of their case as a story about how the 
dam and the village could coexist and then investigated other alter-
natives to removal. When they learned that the dam would flood 
only a small portion of their land, they asked the _government to 
give them an equivalent amount of government-owned land located 
nearby as compensation for the submerged land.208 Rather than 
providing an alternative case theory, the government stuck with the 
204. Id. at 732, 737. 
205. Id. at 721-22. 
206. Id. at 734. 
207. The antiapartheid movement, which had targeted removals as an especially offensive 
piece of apartheid policy, id. at 733, was growing in political strength inside the country, 
paralleled by an upsurge in opposition outside of the country. After the removal was an-
nounced, the international pressure against the government intensified through the efforts of 
foreign journalists and human rights advocates who visited the village and harshly criticized 
the government in their writings. Moreover, the government was embarrassed about the 
recent murder of a village activist who fought the removal, and it feared additional adverse 
publicity. Id. at 722. 
208. They also persuaded the chief minister of the homeland designated as their new 
home to oppose removal. Id. at 734-35. 
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dam story but rejected the proposed land transfer because it was 
smaller than the land taken by the dam.209 
At this point, the villagers had the government where they 
wanted it. They discovered a larger tract located near the village 
and acquired the land as a donation from the owner, a large corpo-
ration.210 At this juncture, the government abandoned its removal 
plan.211 The villagers' case theory had been successful. 
Moreover, in a different context, the story of Driefontein also 
reveals the power of facts as understood by the party closest to 
them. In a memorable passage, White describes how the villagers 
started a collection of media accounts critical of the government's 
removal efforts.212 They kept the clippings at the home of the 
widow of a murdered village activist who had opposed the removal. 
All the villagers touched the clippings and talked about how read-
ers in other countries were connected to the village through these 
accounts.213 This heartbreaking story of community transcends any 
effort to give it meaning; in a sense, these "facts" are the theory. 
In the story of Mrs. G., the client's understanding of her envi-
ronment may have helped her construct case theory by revealing 
new dimensions of the "life necessities" theory. At the hearing, 
Mrs. G. testified that the shoes she bought for her daughters were 
Sunday shoes. She said that her daughters already owned shqes for 
school and needed nice shoes for church.214 
Lucie White, Mrs. G.'s lawyer, was taken by surprise by this tum 
of events, because in preparing for the hearing, Mrs. G. told White 
that she had purchased school shoes for her daughters. Putting 
aside the unanswerable question of which kind of shoes Mrs. G. 
actually purchased with the overpayment,21s Mrs. G.'s actions sug-
gest several important insights about case theory. At a purely doc-
trinal level, Mrs. G. may have understood that Sunday shoes fit the 
209. Id. at 735. 
210. Id. at 735-36. 
211. Id. at 736. 
212. Id. at 727. 
213. Id.; see supra note 207 (describing a recent murder). 
214. White, Mrs. G., supra note 173, at 31. 
215. In telling the story, White seems to assume that Mrs. G. had in fact purchased Sun-
day shoes, not school shoes. Id. at 47 n.151. Viewed in this light, Mrs. G.'s imaginative use of 
the shoes should not be understood as raising issues of client perjury in creating case theory, 
as in the Anatomy of a Murder scenario. Even if it did, White was not in a position to know 
which kind of shoes Mrs. G. purchased, or to frame a response in light of this inevitable 
ambiguity. Mrs. G. also "forgot" about the conversation with the welfare worker that formed 
the basis of the estoppel theory. 
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conventional meaning of the legal category "life necessities."216 To 
a black woman living in the southern Bible Belt - and to her white 
counterparts - Sunday shoes were not an extravagance but a basic 
human need. Her spirituality was an expression of a shared cultural 
identity, reflected in communal rather than individual worship, and 
an important part of her life. In her life, Sunday shoes were as nec-
essary as school shoes. 
White also offers a second, less conventional interpretation of 
Mrs. G.'s actions. Rather than accepting doctrinal constraints, she 
instead expanded the conventional meaning of the legal category to 
include Sunday shoes. In this way, she used the Sunday shoes to 
push the apparent limits of doctrine and enriched the doctrine with 
her life experience.217 
As with the villagers' use of the newspaper clippings, Mrs. G.'s 
actions are also subject to another interpretation in which the refer-
ence point for case theory is not legal doctrine but instead facts 
apart from doctrine. Whatever her legal understanding of terms 
such as life necessities or estoppel, Mrs. G. understood how the Sun-
day shoes could influence the decisionmakers. She knew the worlds 
of the hearing officer, the county welfare director, and the welfare 
worker in some ways better than her lawyer did, and she under-
stood the empathy invoked by an image of a black welfare mother 
purchasing Sunday shoes for her children. Not only did case theory 
create a context for the "fact" of the Sunday shoes, but the fact of 
the Sunday shoes was also powerful in its own right.21s 
Similarly, in "forgetting" the estoppel story, Mrs. G. may have 
recognized the destructive potential of the facts necessary for this 
theory, whatever the legal merit of the argument. The facts blam-
ing the welfare worker would pit the county and the welfare worker 
against Mrs. G., with Mrs. G. the inevitable loser. Or, on an even 
more subtle level, the hearing officer might look at the two women, 
see two black women, and either refuse to hold the AFDC worker 
responsible for her actions or refuse to make Mrs. G. the benefici-
ary of her worker's negligence. In short, Mrs. G.'s criticisms of her 
welfare worker would come full circle back to her, and the "facts" 
would have undermined a legally viable argument. 
216. Id. at 47-48. 
217. Id. at 47-51. Mrs. G. "ignored the doctrinal pigeonholes that would fragment her 
voice," id. at 48, "stretched the category of 'life necessity' to express her own values, and 
turned it around to critique [welfare's] systemic disregard of her own point of view." Id, at 
49-50. 
218. White chose not to argue the "life necessities" point in her closing, believing that her 
"lawyer's language couldn't add anything to what [Mrs. G.] had said." Id. at 31. 
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c. Strategizing About Case Theory. Both stories also speak to 
the role clients can play at the intersection of case theory and strat-
egy. Clients may add a strategy dimension that is at times inaccessi-
ble to lawyers. Clients may be more free to brainstorm new 
strategies than lawyers, who, like members of any other profession, 
learn specific modes of thinking that can hamper their creativity.219 
The Driefontein villagers were wily legal strategists who had 
"figured out how to manipulate the system before the lawyer gave 
these skills a name."220 Although a cynic might say that they were 
successful only because the remedies lay outside the legal system, 
the circumstances they faced were as complex and shifting as those 
in any litigation context. They had to balance political forces both 
inside and outside the country, master technical data about the im-' 
pact of the dam, and gauge the impact of all these factors on the 
interests of their opponents.221 
Similarly, the story of Mrs. G. can be interpreted as a trium-
phant tale about a superb case-theory strategist who made sophisti-
cated judgments about alternative case theories after assessing 
these theories from three different perspectives: winning the hear-
ing, protecting her relationship with the welfare system, and satisfy-
ing personal goals unrelated to these more instrumental 
concerns.222 While the first consideration matches concerns of both 
traditionalist and client-centered theorists, the other two propose 
new dimensions of case theory. 
How might Mrs. G. think about the choice of case theory from 
these perspectives?223 If Mrs. G.'s goal were simply to win her case, 
she would, like the traditionalists, choose the theory most likely to 
appeal to the hearing officer, although she would bring her insights 
about the Sunday shoes and life experience to bear on this ques-
219. See White, Driefontein, supra note 173, at 765. 
220. Id. at 738. 
221. As White eloquently puts it, "[t]hey gained power only by creatively reading the 
contradictions facing the government and orchestrating events so that the government would 
be constrained by its own previous positions." Id. at 736 n.147. 
222. White suggests that Mrs. G. might have been the "better legal strategist of the 
lawyer·client pair," White, Mrs. G., supra note 173, at 47, although she also suggests that her 
victory was "more attributable to the mysteries of human character than to the rule of law." 
Id. at 52. For White, strategy is more than "the manipulation of legal doctrine," id. at 47, 
although she offers no clarifying definition. 
223. For the last several years, I, along with my clinical colleagues at The American Uni· 
versity and at Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America, have used this 
story in teaching case theory in our clinic seminars. We have found that the lesson about the 
client as strategist helps our students think about the role clients can play in case theory 
development. At least one other clinical program assigns the piece, see Spinak, supra note 
22, at 24, although its focus appears to be on client voice more generally. Id. at 24-26. 
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tion.224 If she were concerned about her relationship with the wel-
fare system, she would consider how the life necessities and 
estoppel theories would affect this relationship. The estoppel the-
ory would be dangerous, not only because blaming her welfare 
worker might offend the hearing officer, but also because this ac-
tion might anger her welfare worker. As a welfare recipient, Mrs. 
G. was dependent on both her worker and the welfare system, and 
she understood the repercussions of challenging either the system 
or its representative.225 
But Mrs. G. may have approached case theory from a stand-
point unrelated to winning the hearing or protecting her relation-
ship to the welfare system. Perhaps Mrs. G. rejected the estoppel 
theory because it would not feel good to her to criticize her welfare 
worker, a fellow black woman. Or perhaps she revised the "facts" 
to fit the life necessities theory because the Sunday shoes allowed 
her more dignity than the story about the school shoes.226 If these 
were Mrs. G.'s goals, her actions were not strategic in the conven-
tional sense. But speaking out, if for no other reason than to have a 
voice, can be as strategic as intricately plotting testimony to dove-
tail with relevant legal categories or remaining silent to keep a part 
of the story secret.227 
3. Critique - Metaphors of the Narrative Contest and the 
Lawyer as Translator 
When translated into case theory, however, the critical lawyers' 
approach to legal narrative has both theoretical and methodological 
shortcomings. Despite their focus on client storytelling, critical law-
yers are ultimately pessimistic about the opportunities for clients to 
tell their stories. But a broader concept of case theory provides 
many opportunities for client stories, because case theory is only 
"law-talk" to the extent that it is law-driven. Ultimately, there is 
224. For a discussion of the contribution of Mrs. G.'s life experience to this question, see 
supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
225. White, Mrs. G., supra note 173, at 32-36, 48. 
226. Id. at 48. For Mrs. G., dignity may have been an especially important concern in 
interactions with a black woman who had achieved more economic success than she had 
achieved and who might be disapproving. For a discussion of the irresolvable ambiguity con-
cerning the nature of the shoes, see supra note 215. 
227. Of course, in refusing to follow her script, Mrs. G. may have had no case theory in 
mind; she may have spoken as she did because she did not trust her lawyer, because she 
wanted to flout her, or simply because she forgot the script her lawyer had devised. Other 
commentators have documented similar client concerns. See, e.g., Spinak, supra note 22, at 
1-2. 
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more room for storytelling about clients in legal forums than critical 
lawyers contemplate. 
Indeed, if client voices are to be heard and clients are to be em-
powered, the process of developing case theory is central to this 
task. Rather than seeing case theory as a bridge between client and 
lawyer stories, however, many critical theorists envision an inevita-
ble narrative contest between lawyers and clients.228 Lawyer and 
client stories are always at war, even for those lawyers who are con-
scious of the power dynamics in the lawyer-client relationship, and 
so a choice must be made between two opposing stories. This con-
test metaphor misses the mark in several important respects. 
Although the stories lawyers and clients tell often diverge, not 
all stories lawyers tell differ from their clients' stories. A single 
story may be told not because the lawyer story has displaced the 
client story but because the stories are the same. 
Even when lawyer and client stories diverge and lawyer stories 
predominate, this cannot always be explained by the exercise of 
power. Not all clients want to tell their stories .. A client might 
choose silence or a lawyer narrative over her own narrative to im-
prove her chances of winning or to achieve some other goal. This 
choice is marginalized in the critical world.229 
Critical lawyers proffer a naive vision of clients, all of whom are 
pure of heart and eager to speak. But not all client stories are em-
powering, nor are all clients empowered. Like most stories in life, 
client stories reveal a broad spectrum of hum1;1n character, ranging 
from sordid histories of abuse and neglect by unresponsive or re-
pressive systems to accounts of clients who are themselves victimiz-
ers. Yet critical lawyers mostly write stories about idealized clients, 
such as Deon Williams, a two-year-old child suffering from sickle-
cell anemia whom the state excluded from a nutrition program;230 
Mrs. Celeste, a saintly woman struggling to support a large foster 
family for whom she could not receive food stamps;231 and 
Josephine V., an impoverished young mother who made every con-
ceivable effort to obtain milk and diapers for her baby, only to ex-
perience frustration and delay at every tum.232 
228. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. For a compelling critique of the 
limits of an analysis of lawyering limited to power, see White, supra note 10. 
229. See, e.g., Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 12, at 6'1S-27 (criticizing "instrumentalist 
logic"). For a discussion of different goals case theory niight serve, see infra Part III. 
230. See Alfieri, Dialogic, supra note 12, at 693. 
231. See Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2111, 2114-18. 
232. See Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 12, at 637-43. 
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These clients hold little power in the world, yet they never lose 
their cases.233 Although lawyers must revise client stories to make 
clients appear sympathetic even when they may be less than deserv-
ing, critical lawyers need never exercise this skill because their cli-
ents are almost perfect from the start. The critical analysis, in 
recognizing only clients that make the job of lawyering easy, pro-
vides little frame of reference for client stories that are neither 
noble nor empowering. 
While those relying on the translation metaphor seem to reject 
the notion of a narrative contest and to envision lawyers and clients 
collaborating about case theory, their vision of this collaboration is 
limited. Translationists wisely caution against lawyers viewing cases 
- and case theory - in purely doctrinal terms,234 but nonetheless 
tell stories that reveal a wide gap between lawyers and clients. In 
their world, a black client has the task of educating his lawyers that 
an encounter with the police can be viewed as a racial incident, 
when common sense suggests that race is quite likely an explana-
tion for the encounter.235 They see differences in language as a key 
barrier to client empowerment, when in many instances the prob-
lem is simply bad lawyering, not problems of translation.236 The 
fact that they often fail to see the obvious in their own interactions 
233. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2114 n.14 (citing the invalidation of federal regula-
tions that had authorized the reduction of the client's benefits); Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 
12, at 643 n.128 (referring to an AU's decision that the client was once again eligible for 
public assistance); Alfieri, Dia/agic, supra note 12, at 693-94 (describing a New York court's 
finding that the two-year-old client was eligible for WIC benefits); White, Mrs. G., supra note 
173, at 32 (referring to the State's finally withdrawing its claim of overpayment against Mrs. 
G.); White, Driefantein, supra note 173, at 699-700, 737 (citing the South African govern-
ment's decision not to force the relocation of the villagers from Driefontein). 
234. Cunningham, supra note 8, at 1324, 1361-68 (recounting a case in which viewing the 
facts in Fourth Amendment terms ignored important parts of the narrative). 
235. Cunningham, supra note 8, at 1368-75. In this case, the client, a black man, was 
stopped in a white part of town in the middle of the night for an alleged traffic violation. 
Although the author makes much of the fact that viewing the case in Fourth Amendment 
terms forced a race-neutral overlay on the case, id. at 1370-71, it is difficult to see how the 
lawyers could have missed the point that race might have been involved in the stop. 
236. For example, one author describes the case of a Spanish-speaking client in which his 
lawyers did not know if his insistence that he was "culpable" had the same meaning as legal 
guilt, Cunningham, supra note 2, at 2464-65, and the case of a client who rejected his lawyers' 
argument that prison officials failed to follow required procedures in favor of an argument 
that the entire prison disciplinary system was invalid, id. at 2465-69. Although the author 
describes the problems of representation in these cases in terms of language differences, 
these cases reveal less a problem of translation than of inadequate counseling by the lawyers. 
In the first case, the lawyers did not probe with the client the meaning of guilt or the option 
of pleading not guilty even if he were guilty. Id. at 2483-84. In the second, the lawyers did 
not discuss with the client the pros and cons of the choice between the different case theories, 
or of the possibility of arguing both theories. Id. at 2492-93. Given the lawyering missteps 
revealed in some of these stories, many clients might choose instead to be represented by 
traditional lawyers. 
December 1994] Client Narrative and Case Theory 527 
with clients, coupled with their own naivete about the judicial sys-
tem,237 would seem to make an accurate translation almost 
impossible. 
Translationists also proffer complex solutions to bridging the 
gap between lawyers and clients, relying on after-the-fact lengthy 
textual analysis of client · stories.238 While these theorists are 
refreshingly self-critical, they overlook the fact that lawyer under-
standing must precede translation. Understanding begins with real 
listening to client stories. Once the lawyer has heard the story, un-
derstanding can be furthered by asking the client about the perspec-
tive she wishes to adopt in the case, and talking with the client 
about possible case theories. Through this exchange of lawyer and 
client experience, the lawyer can make client stories into case 
theory. 
Perhaps the greatest weakness of these critical models is that 
they fail to recognize that legal storytelling, at its best, is more than 
either lawyer or client storytelling. Even when clients seize power 
in the relationship, actual collaboration is limited.239 The critical 
theorists view any client choice that cedes power to lawyers as 
manipulated, given the power imbalance in the relationship. Per-
haps because of this power imbalance or the difficulty of translating 
across race, class, or other lines, the gap between_ lawyers and their 
clients appears insurmountable. 
Yet collaboration can take many forms, ranging from the lawyer 
adopting the client's story·by telling it in a legal forum, to lawyers 
and clients brainstorming case theory. As the story of Mrs. V. dem-
onstrates,240 even the impact of powerful client stories can be 
237. One author has expressed "shock" that a judge refused to follow established Fourth 
Amendment law in a particular case, and held instead that the police had the right to search a 
citizen without any reason to believe he was armed or dangerous. Cunningham, supra note 8, 
at 1320-22. Given the extent to which trial courts, especially lower-level criminal courts, 
routinely ignore the law, this judge's misapplication of the Fourth Amendment is hardly sur-
prising, let alone shocking. 
238. Cunningham, supra note 8, at 1339-57. 
239. See Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2124-25; Cunningham, supra note 2, at 2466-68; Cun-
ningham, supra note 8, at 1329-30. For an important exception, see LoPEZ, supra note 3, at 
38-56. 
240. See Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 12, at 637-44. Criminal lawyers know that client 
stories are made invisible, and even incredible, if they are passed over by their lawyers. 
Although commentators disagree about whether the ethical rules allow defense lawyers to 
refer to perjured client testimony in closing argument, compare John Wesley Hall, Jr., Han-
dling Client Perjury After Nix v. Whiteside: A Criminal Defense Lawyer's View, 42 MERCER 
L. REv. 769, 809-10 (1991) (arguing that lawyers cannot refer to client perjury in closing 
argument) with The Ethics Advisory Committee of NACOL Formal Opinion 92-2, reprinted 
in Ethics Advisory Opinion, CHAMPION, Mar. 1993, at 23, 27 (arguing that a lawyer should 
refer to client perjury in closing argument if the lawyer tried to stop the perjury and failed), 
omitting the client's testimony would signal that the client is not to be believed, id. at 27. 
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muted if the lawyer does not collaborate with the client or adopt 
the client's story. Mrs. V. spoke "out of tum" by interrupting the 
hearing officer to describe the indignities she had suffered at the 
hands of the welfare system, a story her lawyer had not told.241 
While her attorney may have seen the act of silencing as his speak-
ing for Mrs. V. at the hearing,242 this characterization misperceives 
the true nature of silence. By excluding her story from his case the-
ory, Mrs. V.'s attorney made her story less meaningful to the trier 
of fact, and even Mrs. V.'s courageous act of speaking for herself 
could not cure this silence. Sometimes it is not enough for clients to 
speak out alone. 
Critical lawyers, by equating speaking out with power and re-
maining silent with the absence of power, oversimplify a complex 
dynamic.243 In the story of Driefontein, the lawyer spoke on behalf 
of the villagers in order to, obtain the land they wanted, using his 
special skills to implement the strategy the villagers devised.244 The 
villagers were far from powerless in a setting in which the allocation 
of power was determined as much by who devised the strategy as by 
who did the talking.245 
Taken together, the emphasis on narrative contest and the privi-
lege afforded client narratives means that lawyers are virtually in-
visible, and perhaps irrelevant, in the critical world. Critical 
lawyers practice at the furthest end of the spectrum from the tradi-
tional lawyers whose practices they most abhor. Yet in their noble 
effort to reclaim clients, these scholars lose sight of the lawyers, to 
the detriment of their clients. In this process, case theory disap-
pears. The case is whatever the client chooses to talk about, un-
tempered by critical reflection and analysis and uninformed by legal 
doctrine. 
Not only is critical theory deficient in its vision of case theory, 
but it is difficult to translate its insights to the actual task of devel-
oping case theory. The discrete tasks of lawyering, such as inter-
viewing, counseling, and case theory development, may vary 
241. Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 12, at 642·43. 
242. Id. at 642-45. 
243. As Jane Spinak perceptively notes, it is not voice alone that should be extolled but 
rather "voice understood and respected within the legal system, particularly by the lawyer." 
Spinak, supra note 22, at 26. 
244. White, Driefontein, supra note 173, at 736 n.147 (noting that "[o]nly in the context of 
[the villagers'] overall strategy was [the lawyer's] connection of any value"). 
245. The same issues of power and control are reflected in clinical teaching, where clinical 
teachers are hardly silent despite the fact that their students do most of the talking in court. 
See Shalleck, supra note 14, at 113-36, 178-81. 
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tremendously in their potential for broader client involvement, yet 
the actual tasks undertaken by lawyers are discussed only in broad 
conclusory terms. For example, Tony Alfieri, in lumping together 
his decisions to exclude a client from strategy discussions and to 
withhold from her his case theory and documents supporting this 
theory,246 fails to recognize the world of difference between giving a 
client documents that bolster a particular case theory and discussing 
with her the pros and cons of alternative theories. 
Exhortations about client voice lack meaning unless they inform 
the actual dialogue between lawyers and clients and the work law-
· yers actually do.247 The actual exchange between lawyers and cli-
ents in critical theory articles is almost completely invisible, 
revealing only bits and pieces of their conversations.248 When these 
conversations do receive attention, they ar~ often parodies of 
lawyer-client interactions,249 and the suggestions for improvement 
are either prosaic250 or eccentric.251 Often the observations of criti-
cal lawyers end abruptly with a self-critique, leaving us with only 
tantalizing teasers.252 
At their best, critical lawyers offer a much-needed critique of 
traditional practices, some of which apply to case theory. Yet they 
do not carry their insights to an explicit discussion of lawyer-client 
collaboration around case theory. They avoid the hard question of 
how case theory can serve as a vehicle for bringing together the 
often very different perspectives of lawyers and clients to make an 
effective case. Missing is a vision of what clients might speak about 
and how lawyers might best serve as partners in that enterprise. 
II. THE CASE 
Our client, Mr. Jay,253 was referred to the Criminal Justice 
Clinic, where I teach, by a local public defender's office. Jay is a 
246. See Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2128. 
247. Dinerstein, supra note 10, at 981-89. 
248. See, e.g., Alfieri, Mrs. V., supra note 12, at 636 (providing no details about "one-
sided and unilateral" lawyer conversation). 
249. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2112-18 (describing an interview at which the 
client remains silent). 
250. See, e.g., id. at 2139 (suggesting the possibility of counseling a client about whether 
litigation best serves her needs). 
251. See, e.g., id. at 2136-37 (discussing the concept of lawyer-client "play"); Alfieri, Mrs. 
V., supra note 12, at 646-47 (same). 
252. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 23, at 2128, 2139 (discussing the author's own failure to 
include the client in case theory and strategy discussions). 
253. I have adopted fictitious names for Jay and all other participants and have changed 
some characteristics of the case in order to respect client confidentiality. 
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thirty-year-old black man who lives alone in southeast Washington, 
D.C.254 He works as a janitor for a federal agency.2Ss Jay was 
charged with three misdemeanors: disorderly conduct, assault and 
battery, and resisting arrest.256 He had never been arrested for any 
other crime. 
After he was convicted in a bench trial,257 Jay had filed a circuit 
court appeal and then had rejected a plea offer at the pretrial pro-
ceeding in the circuit court. Given the possibility of a jury trial, his 
de novo trial could be expected to take more time than the first 
trial258 and would stretch the crowded docket of the overworked 
public defender. I accepted Jay's case and assigned it to a team of 
two students working under my supervision.259 
In order to provide a solid foundation for discussing case theory, 
I will set out the "facts" of Jay's case as viewed from the multiple 
perspectives of Jay and the other participants.26° Because Jay ulti-
254. The southeast quadrant of Washington, D.C. is the most impoverished section of the 
city. 
255. Jay was fired from his previous job as a janitor because the numerous court appear-
ances required in this case caused him to miss too much work. 
256. Disorderly conduct is a statutory misdemeanor. See Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 123 
{1992}. Assault and battery and resisting arrest are common law misdemeanors. DAVIDE. 
AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY §§ 4.12, 4.80 (2d 
ed. 1988). The charges were contained in a statement of charges, which is one means by 
which an individual may be charged with a crime in Maryland. Mo. R. 4-201. The statement 
was supported by an application for statement of charges, which is a narrative of the facts 
supporting the charges. The complainant signs both documents under oath before a judicial 
officer known as a commissioner. 
257. Jay was tried in Maryland's unusual two-tier court system, under which all misde-
meanors and a few felonies are within the jurisdiction of the district court, Mo. CooE ANN., 
CTS. & Juo. PROC. § 4-30l(b) {1}·{2} {1989), in which jury trials are not available, Mo. CooE 
ANN., CTS. & Juo. PROC. § 4-302{e) {1989). If the defendant is found guilty following either 
a guilty plea or a bench trial, he can appeal to the circuit court and is entitled to a trial de 
novo by jury. Mo. CooE ANN., CTS. & Juo. PRoc. § 12-401 (1989). For an interesting dis-
cussion of how a two-tier system disadvantages criminal defendants, see David A. Harris, 
Justice Rationed in the Pursuit of Efficiency: De Novo Trials in the Criminal Courts, 24 CONN. 
L. REv. 381 (1992). 
258. Jay was represented by an assistant public defender in the District Court trial, in 
which he was acquitted of a second count of assault and battery. See infra note 264. The trial 
carried over to a second day and involved the testimony of seven witnesses. 
259. The Criminal Justice Clinic represents individuals charged with misdemeanors -
and some felonies - who have met the income qualifications of the public defender's office. 
We accept cases set for trial during the school semester that will provide valuable pedagogical 
lessons. For insightful discussions of clinic supervision theory and practice, see Phyllis Gold-
farb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLINICAL L. REv. 65 {1994}; Gary Palm, Reconceptualizing 
Clinical Scholarship As Clinical Instruction, 1 CLINICAL L. RE.v. 127 {1994); Shalleck, supra 
note 14; and Kathleen Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the 
Clinical Relationship, 27 IND. L. REv. 115 {1993). 
260. The source of the stories is the participants' trial testimony, the statement of charges, 
the application for statement of charges, and the police report. In addition, Jay's story is 
based on conversations with his student attorneys documented in file memoranda and, in a 
few instances, my recollection. A written transcript of the trial testimony was prepared by 
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mately pied guilty to disorderly conduct and resisting arrest in the 
circuit court,261 the only legal forum in which these stories were told 
was the district court trial. 
A. The Stories 
1. Client's Story - Implying Racism 
On a weekday afternoon Jay was shopping at a clothing store in 
a predominantly white suburb of Washington, D.C. Although he 
often shopped at this store, on that particular day he was bargain-
hunting at the store's ''Bash" sale. He purchased a pillow and 
washcloths and then shopped for a pair of jeans. Jay, who is six 
feet, three inches tall and weighs 260 pounds, was unable to find a 
pair of jeans in his size, so he decided to look for a sweater. 
As Jay browsed in the sweater department on the second floor, 
he noticed that he was being watched by three security guards, Mr. 
Dirk, Ms. Deal, and Ms. Mormon. Mormon is a full-time security 
guard. Dirk and Deal are police officers who moonlight as security 
guards; because they wore store uniforms, Jay was unaware that 
they were police officers. Both Dirk and Deal carried guns. All 
three guards are white. 
Jay was carrying his purchases in a bag bearing the store logo. 
A receipt was stapled to one comer of the bag, which was partially 
open because the pillow was sticking out of the top. Jay had asked 
for a larger bag, but none was available. 
The guards followed Jay for five or ten minutes, looking down 
every time he looked at them. Jay approached Mormon, told her 
that he regularly shopped in the store, and asked her why she and 
her companions were following him. She denied following Jay, said 
she needed to "check something out," and made a telephone call on 
the store telephone. Jay angrily thought that Mormon was report-
ing him for shoplifting and rode the escalator to the first floor, plan-
ning to leave the store. He stopped at the bottom of the escalator 
because his "stubbornness wouldn't allow [him] to leave." Not far 
behind were the three security guards. 
From about ten feet away, Dirk shouted, "Hey pal, what do you 
have in the bag?" Other shoppers and store employees were within 
hearing distance of this remark. Jay replied, "Well, what I have in 
the clinic's administrative staff from the official tape recording of the trial. Unofficial Trial 
Transcript, Maryland v. Jay (on file with author) (source withheld to protect confidentiality). 
261. Jay received a suspended sentence and six months of unsupervised probation, and 
the assault and battery charge was dropped. His decision to accept the plea is discussed 
further infra in section III.B. 
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the bag is what I purchased, and if you're accusing me of stealing, 
those are some strong accusations and if you are, then I will sue the 
fucking store." Dirk said, "Fuck you," and called Jay a "punk," and 
both men exchanged more profanities. Then Jay said, "You know, 
if you weren't wearing that gun, I'd probably whoop your ass for 
the degrading things that you were saying to me." 
Two or three managers arrived, including Rosenholtz, an older 
white man with gray hair, and Thompson, a tall black man who is 
slightly heavier than Jay. Speaking all at once, the three guards re-
ported that Jay had threatened Dirk with the gun. When 
Rosenholtz asked Jay what he wanted, he asked for a refund. 
Thompson put his arm around Jay and walked with him to the ser-
vice counter at the front of the store. Dirk and Deal followed. 
At the service counter, Jay waited while Rosenholtz began 
processing the refund. Dirk and Deal stood near the counter. Jay 
dug in his pocket for some change, sorted the pennies from the 
nickels, dimes, and quarters, and tossed the pennies up in the air, 
saying, "[M]oney is no big issue to me .... That's why you're follow-
ing me around because you think I can't afford to buy anything." 
Deal suddenly moved toward Jay, urging Dirk to arrest Jay for as-
sault and battery.262 Jay, who was startled by Deal's charge, heard 
Dirk say something in a loud and boastful voice. Dirk pushed Jay's 
arm and told him he was under arrest, but he did not state that he 
was a police officer or show any identification.263 Jay escaped from 
Dirk by backing away from the counter and toward the front exit. 
When Jay left the store, a police officer in the parking lot leapt 
from his motorcycle and grabbed Jay. Jay told the officer that he 
did not know why the security guards wanted to arrest him for as-
sault and battery and did not understand what was happening to 
him. Five or six officers, responding to the guards' 911 call, joined 
in. As Jay struggled,264 one officer handcuffed one of his arms and 
held him by that arm, while the other officers grabbed him by the 
other arm and completed the handcuffing. 
After Jay was handcuffed, Deal arrived in the parking lot, where 
she punched him three or four times, slapped him, dug her hands 
262. All three security guards claim that Jay threw the pennies at Deal and that the pen-
nies struck her. See infra section 11.A.3. 
263. The relevance of their status as police officers and of Jay's knowledge of their status 
to the resisting arrest charge is discussed infra at notes 283-86, 299-300 and accompanying 
text. 
264. Jay was acquitted of the second count of assault and battery, which accused him of 
"striking [Dirk] in the chest, knocking him to the ground" in the parking lot. 
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into his neck to grab a gold chain he was wearing, and pulled on the 
chain, choking him. She then ripped the chain off his neck. 
Five or ten minutes passed before the police took Jay to the 
station and booked him. While J~y waited in the parking lot, 
Rosenholtz put a refund in Jay's pocket and apologized for the 
incident. 
2. Supporting Stories - Seeing Racism 
Perry Rodriguez, Darryl Prince, and Jimmy Williams, three 
other shoppers who observed Jay's encounter with the three guards, 
tell stories supporting Jay's view of his case.265 Rodriguez is Latino; 
Prince and Williams are black. Rodriguez works as an office clerk 
and shops at the store once or twice a week. On the day that Jay 
was arrested, Rodriguez was shopping at the store with his friend 
Prince, who works for a temporary employment agency and plans 
to study engineering at a community college.266 Williams was shop-
ping with his wife and three children in the pantyhose section of the 
store.267 This chronology weaves together the stories told by all 
three men. They corr~borate Jay's story with respect to several key 
details,268 including the fact that Jay had a receipt for his purchases, 
that he threw the coins up in the air rather than at Deal, that he did 
not hit Dirk or anyone else, and that Deal punched Jay after he was 
handcuffed. Perhaps more importantly, they viewed Dirk as the 
hostile aggressor and the entire incident as· racially charged, ex-
plaining why the security guards stopped Jay in the first place and 
then escalated the incident until it was out of control. 
Before Dirk and Mormon encountered Jay that day, they 
stopped Rodriguez on the second floor of the store, and Mormon 
told him that he was banned from the store because one of his 
friends had shoplifted. When Rodriguez denied this accusation, 
Dirk became aggressive. He said, "Well, she told you to leave," but 
Rodriguez refused to leave, saying, "If I'm not doing wrong, I 
shouldn't be thrown out of the store." Dirk moved "real close" to 
265. After Jay was taken into custody, these men gave statements to a police officer, 
along with their names, addresses, and telephone numbers. The prosecutor, however, did not 
contact them. Rodriguez and Prince went to the police station to find out how to contact Jay, 
but the station staff refused to release this information. They waited several hours for Jay to 
be released and told him how to reach them if he needed them as witnesses. 
266. Both men live in the suburbs, Rodriguez with his aunt and Prince with his father and 
sister. 
267. Williams was recently emp1oyed as an office manager but was unemployed at the 
time of trial. 
268. I use footnotes to distinguish the portions of their stories that differ in significant 
respects. 
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Rodriguez and said, "You young punks, you know, you think you 
can always come in here and ... not ... follow directions." Then he 
said, "Boy, when I talk to you, you need ·to look me in my eye." 
Rodriguez told the guards to leave him alone and walked away. 
When Dirk followed, Rodriguez told him, "Hey, you can follow me 
all day." 
Later, as Rodriguez and Prince rode the escalator to the first 
floor, they observed Dirk "hassling" Jay.269 At this point, Williams, 
who was standing near the staircase on the first floor, joined the 
scene. He did not pay much attention to the argument until he 
heard someone utter the word black. 270 When Williams heard this, 
he turned and saw Jay "having some trouble" with Dirk. Jay asked 
Dirk, "Why [are] you embarrassing me? Why [are] you harassing 
me? I shop here all the time .... Is it because I'm black?" Dirk 
replied, "No, it's not because you're black." Jay responded, "Why 
then?" and Dirk said, "I don't give a damn." 
During this exchange, which lasted about fifteen minutes, the 
shoppers and employees who gathered to watch "were able to hear 
the argument and talk." Dirk "kept on.bashing, provocating, [and] 
irritating" Jay, while Thompson, who had just arrived, was "apolo-
gizing, begging[, and] cooling [him] down." 
At some point, Thompson said, "Look, for god['s] sake, come 
on[;] he hasn't done anything. We gotta let this guy go .... " As Jay 
walked with the managers to the service counter, Rodriguez, 
Prince, and Williams watched from a distance. While Jay waited for 
his refund, Deal stood behind Dirk about two feet away. Dirk 
taunted Jay, saying "he could arrest him; that he wasn't scared of 
him [just] 'cause he was a big boy." Jay turned from the counter, 
reached into his pocket, and tossed some coins "straight up" in the 
air.271 Next, Deal "charged" towards Jay and accused him of throw-
ing coins at her. To Williams, it looked like a "set up," so he 
shouted at Deal, "You lie. You are a liar." Then Dirk and Deal 
grabbed Jay, "roughhandling" him and pushing him out the front 
door. Jay cried out, "Leave me alone, what have I done? What are 
you trying to do?" 
269. As Rodriguez and Prince described it, Dirk was "all up in [Jay's] face," Jay was 
upset, and both men were yelling. 
270. At trial, Wtlliams testified, "[Be]cause I'm black, I wanted to know, so I turned 
around, and was watching, was listening" to find out if the encounter was racially motivated. 
271. The three men disagree about whether the coins struck Deal. According to Rodri-
guez, some of the coins struck Deal, who faced Jay when Dirk moved aside. Williams testi-
fied that the coins never touched Deal, and Prince did not see where the coins fell. 
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Williams left his family in the store and went outside, where 
Rodriguez and Prince also observed the struggle in the parking lot. 
At some point during the struggle, Dirk slipped and fell. As the 
officers were "dragging" Jay on the ground, he pleaded, "Leave me 
alone, what have I done? Come on, don't do this to me." A store 
customer, a black woman, approached Deal after she hit Jay and 
said, "Why did you do that? You don't hit people!" In a nasty 
tone, Deal replied, "I don't care." 
Later, Rodriguez called Rosenholtz, who apologized to Rodri-
guez for how he was treated in the store. 
3. State's Story - Denying Racism 
The State's story is told by security guards Dirk, Deal, and Mor-
mon.272 In addition to wanting to convict Jay, the State wants to 
limit its exposure for any claims he might file against it for the ac-
tions of Officers Dirk and Deal.273 Identifying this story as the 
"State's story" sets it apart from the stories that other institutions, 
such as the store, might tell.274 
Mormon, who is five feet, five inches tall, was working security 
with Dirk and Deal on the second floor of the store on the day that 
Jay was arrested. Deal is five feet, one inch tall and weighs 110 
pounds; Dirk is of medium build. 
Before the Jay incident, the guards had a "run-in" with Rodri-
guez, whom Mormon recognized as someone Rosenholtz had ar-
gued with and banned from the store. Mormon confronted 
Rodriguez with this fact and then walked over to a telephone to 
request a manager to come upstairs. 
While Mormon stood at the telephone, she noticed Jay carrying 
a store bag with a receipt stapled to the outside. The bag was par-
tially open and a pillow was sticking out of it. The store has a policy 
272. Dirk and Mormon testified as witnesses for the State at trial, while Deal wrote and 
signed the statement of charges and the application for a statement of charges and authored 
the police report. To avoid telling three versions of the story, I present the story that appears 
here as a composite. I use footnotes to distinguish points where the perceptions of the guards 
vary in ways that matter to case theory. While Thompson testified for the State, the label 
State's story is a misnomer because his testimony supports our client's story in part. Thus, I 
set out his story separately infra in section II.A.4. 
273. If Dirk and Deal were acting in their capacity as police officers, Jay could assert a 
cause of action against the State under state law for the torts of assault and battery, false 
arrest, and false imprisonment. The same facts would give rise to constitutional torts under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994). 
274. Although the store may share the State's concern about civil liability, it may be 
either more or less enthusiastic about prosecuting Jay. The store might want Jay convicted to 
obtain an order prohibiting him from shopping at the store or, contrarily, might support Jay 
out of a concern about negative publicity or a belief that Jay was unjustly treated. 
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that merchandise must be verified for any shopper carrying a bag 
that is not stapled shut. Mormon nodded to Deal to alert her; Deal 
nodded back. 
When Jay noticed that the security guards looked at him and 
made eye contact, he approached Mormon, stood four inches from 
her face and said in an agitated tone, "I dare ... any of you racist 
officers to check my fucking bag or stop me on the way out of the 
store, 'cause I'll sue the store." Mormon walked over to Deal, who 
was joined by Dirk,275 and told them about Jay's dare. Dirk was 
carrying a loaded nine-millimeter automatic weapon, and Deal also 
carried a gun. 
Jay left and went down the escalator, while Dirk and Mormon 
pursued him, trying to look at his bag. Meanwhile, Deal called 
downstairs to alert someone at the front desk to stop Jay. On the 
escalator, Mormon pointed to Jay. When Dirk looked at him, Jay 
stared back and said, "What the fuck are you looking at?" 
At some point, Mormon tried to calm Jay down by explaining 
the store's policy and telling him she was just doing her job and that 
he could see the manager if he had a problem with the policy. 
When Jay replied that he believed she wanted to see his bag be-
cause he was black, Mormon told him that she was involved in an 
interracial marriage. 
At the bottom of the escalator, Jay walked past Dirk carrying a 
bag under his arm "as if to hide" the bag from Dirk. Jay retraced 
his steps, stood less than three feet from Dirk, and said, "Touch my 
fucking bag and I'll sue this fucking store." Dirk replied, "[S]ir, it's 
the policy of [the store] that all bags be securely stapled shut," and 
told Jay that he would have to comply with the policy to remain in 
the store. Jay said, "You don't know what the fuck to do, and you 
just blew your chance." Dirk replied, "I know exactly what to do[.] 
I'll call the manager over and he can discuss it with you." 
At this point, Jay became loud and angry, and a crowd began to 
gather. Jay yelled, "The only reason you are harassing me is be-
cause I'm black." When Dirk didn't respond, Jay pointed his finger 
in Dirk's face and said, "I am gonna take that pea shooter off your 
hip and pistol whip you with it."276 Dirk was afraid to move and 
asked Deal to call for backup. 
275. Dirk testified that he was summoned to the second floor for "an altercation" with 
Jay, was "advised" that Jay had an open store bag with a pillow sticking out of it, and was 
asked to follow "the subject" downstairs. 
276. Mormon testified that Jay dared Dirk to check his bag and threatened to "take 
[Dirk's] pea shooter off and whoop his ass with it." 
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Dirk then pointed his finger at Jay, who said, "Get [your] finger 
out of [my] face." Jay then threatened to take Dirk's gun from him 
and shoot him. Dirk, raising his voice for the first time, asked Jay if 
he was threatening him. 
At this point, Thompson and Rosenholtzjoined the fray, repeat-
edly tried to calm Jay down, and told him that he could receive a 
refund. Thompson pushed Jay to the front of the store, using his 
"body as a block" between Jay and Dirk. Jay twice tried to "leap 
over" Thompson to get at Dirk, shouting, "[T]ake your fucking eyes 
off me." 
While Jay waited for his refund, he "walked back and forth like 
a caged animal," screaming about discrimination and acting "out of 
control." Finally, Jay "turned on" Deal, who was standing at the 
front door waiting for backup. Dirk moved next to Deal to protect 
her and asked a store clerk to call 911 to request a faster response. 
Then Jay took some change from his pocket and picked out six 
or seven pennies. He said, "I make more fucking money than you'll 
ever see[;] here, you want some?" and threw the change in Deal's 
face. Deal "jerked back" against a railing when the ·change struck 
her, and cried out, "Assault and battery!" Dirk grabbed Jay's arm, 
announced that he was a police officer, and told Jay he was under 
arrest. Jay lunged back, told Dirk to get his hands off of him, and 
pushed Dirk's arm away. When Dirk grabbed Jay by the arm again, 
he broke free and ran out of the front of the store. 
The guards noted Prince and Rodriguez among the crowd gath-
ered at the front door and observed them complaining to a manager 
about the "racial thing" involving their own mistreatment by the 
guards. 
Dirk pursued Jay into the parking lot, followed by the crowd. A 
police officer leapt from his motorcycle and grabbed Jay by one 
arm; Dirk grabbed his other arm. Jay told the officers to get away 
from him and struggled to get free. Jay punched Dirk in the chest. 
The force of the punch sent Dirk "flying through the air"; he broke 
his right wrist trying to break his fall. When Deal grabbed Jay by 
the collar, his chain became entangled in his collar and broke. Jay 
grabbed Deal's arm, squeezing it and yelling, "You broke my chain 
you white bitch; you're going to pay for it." Jay continued to yell 
obscenities and racial slurs after he was handcuffed. 
4. Swing Story - An Ambivalent Account 
Assistant store manager Thompson first encountered Jay during 
the "commotion" on the first floor of the store. Thompson, who 
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had just arrived at the scene with Rosenholtz, got between Jay and 
the guards and told Jay "it's just not worth going through all the 
hassle." The managers offered Jay a refund because he was upset 
with the way security was "handling him" and accused them of har-
assment. As they walked to the service counter for the refund, 
Thompson tried to calm Jay, who was "a little irate and angry." 
Jay waited at the service counter for his refund while 
Rosenholtz opened the bag and checked his receipt. Thompson, 
who stood by the side of the counter, "just wanted to get the situa-
tion resolved" and thought Jay was "pretty well calmed down." 
Then, Jay "just tossed" some pennies to Deal, which struck her on 
the chest and the head. 
Dirk came from around the side, identified himself as a police 
officer, and told Jay that he was under arrest. Dirk grabbed Jay, Jay 
pulled away, Dirk grabbed him again, and Jay ran out the front 
door. Jay "more qr less just [took] his hands ... away" from Dirk, 
but did not strike him. Thompson stayed in the store and did not 
see the ensuing struggle in the parking lot. 
B. Applying Case Theory Concepts to the Stories 
What lessons about case theory can be gleaned from the stories 
in Jay's case? Rather than providing a literal account of how we 
constructed case theory, I use the story to explore the limitations of 
the traditional approach; I present it as a catalyst for a different 
model that focuses on the client and his experience of the encoun-
ter. For me, the case demonstrated that the framework that legal 
doctrine provides for describing "what happened" is not the exclu-
sive framework. In the new case theory model, the client acts as a 
source of the framework explaining what the case is about, not 
merely as a source of facts about "what happened" to be plugged 
into doctrine. 
Although representing Jay prompted us to move from thinking 
about case theory in traditional ways to creating a different frame-
work, other circumstances hampered us from fully realizing this 
model. Because Jay missed several scheduled meetings,277 the stu-
277. Jay called to cancel the first meeting because he was leaving town for the weekend, 
and he failed to show up for the rescheduled meeting. After the students left two messages 
on his answering machine, Jay called and arranged another meeting, which did not occur until 
three weeks after we received the case. For a thoughtful discussion of the connection be-
tween clients seeking greater control over their cases and their desire to cooperate with their 
attorneys, see Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, A Battered Women's Rights Clinic: Designing a 
Clinical Program Which Encourages a Problem-Solving Vision of Lawyering That Empowers 
Clients and Community, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 2rr7, 220 (1992). 
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dents listened to his story on audiotape long ·before they heard it 
from him in person; the tape raised many questions about his per-
ception of the case. Many of these questions were left unanswered 
when Jay decided to accept the State's plea offer not long after the 
first interview, bringing case theory development to a halt. Some of 
my sharpest insights about the case come from reflections after it 
ended, leaving me with a sense of unrealized possibilities. 
1. Traditional Approach 
A traditional rebuttal theory begins with legal elements and 
then looks to whether the facts fit the elements of the crimes 
charged. Disorderly conduct is the crime of acting or speaking in a 
manner that "offends, disturbs, incites, or tends to incite" onlook-
ers.278 The State must show that the conduct occurred in a specified 
public place, that a number of people gathered to observe it, and 
that the defendant's behavior was offensive, disturbing, or inciting 
to those gathered.279 Because there is little doubt in Jay's case that 
a clothing store is a location covered by the statute280 or that a 
crowd gathered, the conduct element seems most vulnerable to 
attack. 
As the guards described Jay, his threats and racial epithets were 
offensive, disturbing, even shocking. To defeat this claim, we would 
have to show that the guards were either mistaken or lying. But 
even by Jay's account, his words were profane, loud, and possibly 
disturbing. Although Jay paints a different picture of the guards, 
who by their account were polite and almost deferential, their be-
havior seems irrelevant in the statutory scheme. 
Battery is the crime of intentionally touching another person 
without her consent.281 The State must prove that Jay made physi-
278. Reese v. State, 299 A.2d 848, 853-54 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (holding that use of 
the word fucking is not obscene and thus constitutes constitutionally protected speech). The 
statute provides that "[a] person may not act in a disorderly manner to the disturbance of the 
public peace ••. in any store during business hours." Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 123 (1992). 
279. See Barnhard v. State, 602 A.2d 701, 708 (Md. 1992) (finding that there was probable 
cause to arrest the defendant for disorderly conduct where he "taunted the officers with 
obscenities, threatened to kill [one of them], and incited the crowd"); Briggs v. State, 599 
A.2d 1221, 1227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that the defendant's conduct "disrupted 
the carnival .•. and eventually incited the crowd against the officers"). 
280. See Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 123 (1992) (referring to "any store during business 
hours"). 
281. AARONSON, supra note 256, § 4.12, at 229. Although the State charged Jay with 
assault and battery on Deal, the prosecutor emphasized the physical contact, rather than 
arguing under an assault theory that Jay had attempted to batter Deal and failed or had 
intended only to frighten her. Thus, the charge should be viewed as one asserting battery. 
Id. at 230. 
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cal contact with Deal using the coins as an instrument, that he in-
tended this contact, and that she did not consent.282 Because none 
of the participants tells a story in which Deal acquiesced, the issue 
is whether. the coins struck Deal, and if they did, whether Jay in-
tended the contact. If either of these elements is not present, then 
Jay is not guilty. 
The stories on this point diverge more than for the disorderly 
conduct charge. The State's witnesses and Rodriguez say the coins 
struck Deal, Jay and Williams thought the coins did not touch her, 
and Prince did not see where the coins fell. On the question of 
intent, all the State's witnesses but Thompson characterize Jay's ac-
tions as clearly intentional, while Jay's witnesses view the contact as 
unintentional. Again; in this "he says-she says" contest, someone is 
either mistaken or lying. 
Resisting arrest is the crime of refusing to submit to a lawful 
arrest.283 The State must show that Jay was arrested, that he re-
fused to submit to the arrest, and that the arrest was lawful. A law-
ful arrest is one in which the individual making the arrest was 
authorized to do so, identified himself as an officer of the law, and 
had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed.284 
Because Jay concedes that the security guards were attempting 
to arrest him and that he resisted, our theory must attack the law-
fulness of the arrest. By statute, police officers are broadly empow-
ered to make arrests.285 Probable cause for an arrest is a 
reasonable belief that the person charged is guilty of a crime. Thus, 
the real point of contention is whether Dirk announced in some 
fashion his status as a police officer.286 Although everyone agrees 
that Dirk was not in uniform, the stories conflict on the question of 
what Dirk said to Jay in attempting to arrest him. 
282. The issue of consent arises because Deal suffered no physical injury. See AARON· 
soN, supra note 256, § 4.12, at 229. 
283. See Barnhard, 602 A.2d at 704-05. 
284. AARONSON, supra note 256, § 4.80, at 628. 
285. Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 594B (1992). The term police officer covers a variety of 
law enforcement positions whose common denominator is that the employers are state and 
local governments. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594B (1992). Persons deputized as "special 
police officers" may make arrests under more limited circumstances. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 
27, § 594C (1992); Mo. ANN. CooE art. 41, § 4-905 (1993); Waters v. State, 575 A.2d 1244, 
1246·47 (Md.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 989 (1990). 
286. On the subject of the guards' arrest powers, the question of whether Dirk and Deal 
lost the protective cloak around police officers when they assumed the mantle of store secur-
ity guards at first seems promising, but leads nowhere. While probable cause can be chal-
lenged, I do not separately examine this issue because it folds into the disorderly conduct and 
battery charges. It may perhaps be limited to battery, given that the guards did not initiate 
the arrest until after the alleged battery. 
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In this traditional analysis, each "crime" is treated as a separate 
and distinct event, rather than as part of a series of interrelated 
experiences. This approach does not draw a big picture of what 
happened or why, and it includes very little of the client, except as a 
source of facts about "what happened." It has a gr~at deal of faith 
in the existence of an objective version of "what happened," and 
individuals whose stories deviate from this version are either mis-
taken or lying. Jay was either loud and obnoxious or not, and he 
either threw the coins or did not throw the coins. By the same to-
ken, Dirk either stated that he was a police officer or did not. 
Although the model concedes the importance of motivation and 
credibility in answering these questions,287 it provides no real 
framework for looking at Jay's experience of the event. 
2. Acknowledging Client Life Experience 
How then can case theory be reimagined, given the real limita-
tions of the traditional and client-centered perspectives and both 
the insights and flaws of the critical approach? An alternative vi-
sion of case theory is as a phenomenon that operates at two distinct 
levels or layers, like geological strata. As lawyers, we must work 
through the first layer to get to the second layer and the possibilities 
of imagination. 
The first level is the surface level set out in the traditional model 
of case theory development. This concept of case theory is hierar-
chical and top-down in its focus, beginning with the law, adding the 
facts, and finding little room for the client in the interstices. The 
first layer captures many aspects of a case but leaves much unsaid. 
The second level is below ground and rich with almost limitless 
possibilities.288 At this level, case theory is a story that is more than 
the law and more than the facts. Life, or any one event in life, does 
not unfold in the neat boxes doctrine envisions but instead proceeds 
in fits and starts, with the facts all jumbled together. We start with 
the stories, and work the law back in. Case theory becomes a vehi-
cle for communicating the client's story and meshing his story with 
the stories told by other participants. It offers images of the client 
287. See BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL, supra note 33, at 28 (asserting that a theory that the 
opposing party lied is "more extreme" than a theory that the opposing party was "mis-
taken"); SONSTENG ET AL., supra note 39, at 4 (stating that a jury is more likely to believe 
that the prosecution witness was mistaken than that he was a liar). 
288. Of course, ethical rules restrict the arguments lawyers can advance on behalf of their 
clients, and in criminal cases, these ethical considerations are constitutionalized. See Ogle-
tree & Hertz, supra note 96, at 35-37 {discussing the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free 
counsel). 
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and his world and creates a bridge between these images and the 
law. 
a. Revisiting the Story. As we think about how to frame the 
events at the store, race plays a prominent role in the encounter. 
The guards believed that Jay perceived the incident as racial but 
deny any racial intent, arguing that Jay made race an issue by .re-
sponding to imagined racial insults with his own racial epithets. Yet 
the client deftly avoids either of these characterizations, never using 
the word black and admitting only to being angry. It is as if he is 
speaking in code by not tying the incident directly to race but ob-
liquely conveying that only racism can explain what happened to 
him. By looking at the case through the lens of race, what light is 
shed on case theory? 
At one level, the fact that Jay is black and the security guards 
are white makes the encounter a racial incident. We do not need 
case theory to see this encounter as having something to do with 
race, given the power of racial images in our society. But once we 
highlight the role of race as a critical factor, then the story comes 
into sharper focus. By starting with race, we can see a picture of the 
case that is very different from the one a traditionalist would see. 
Based on what we know of Jay's story, we can create this 
framework: 
This case is about Mr. Jay, a black man, who was shopping at a store 
and minding his own business until three white store security guards 
singled him out for surveillance and harassment because he was black. 
Instead of just going along quietly and playing their game, Jay got 
angry and shouted out the truth about racism. The guards punished 
him by teaching him a lesson about daring to speak out and about 
challenging authority. When they were proven wrong about him be-
ing a shoplifter, they got even. They charged him with disorderly con-
duct, battery, and resisting arrest, but the real crime was being a black 
man who would not stay in his place.289 
By using a theory that the guards were racist, Jay's story can be 
retold through the language of race. There is a haunting "if only" 
quality to the story - a sense that the incident could have been 
prevented from getting out of hand. The guards created a crime 
and then escalated it to the point where Jay was lying on the ground 
in handcuffs. Although the client's voice comes through with the 
greatest clarity in this account, the story is more than his voice. 
Viewed through the lens of race, the story changes. So too do the 
law and the facts. 
289. Other alternatives to a theory that the guards were racist that still involve viewing 
the incident through the lens of race are discussed infra in Part III.B. 
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Mr. Jay is a large black man - quiet and soft-spoken. He was 
shopping at the store one afternoon, as he often does, looking for 
bargains. Jay does not have much money because he works part-time 
as a janitor, but he likes to own nice things and to stretch his money as 
far as possible. Unlike many men, Jay enjoys shopping. He lives by 
himself, and shopping is a way for him to feel a part of other people's 
coming and going. He bought some ordinary household items - a 
pillow and some washcloths - and then went looking for some 
clothes. 
As he was shopping on the second floor, white security guards 
with guns followed him for five to ten minutes, watching him closely. 
The guards gave themselves away by looking down and refusing to 
look at him when he tried to make eye contact. They watched him 
but would not admit it, even when he approached Mormon and asked 
her flat out. Their refusal to make eye contact angered and embar-
rassed him, making him both invisible and an object of surveillance. 
They might as well have pointed at him and announced to the world 
that he was a black man and a thief. This was a lie; he carried a store 
bag with the things that he had purchased, and a receipt was stapled 
to the bag. His race was the only reason they were watching him. 
People who work in stores think that young black men are there to 
steal. 
All Jay wanted was to be left alone, to browse a bit and go home, 
but they would never stop watching him unless he did something. Jay 
went up to Mormon and told her that he was a regular store customer, 
wanting her to think of him as a person, not a stereotype. Instead, she 
called to report him for shoplifting. The only way to get away from 
the guards was to leave the store. 
Still, the three guards followed him, and he changed his mind 
about leaving. He wanted to convince the three guards that he was 
not the person they thought he was; he was not a thief. 
When Dirk yelled, "Hey pal, what do you have in the bag?" he 
was making Jay a public spectacle; other customers in the store could 
hear the slur. Dirk wanted to prove that he was in charge, that he had 
the power, and that Jay was nothing. Dirk might as well have called 
him "boy." Even profanity could not begin to express Jay's feelings. 
He was enraged, but he still wanted Dirk to put a name to the accusa-
tion, to call it what it was. 
Dirk's explanation about store policy did not ring true to Jay. He 
always carried his purchases in a store bag and had never been chal-
lenged for it. If there was a problem with the bag, it was the store's 
fault. After all, he had asked for a larger bag and the cashier said the 
bag was the largest one they had. 
Jay told Dirk that he had been singled out because he was black, 
and Dirk denied it. When Jay pressed for an answer, Dirk said, "I 
don't give a damn!" with an expression of utter contempt and disdain. 
Something in Jay snapped. He had gone along quietly all his life 
without making a fuss. He worked as a janitor and was used to peo-
ple walking past him as if he did not exist. He pushed mops and 
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brooms and wiped up the floor with rags. He had been subservient, 
invisible. Now he needed to stand up for himself and to force an an-
swer from these security guards. At the same time, he wanted to 
burst into tears. 
The rest was a nightmare. When a crowd gathered, it was as if 
Dirk had stripped him naked in front of a crowd of strangers. Every-
one was looking at him as if he were a thief. The security guards had 
confirmed the onlookers' worst fears about black men like him. 
Still, Dirk would not say the words stealing or shoplifter but called 
Jay a "punk." Jay yelled back, even though Dirk wasn't listening, to 
prove that he would not back down, despite the fact that Dirk had the 
gun and the power. He wanted Dirk to know that he was not afraid 
of him - that if Dirk had not had a gun, he would have taken charge. 
Right after that, the managers came up. The managers seemed to 
take his side by offering him a refund, and the black manager, 
Thompson, put his arm around Jay and walked him to the service 
counter. Although Jay felt reassured by this gesture, he still felt the 
sting of the racial insult. 
Dirk and Deal still would not leave him alone. They followed him 
up to the service counter and would not take their eyes off of him. 
They did not belong there, because he was waiting for a refund and 
security guards don't handle refunds. Their presence was a continu-
ing slap in the face; their stares felt like a taunt. Suddenly, the refund 
seemed like an insult, a cheap way to buy him off and keep him quiet. 
Instead of waiting for the refund, Jay dug in his pocket for some 
change. He wanted to throw the refund in their faces because they 
had offended his dignity, but he never thought about whether the 
coins would hit them. Jay could not afford to lose quarters, but he 
would lose his point if he threw the change and then bent down to 
pick it up. So he very deliberately chose pennies. The message was 
that money was not the issue for him. The issue was his reputation. 
Maybe they thought he meant he made more money than they did. 
They would think that was the message, even if he never made that 
comparison. All he meant was that they shouldn't assume that black 
men had no money and had to steal to have nice things. To them, 
money was a symbol of status and prestige from which they - and 
blacks - were excluded. · 
He could not believe it when Deal cried out "assault and battery" 
and said something about arresting him. He hadn't hit anybody. 
How could Dirk arrest him? Only police officers can arrest someone, 
and Dirk was a security guard. 
He just wanted to get out of the store and away from these crazies 
who were chasing him with loaded guns. He did not even think about 
the fact that he was leaving the refund behind. Once he got outside, 
he stopped thinking and just reacted. He struggled to break free from 
the police, but he never hit anybody. 
Looking back on the arrest, the whole thing seemed like a set-up. 
From the time that Thompson walked him up to the service counter, 
Dirk and Deal were just looking for an excuse to turn the tables. 
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They were angry that the managers took his side and were going to 
give him his money back. The pennies were no big deal; Deal and 
Dirk just wanted to get Jay under their thumb, to prove that they 
could keep him down. 
The sale, called a "Bash," was the ultimate irony. The Bash was 
an open invitation to the community to come and shop, but when he 
got to the store, they slammed the door in his face. Jay never knew 
what hit him until he was lying on the ground in handcuffs. 
Much is imagined in this story because we did not brainstorm 
this race theory with our client. Not only does race matter in the 
larger sense of our client's shared experiences with other black men 
who have experienced racism in their lives,w0 but so too does our 
client's personal experience of the encounter. We knew little about 
his life experiences and attitudes, or how they shaped how he un-
derstood the guards' suspicions that he was a shoplifter. Nonethe-
less, even this incomplete story tells us much of value about legal 
doctrine and the importance of "life facts." 
b. Enriching Legal Doctrine. Thinking about the incident in 
the store as a racial encounter changes how we look at legal ele-
ments such as behaving in a "disorderly" manner, intending to 
strike another person, and identifying oneself as a police officer. It 
brings the dry language of the law alive and gives its words shape 
and meaning. 
Disorderly conduct. In telling a story about a man who was 
pushed to his limits on the intensely personal issue of race, Jay sug-
gests a different answer to the question of what kind of conduct is 
disorderly. Perhaps the law of disorderly conduct includes a con-
cept of provocation - the idea that some behavior, such as accus-
ing an innocent person of shoplifting, is sufficiently provocative that 
any verbal response, even one as vehement as Jay's, could be 
justified. 
Under this interpretation, we might invoke a kind of speech 
self-defense theory in viewing the guards, rather than Jay, as disor-
derly. Loud, even belligerent, behavior may be excused under cir-
cumstances when someone else starts the disturbance. Rather than 
simply being disruptive, Jay may have been justified in defending 
himself against individuals who were themselves disorderly. 
290. See Studs Terkel, Studs Terkel Ponders the Meaning of Race and Riot, PEOPLE MAG., 
May 18, 1992, at 105 ("A black man once said to me that race is always on his mind, from the 
moment he wakes up to the time he goes to sleep."). In interviews of black men, Essence 
magazine quoted one interviewee: "We've all had the experience of trying to hail a cab and 
being ignored, of being followed around in a store like a thief on the make, of being mistaken 
for a messenger when we have an appointment to see the boss." Charles N. Jamison, Jr., 
Racism: The Hurt that Men Won't Name, EssENCE, Nov. 1992, at 62, 64. 
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Although the case law interpreting the statute envisions an area 
of protected speech under the First Amendment,291 it does not 
specifically address the issue of provocation. Yet a closer look at 
the law, in light of our theory, creates room for such an 
interpretation.292 
The strength of this theory may correlate with Jay's racial identi-
fication; perhaps a black man wrongly accused of shoplifting re-
sponds differently than a white man does. On the one hand, the 
cases do not seem to suggest that conduct should be viewed in 
terms of the personal characteristics of the accused. Nonetheless, 
once the accused person's intent - whether to disturb or simply to 
respond - is relevant,293 it may be that the person's subjective ex-
perience of the insult matters. 
Indeed, taking seriously Jay's experience of the incident may 
permit a First Amendment defense that is more affirmative than a 
speech self-defense theory. While the self-defense theory is predi-
cated on the legitimacy of Jay's response to the guards, it does not 
address any effort he may have made to publicize his outrage fur-
ther. For instance, he may have sought to go beyond a one-on-one 
encounter with Dirk by protesting more broadly and seeking to re-
cruit others to his point of view. Rather than simply parrying the 
guards' thrusts, he may have tried to draw attention to how he was 
being treated. Viewed in this light, his actions may have been a 
legitimate attempt to galvanize the crowd against the racist guards. 
While the law seems to draw the line at incitement,294 perhaps if 
such actions take the form of shared outrage rather than interfering 
with police business, they might receive protection. Perhaps all Jay 
wanted was for the crowd to see that he was being mistreated be-
cause he was black. 
But until we have a framework for thinking seriously about the 
reasons for the client's anger or why the actions of the security 
291. Diehl v. State, 451A.2d115, 118-19 (Md. 1982) (interpreting Mo. ANN. Com? art. 
27, § 121 (1992)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983). When the students first researched the 
case law, they found no potential clash between the statute and the First Amendment. Be-
cause the students were competent researchers, their oversight puzzled me. In hindsight, I 
wonder whether their own resistance to using race in the case may have impeded their read-
ing of the cases. See discussion infra section 111.C. 
292. For example, in holding that the defendant's speech was protected under the First 
Amendment, the Diehl court noted that the officer's unlawful order for a passenger to return 
to the passenger seat of a car stopped for a traffic violation "precipitated the entire episode," 
while the defendant's speech "was merely a response." 451 A.2d at 118. 
293. 451 A.2d at 118-19 (finding that the evidence did not indicate that the defendant 
"intended to disrupt the quiescence of the neighborhood"). 
294. 451 A.2d at 119 (noting that protest is permissible so long as it does not "precipi-
tate[ ] public disorder amounting to a breach of the peace"). 
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guards were so provocative, both the provocation and protest inter-
pretations pass almost unnoticed. Anyone who causes a scene is for 
that reason alone guilty of being disorderly. It is the client's experi-
ence as a black man, or more accurately, the way we translated this 
experience, that reveals a different way of looking at the question. 
We understand the law differently once we acknowledge the rela-
tionship between racial insult and conduct. 
Battery. Thinking about the events in terms of race also envi-
sions the crimes with which Jay is charged as interconnected rather 
than as isolated events and thus transforms the doctrinal boxes of 
disorderly conduct and battery. For example, Jay's act of deliber-
ately picking pennies out of the change in his pocket and flinging 
those coins at Deal at first seems to support the State's charge that 
Jay intended to strike Deal. His action in sorting the pennies was a 
careful, deliberate act that seems inconsistent with an act of pas-
sion, accident, or mistake.ws 
Viewed in light of race and our insight into disorderly conduct, 
however, this act suggests a different kind of intent. Jay selected 
the pennies, not with the intent to strike Deal, but with the intent to 
make a statement about being wronged. If the calculated gesture of 
selecting the pennies is an extension of the act of shouting in the 
store, the deliberate character of the act goes to speech. Jay's act 
can then be seen as having the unintended consequence of striking 
Deal - as a technical battery, a byproduct of an act whose real 
purpose was simply speech.296 
Moreover, if we portray the act of throwing the pennies as an 
extension of speech,297 then we can piggyback on the self-defense 
theory for disorderly conduct. Just as Jay's shouting can be under-
stood as defensive rather than offensive, so can throwing the pen-
nies be seen as an act of self-protection rather than an attack. In 
throwing the pennies, Jay was defending himself, not against a lit-
295. For a discussion of how another client's insight into his behavior gave my clinic stu-
dents a better understanding of case theory, see infra note 359. 
296. In contrast, courts draw a bright line between speech and conduct in finding that 
certain conduct is disorderly even when the accompanying words are not. See, e.g., Briggs v. 
State, 599 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that the defendant's cursing 
was protected but that his actions of seizing gambling money and slamming dice onto the 
gaming table were not). Here, however, Jay's actions were so closely connected to his words 
that the line between actions and words is fuzzier. I am not suggesting that any physical act 
could be excused under this theory; Jay could not punch Deal in the face and then claim that 
the assault was an act of pure speech. 
297. If racist speech is like an assault, then perhaps we can see the guards as striking the 
first blow. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech 
on Campus, 1990 DuKE LJ. 431, 452 ("Assaultive racist speech functions as a preemptive 
strike. The racial invective is experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea .... "). 
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eral physical attack, but against an attack that felt physical in its 
force.298 
Resisting arrest. Finally, thinking about Jay's perceptions of the 
identity of the security guards also helps us undercut a critical ele-
ment of proof to the charge of resisting arrest - the requirement 
that the arresting officer identify himself as a police officer. The 
case law assumes that the relevant question is what Dirk did, not 
how Jay interpreted his actions.299 So long as the officer states that 
he is a police officer, shows a badge, or otherwise announces his 
status, such as by wearing a uniform, this element is satisfied. 
Jay makes us think of this question differently. Jay already had 
a picture of who Dirk was, regardless of any statement Dirk might 
have made. Even if Dirk had identified himself as a police officer, 
Jay may never have heard him, either because he was not listening, 
or because the statement seemed sufficiently improbable that its 
content never registered. Even if he heard the statement, Jay sim-
ply may not have believed it. In Jay's experience, cops, white or 
black, do not keep their identity a secret when they harass some-
one, especially cops as puffing and boastful as Dirk. If Dirk were 
really a police officer, he would have announced it during the argu-
ment at the bottom of the escalators as part of his power1Jlay to put 
Jay in his proper place.300 Thus, Dirk's statement about being a cop 
seems at best questionable and at worst laughable. Given that Dirk 
and Deal were not dressed as police officers and had not at any 
point previously in the lengthy encounter identified themselves as 
police officers, what reason had Jay to pay any attention to Dirk's 
assertion? 
298. Some case law suggests that the slightest touching may constitute a battery. See, e.g., 
Lamb v. State, 613 A.2d 402, 412-14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992). But often-overlooked lan-
guage in jury instructions and case law requiring that the contact be "offensive" may provide 
room for an argument that not every physical contact without consent is a battery. See Mary-
land Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions § 4.04 (1991); 613 A.2d at 412 n.4. Although the 
instructions do not explain the meaning of the term offensive, Jay's experience suggests that 
the minimal contact that occurred here might not meet this standard. 
299. See Jordan v. State, 300 A.2d 701, 703-05 {Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (rejecting sub-
jective interpretations of police statements of authority to arrest). Most cases simply assume 
the authority to arrest because the officers' status is not challenged. See, e.g., Barnhard v. 
State, 602 A.2d 701 {Md. 1992). In contrast, Maryland courts apply a subjective standard 
when a defendant urges that an illegal arrest provides legally adequate provocation to reduce 
murder to manslaughter. See Blake v. State, 349 A.2d 429, 433 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). 
300. See Jamison, supra note 290, at 123 (citing encounters with police as examples of 
racism experienced by black male adolescents). For an insightful account of the relationship 
between the police and the black community, see Homer Hawkins & Richard Thomas, White 
Policing of Black Populations: A History of Race and Social Control in America, in OUT OF 
ORDER? POLICING BLACK PEOPLE 65 {Ellis Cashmore et al. eds., 1991) ("In every major city 
where blacks lived in large enough numbers to be noticed and feared by whites, the white 
police force was allowed and often encouraged to keep 'the niggers in their place.' "). 
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c. Reenvisioning Facts. In addition to enriching our notion of 
legal elements, case theory also makes facts come alive, including 
facts that do not seem to fit a particular legal element. How can a 
case theory based on race, and on Jay's life, change the meaning of 
facts? 
In viewing Jay's case in light of the doctrine-driven traditional 
approach, the key factual disputes are whether Jay was loud and 
used profanity, whether he deliberately threw the coins at Deal, and 
whether Dirk adequately identified himself as a police officer 
before attempting to arrest Jay. As we have seen, a race case the-
ory makes us think anew about these legal elements and changes 
the relevant facts. Perhaps Jay could have been loud and profane, 
have thrown the coins in the direction of Deal, and have heard Dirk 
identify himself as a police officer, and still not be guilty of a crime. 
Instead, the focus shifts to the reasons Jay became so angry in his 
interactions with the guards, what they did to provoke him, how to 
view the act of throwing the coins, and how Jay understood what 
Dirk said about his status as a police officer. 
But case theory also gives facts meaning apart from doctrine. 
Case theory works at two levels, both at the enriched doctrinal level 
and, in an even purer way, at the level at which race is the frame, 
regardless of how it shapes our understanding of doctrine. This is 
the level at which we can say, "Now the story makes sense." 
This shift, both in doctrine and in frame, forces us to look at Jay 
and his life experience. In this scenario, although the facts about 
"what happened" matter, other facts outside those parameters mat-
ter just as much. These are "life facts" - facts about the lives of 
the people in the case. 
In moving from case theory to life facts, we must sift through 
the morass of facts to discover the critical facts. It is helpful to be-
gin by identifying a few "good" and "bad" facts. The good facts are 
the critical underpinnings_ of case theory, leading us to accept our 
client's perspective on the encounter. The bad facts undercut this 
perspective, leading us to question his perceptions. 
When race is the image that drives the case, the good life facts 
are that Jay is black, that he is a gentle and soft-spoken man, that he 
works as a janitor, that he was not stealing that day, that he has 
never been arrested or convicted of any crime, and that he likes to 
shop. While these facts might matter even if race were irrelevant, 
they are more powerful under our theory that the encounter was 
racial. 
550 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:485 
We are drawn to Jay because he makes himself vulnerable in 
revealing that he could not find a pair of jeans in his size in the 
store. We see him as cautious and hesitant to expose his own vul-
nerabilities, using his charges of racism as a shield, not a weapon. 
By removing this shield, he has exposed something of himself irt 
telling the guards, two strangers, that race matters to him, and so 
does his dignity. He has put himself on the line by announcing that 
something as personal to him as his race could cause another per-
son to treat him with contempt. Viewed in this light, his allegations 
seem less like an accusation and more like a painful query - "Are 
you treating me differently because I am black?" 
The security guards describe Jay as hostile and aggressive - a 
man willing to fling unwarranted charges of racism. Yet Jay works 
as a janitor. A janitor mops floors and cleans up other people's 
messes. A janitor looks down, speaking only when he is spoken to. 
A janitor does not challenge authority unless he is pushed to the 
wall. 
Jay was not a thief that day and has never been a thief or a 
criminal of any sort. We reluctantly admit that if we had joined the 
crowd in the store that day and seen the guards interrogating him, 
we probably would have assumed that he was shoplifting. We are 
made uncomfortable by our realization that we might have made 
the same mistake the guards made. 
It matters not only that Jay paid for the items in the bag but also 
what those items were. There is something familiar, even poignant, 
about his purchase of familiar household items, such as washcloths 
and a pillow. Who these days, besides your grandmother, uses a 
washcloth? We would have had a very different picture of Jay and 
his case if the items in the bag had been a boombox, rap music, or 
Nike tennis shoes.3°1 The kind of man who shops for pillows is not 
the kind of man who goes on a rampage in a store.302 
Yet this image is counteracted by the fact that Jay wore a gold 
chain that day. Suddenly, Jay is not a single man shopping for com-
forting household items such as a pillow and washcloths. He is a 
black man fond of flashy jewelry, like a pimp or a drug dealer. Un-
less we can explain the chain in a way that does not implicate these 
301. See TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF TiiE VANmES 110 (1987) (describing the wide 
gulf in a Bronx courtroom between white lawyers and black defendants wearing white "go· 
to-hell" sneakers). 
302. Of course, all these images concerning what kind of man Jay is can be challenged as 
gross generalizations, but they are nonetheless powerful. Obviously, black men who buy 
boomboxes, rap music, or Nike shoes are not by virtue of this fact prone to rampage, nor are 
men who buy pillows incapable of committing horrific crimes. 
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racist stereotypes,303 this image is at odds with the image created by 
other facts. 
Facts·from other peoples' lives also seem significant. Prince and 
Williams are black; Rodriguez is Latino. Prince lives with his father 
and sister, is a student who works part-time, and aspires to be an 
engineer. Williams lives with his wife and three children with 
whom he goes shopping. Rodriguez lives with his aunt. These men 
are people like us. They have families; they go shopping; they are 
not troublemakers. None of these men knew Jay before his en-
counter with the security guards. All came to his assistance later. 
The witnes~es for the State also have lives, but we know little 
about them. Perhaps the most revealing thing we know about Dirk 
is that he thought of Jay as a "caged animal." That image would 
probably not surprise Jay. 
Mormon tells us, in what at first seems like a non sequitur, that 
she is involved in an interracial marriage and that she explained this 
to Jay.304 She does not state the race of the person with whom she 
is involved. Mormon wants us to believe that because she is in-
volved with a person of a different race, she cannot be a racist.305 
Yet if Mormon were involved in a relationship with an Asian Amer-
ican, for example, this fact would have little to do with her attitude 
towards blacks. Even if she were involved with a black person, this 
fact hardly renders her immune from the label racist. Yet her pro-
nouncement has a certain surface appeal, despite the questionable 
assumptions on which it rests. 
We know that Dirk and Deal are police officers who moonlight 
as security guards. We can only guess about other aspects of their 
lives. They probably receive low pay and work second jobs to make 
ends meet. They expect to be obeyed because they are police of-
ficers, and they transfer that expectation to other interactions. 
303. For instance, if the chain were given to Jay by his grandmother, its message might be 
a neutral, or even favorable, fact. 
304. Mormon is a key participant because she Confronted Rodriguez and Jay. If her mo-
tives were pure, they soften the impact of the actions of Dirk and Deal. If her motives were 
impure, then the entire encounter is tainted. 
305. This is not much different than saying, "I have black friends, so therefore I am not a 
racist," or as Charles Garry, an attorney for then-Black-Panther Huey Newton, belatedly 
recognized, "I thought I knew something about Negro America because some of my most 
intimate friends are Negro professionals .... It wasn't a week or two weeks after I got this 
case and I came to the conclusion that I knew absolutely nothing about black America .... " 
Drew Findling, Closing Argument: Tapping the Human Experience, 42 MERCER L. REV. 659, 
662 (1991) (citing RAY EDWARD MosES, JuRY ARGUMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES 168-69 
(1985)). 
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They think a person who refuses to follow their orders is a trouble-
maker, or worse. 
Thompson plays an especially important role in a case theory 
based on race, while under a different case theory his role would be 
anomalous. He testifies for the State, but acts as a turncoat witness 
who makes an artful effort to give Jay as much as he can. This 
equivocal testimony makes more sense when we see him as a black 
man caught between two worlds - between Jay's world and the 
world of his white colleagues. During the actual incident, he imme-
diately felt the need to separate the trio of Dirk, Deal, and Jay. We 
sense that if the decision had been up to him, he would have let the 
incident go. But he came to the scene too late to derail an encoun-
ter already rushing to its inevitable conclusion. 
Attention to life facts also reminds us to expand the time frame 
beyond the immediate incident.306 Before: Mormon and Dirk ask 
Rodriguez to leave the store. When he refuses, Dirk calls Rodri-
guez a "punk" and "boy." After: in a cheap shot, after Jay is lying 
on the ground in handcuffs, Deal punches and slaps Jay and rips off 
his gold chain. 
As Jay's story demonstrates, thinking of case theory as life expe-
rience opens up a world of possibilities. For the lawyer, legal doc-
trine can change in the process; for the client, case theory fits with 
his experience by highlighting the importance of his life facts. This 
can give the client a sense of vindication and will resonate with 
some juries. 
Ill. R.ECONCEIVING CASE THEORY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
LA WYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
A. Creating a Theory of Case Theory 
In looking at Jay's case, we have come a great distance from the 
traditional model of case theory. Once we entertain the notion that 
Jay might have correctly perceived that he was singled out because 
he was black, we can better understand why he and others acted as 
they did. Jay was just sick and tired of being treated badly. 
In revisiting the story, however, the story that we tell is not so 
different from the kinds of stories that good lawyers have been tell-
ing for years. These kinds of case theories, however, have not been 
captured in academic theory, whether traditional, client-centered, 
306. For a discussion of the importance of time frames and how they relate to the framing 
of a case, see Robert Heidt, Recasting Behavior: An Essay for Beginning Law Students, 49 U. 
Prrr. L. REv. 1065, 1086-91 (1988). 
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or critical.307 It is as if we have forgotten what we know to be true 
and have forsaken familiar ground for theory that fails to reflect 
how case theory really works. Ironically, it seems that theory and 
practice have truly diverged in efforts to describe a model of case 
theory.308 
My aim is to articulate a theory of case theory that is truer both 
to the client's life experience and to what it is that lawyers actually 
do. By defining case theory as an explanatory statement linking the 
case to the client's experience of the world, we create a context for 
seeing what we mj.ght not otherwise see. Case theory creates a per-
spective for the facts, relationships, and circumstances of the client 
and other parties that is grounded in the client's goals. Case theory 
makes actions seem quite reasonable that at first seemed unreason-
able, and it allows us to accept the client's story and at the same 
time have a plausible explanation for other stories. 
The account of theory that has most influenced my thinking 
about case theory is not a work about lawyers and clients but rather 
Robert Coles's account of the psychiatrist-patient relationship in 
The Call of Stories.309 Although the lawyer-client relationship dif-
307. An important exception is clinical theory, in which ~linical teachers have proposed 
more creative interpretations of case theory. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 14, at 54 (describing 
case theory as a "new perspective[]" arising from the "exchange of stories"); id. at 62 (argu-
ing that in developing case theories a lawyer "chooses facts and creates contours of mean-
ing"); Dinerstein, supra note 10, at 975-77 (noting the need for case theory to incorporate the 
perspective of the client); Shalleck, supra note 14, at 139 n.22 ("[C]ase theory draws upon, 
integrates, and shapes the facts and the law in light of what the client wants to achieve in the 
legal action."). Others have stressed the importance of presenting the client's case as 
grounded in the client's life experiences. See, e.g., Julius Getman, Voices, 66 TuxAs L. REv. 
577, 582-83 (1988) (arguing for greater emphasis on human voice as distinct from profes-
sional, critical, or scholarly voice); Michael E. Tigar, Voices Heard in, Jury Argument: Litiga-
tion and the Law School Curriculum, 9 REv. LmG. 177, 190 (1990) ("[T]he advocate cannot 
get by with an abstract reference to her own worldview. Instead, the advocate must evoke 
the client's and the jurors' human concerns."). 
308. Just a glance at media accounts of well-known trials demonstrates that the common-
sense understanding of case theory is closer to the real thing than the models that have been 
developed. For example, in the opening statements of the Lorena Bobbitt trial, the defense 
lawyer told the jury that the case is about whether "a life is more valuable than a penis." 
Martin Kasindorf, Bobbitt Denies Assault on Wife, NEV.:SDAY, Jan. 11, 1994, at 6; see also 
infra notes 320-57 and accompanying text. The claim that I make here is a claim about how 
lawyers conceive of case theory. I do not make the claim that lawyers typically brainstorm 
case theory with their clients or involve clients in decisions about case theory. 
309. See ROBERT CoLES, THE CALL OF STORIES (1989). Coles's work has inspired other 
legal scholars. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 
971 (1991) ("Coles exemplifies the kind of fruitful, humane attention that narrative scholars 
and others are beginning to bring to the law."); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: 
Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1181 n.30 
(1992) (citing Coles to support the importance of lawyers' "helping the client tell his or her 
story in a clear and compelling way"). In fact, Coles has examined the lawyer-client relation-
ship in other contexts, having authored an article on Dickens's legal fiction, see Robert Coles, 
The Keen Eye of Charles Dickens, 35 HARv. L. SCH. BuLL. 30 (1984), and having taught a 
seminar at Harvard Law School entitled "Dickens and the Law," which examined the toll 
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fers in some respects from the· psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship,310 Coles's account in chapter 1 - entitled "Stories and 
Theories" - has much to offer a conception of case theory 
grounded in client lives. 
As a psychiatric resident, Coles worked under the supervision of 
two psychiatrists, Dr. Binger and Dr. Ludwig. Coles's first patient 
was a driven woman who paced up and down the corridors of the 
psychiatric ward incessantly and in so doing acquired the name "the 
hiker."311 In discussing this patient in supervision meetings, Binger 
readily diagnosed the woman as "phobic," a familiar conceptualiza-
tion that at first was reassuring.312 Binger focused on categorizing 
her condition according to familiar psychiatric precepts and formu-
lating an immediate diagnosis of her "psychodynamics." 
In contrast, Ludwig followed a radically different approach. He 
stressed the importance of patients' talking about events in their 
lives before doctors formulate solutions to their problems and the 
need for open-ended conversations without theoretical con-
structs.313 He urged Coles to listen to patients' stories before offer-
ing ready conceptualizations of their problems and to recognize 
that diagnosis is only a guess - an effort to connect a particular 
patient to a category of patients.314 
In time, Coles learned to embrace Ludwig's vision of the psychi-
atrist-patient relationship. In this vision, theory is not abstract and 
accepted medical doctrine but, instead, the "enlargement of obser-
vation."315 As Ludwig put it: "'The people who come to see us 
bring us their stories. They hope they tell them well enough so that 
we understand the truth of their lives. They hope we know how to 
interpret their stories correctly. We have to remember that what 
we hear is their story.' "316 In this way, "each patient [can] be a 
that professional roles take on lawyers and their impact on justice, and the impenetrable 
nature of legal rhetoric. Coles is also the author of the foreword to RICHARD D. 
KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CoNTRAcr: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1992). 
310. Dinerstein, supra note 26, at 538-44; Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1010-15 (discussing 
the difference between client-centered psychotherapy and client-centered lawyering). For 
comparisons between the doctor-patient relationship and the lawyer-client relationship, see 
JoHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE BAR 333-42 (1982); 8 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 2380(a), at 828-32 (J.T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (distinguishing legal and medical privi-
leges); Dinerstein, supra note 26, at 525, 532-34 & nn.142-44. 
311. CoLES, supra note 309, at 1-3. 
312. Id. at 3-4. 
313. Id. at 7-8, 14. 
314. Id. at 6-8, 13-15, 18-24, 26-27. 
315. Id. at 20. 
316. Id. at 7. 
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teacher,"317 and psychiatrists.can "make over [patients'] stories into 
something of our own."318 Theories are stories infused with the 
particularity of each patient's experience in the world. 
Just as Coles learned to avoid deceptively easy theoretical con-
structs and to see theory as simply stories writ large, so too can 
lawyers come to see case theory, not as finite and confined, but as 
an account of what happens in the world, mediated by clients' 
unique experiences of the world. By taking to heart Ludwig's ad-
monition to Coles for" 'more stories, less theory,' "319 lawyers can 
see case theory as stories that rely on the law. There are as many 
case theories as there are clients. 
While this view of case theory is noticeably absent from legal 
scholarship, it thrives in popular legal culture. Recent media ac-
counts of highly publicized trials present a picture of case theory 
that is driven by the life experiences and identities of clients and 
their surrounding communities. The Long Island Railroad massa-
cre, the conspiracy trial related to the World Trade Center bomb-
ing, and, of course, the O.J. Simpson trial offer a rich ground for 
examining race and case theory.320 Like the well-established bat-
tered woman syndrome defense,321 these cases demonstrate how 
perspectives on race and other identities can be used to fashion case 
theory. 
The case of Colin Ferguson, who shot and killed six commuters 
and wounded nineteen others on the Long Island Railroad, paral-
lels the reconceived story of Jay's case. The crimes in the two cases 
are vastly different, but both cases create room for case theories 
that examine the client's life facts coupled with an understanding of 
racism. Ferguson, who represented himself, rejected one case the-
317. Id. at 22. 
318. Id. at 19. 
319. Id. at 27. 
320. Case theory has also played an important role in other high·publicity cases. See Seth 
Mydans, Menendez Trials' Collapse Discourages Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, at 
A16 (criticizing the prosecution in.the trials of Lyle and Erik Menendez for failing to choose 
a single theory explaining the defendants' motive); Sonja Steptoe, A Damnable Defense: Not 
only did Mike Tyson lose his rape case, but his lawyers perpetuated a racial stereotype, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 24, 1992, at 92, 92 (noting that the prosecutor's theory of the case in-
cluded portraying 'fyson as "being almost playful toward the [beauty pageant] contestants"). 
321. For the history of this defense, see CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: 
BATIERED WoMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND nm LAw (1989); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BAT· 
TERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LoVE: WHY BAT· 
TERED WoMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY REsPONDS (1989). For a fascinating account of the 
development of a self-defense theory that incorporated the perspective of the client, a 
Native-American woman accused of murder, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of 
Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 606-10 
(1986). 
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ory - the "black rage" defense322 - crafted by his former defense 
attorneys in favor of a different theory - a theory that whites con-
spired to charge him with the crime, which was committed by a 
white passenger who seized the gun from Ferguson while he 
slept.323 
If Ferguson was competent to stand trial, the choice of which 
story to tell should have been his; nonetheless, the black rage de-
fense would have differed from Ferguson's race-based defense in 
focusing on Ferguson's life experience, not just on the fact that he is 
black. Black rage is an explanation for the rage and anger that 
blacks in America feel toward those they view as their oppressors, 
namely whites. Black rage emerges from group conditions, 
although not every member of the group is enraged enough or out 
of control enough to commit murder.324 
One story that Ferguson could tell gives shape to the black rage 
defense.325 Colin Ferguson grew up in a privileged family in Ja-
maica that employed a cook and a gardener; he moved to the 
United States when he was twenty-four years old. His brother re-
members Ferguson as a man who " 'never . . . curse[ d] other 
races.' "326 
322. His former lawyers borrowed the term black rage from a book written in 1968 by 
black psychiatrists William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs. See WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE 
M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968). 
323. See Dale Russakoff, N. Y. Defendant Keeps His Own Counsel, WASH. PoST, Jan. 27, 
1995, at A3. The efforts of his former attorneys to undermine his defense and to persuade 
the judge to find Ferguson incompetent to stand trial, see John T. McQuiston, Advisor to 
L.I.R.R. Suspect Threatens to Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at BB, raise troubling ethical 
issues. Ironically, now that Ferguson has been convicted, he reportedly plans to argue in 
posttrial motions and on appeal that he was incompetent to stand trial - an argument that 
clearly contradicts his previous position that he was competent to stand trial and legally sane. 
See John T. McQuiston, Appeal Strategy of L.I.R.R. Killer Is Insanity Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 1995, at Al. 
324. " 'People bear all they can and, if required, bear even more. But if they are black in 
present day America they have been asked to shoulder too much ...• Turning from their 
tormenters, they are filled with rage.' " WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, MY LIFE AS A RADICAL 
LAWYER 386 (1994) (quoting GRIER & COBBS, supra note 322, at 4). In the Ferguson case, 
the black rage defense would have been used in conjunction with a traditional insanity plea, 
rather than standing on its own as a separate and independent defense. Arguably, Ferguson's 
rage is a catalyst for insanity, joining with his psychological problems to turn the black rage 
that otherwise justifiably exists within the black community into an uncontrollable murder-
ous rage. According to one of his legal advisors, Ferguson preferred to run the risk of being 
found guilty of murder to being found insane. John T. McQuiston, Advisor Says L.I.R.R. 
Suspect Prefers Conviction to Insanity Finding, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at BS. 
325. The following facts, which I have altered slightly to make the point about case the-
ory, are detailed in Shirley E. Perlman et al., An Angry Young Man; The troubled times of 
Colin Ferguson: from a privileged boyhood to chaos on the LIRR, NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 1994, at 
4. 
326. Id. at 5. 
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When he arrived in the United States, he took Jobs such as run-
ning a cash register at a liquor store, although he eschewed sweep-
ing or stocking shelves as beneath him. He felt that he was 
constantly being put down because he was black, and he began to 
feel angry about the discrimination he felt and about whites who 
got all the breaks in life. 
While he was unable to get the jobs he wanted and felt he de-
served, he also was ridiculed at Adelphi University for having radi-
cal political ideas and for being vocal about the need for black 
revolution. Because he was viewed as hostile toward white students 
and professors, he was eventually asked to leave the university. He 
became more and more alienated, and more and more angry. His 
rage was reaching a boiling point. 
Ferguson then went to California to look for a job and to collect 
his thoughts. He returned to New York with a semiautomatic 
weapon that was popularly used for target shooting and self-
defense. For Ferguson, the gun was a symbol of his belief that he 
was on the defensive against his white oppressors. After that, he 
simply lost control. 
A race-based theory similar to the black rage defense is the "ur-
ban survival syndrome," which was argued in the trial of Daimion 
Osby, a young black man from Fort Worth, Texas, who shot and 
killed two unarmed neighborhood black youths.327 Osby's defense 
lawyer did not deny that Osby pulled the trigger but instead argued 
that his client was so fearful from years of living in the inner city 
that he almost reflexively pulled the trigger in order to defend him-
self. This defense was crafted to explain how black inner-city resi-
dents can be so afraid for their lives that a very small amount of 
provocation can actually set off deadly consequences.328 Osby was 
convicted in his second trial,329 although the jury had deadlocked 
11-to-1 in the first trial.33o 
No discussion of race and cas~ theory would be complete with-
out some mention of the ongoing double-murder trial of O.J._ Simp-
327. "Urban Survival" trial ends with hung jury, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 21, 1994, at Al 
[hereinafter Hung Jury]; Jury Rejects 'Urban Survival' Defense, WASH. PoST, Nov. 13, 1994, 
at A16 [hereinafter Urban Survival]. For a discussion of the black rage defense and the 
urban survival syndrome, see Michael Fumento, From Battered Wives to Battered Justice Syn-
drome, w ASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at B3. 
328. While this defense on its face is not limited to people of color, the demographics of 
most inner-city neighborhoods suggest that the opportunity to raise this defense would most 
frequently arise for defendants of color. 
329. See Urban Surviva~ supra note 327, at A16. 
330. See Hung Jury, supra note 327, at Al. 
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son. While a complete analysis of that case is beyond the scope of 
this article,331 several aspects of the case show how lawyers make 
actual use of case theory for their clients. O.J. Simpson, who won 
the Reisman trophy for the University of Southern California and 
played for the Buffalo Bills in the National Football League before 
gaining widespread fame in commercials and as a football commen-
tator, is currently on trial for first-degree murder for the brutal 
slashing deaths of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her 
friend, Ronald Goldman. 
From the beginning, the media has reminded the public that all 
of our views of the case are shaped by individual perspective and 
that our experiences and values affect what we see and believe to 
be true.332 Simpson's defense lawyers have highlighted the issue of 
black celebrity status in framing Simpson's case theory, attempting 
to tum those aspects of Simpson's case that might be used against 
him - race and celebrity status --- into strategic advantages. By 
raising allegations against the Los Angeles Police Department of a 
sloppy and biased investigation333 - allegations that require little 
prompting in the wake of the Rodney King case334 - the defense 
has played a racial card that many see as valid.335 Part and parcel of 
331. The case has generated so much publicity that NEXIS has added a research file 
covering only that case. By now the Simpson case has reached the comic strips, where a 
defense attorney for "Bill the Cat" invokes case theory by weaving together references to 
J Elvis, Michael Jackson, Prozac, avenging angels, and kitty bigots to frame an outlandish argu-
ment that his client is innocent of a chainsaw attack. Berkeley Breathed, Omland, WASH. 
PoST, Oct. 23, 1994, § 1 (Comics), at 3. It appears that the cat reference is to Simpson's 
humming the tune "Memories" from the musical Cats during jury selection. See Christine 
Spolar, An Animated O.J. Takes Center Stage in Jury Selection, WASH. PoST, Oct. 2, 1994, at 
A18. 
332. See, e.g., Stebbins Jefferson, Fallen Hero Worship, PALM BEACH PoST, Aug. 14, 1994, 
at lF (quoting Kimberle Crenshaw, professor of constitutional law at UCLA, as saying, "It's 
a Rorschach (test) on race and gender. Whatever your issue is, you can look at this case, and 
•.. see it."). 
333. Simpson Team Faults Probe of Slayings; Blood Evidence Was Contaminated, Defense 
Asserts, WASH. PoST, Jan. 26, 1995 at Al (describing the defense's case theory as it was set 
out in their opening statement). 
334. See Fire and Fury, Part 5 - A Case of Black and White (CNN television broadcast, 
Oct. 16, 1994) [hereinafter Fire and Fury] (suggesting that the effect of the famous police 
beating of Rodney King has made it difficult for the public to believe what the Los Angeles 
Police Department says about the Simpson and Goldman murders); CNN & Company (CNN 
television broadcast, Oct. 16, 1994) (showing agreement among a panel of criminal defense 
attorneys that, in light of the riots following the verdict in the Rodney King beating trial, O.J. 
Simpson's attorneys should not suggest bias on the part of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment in the absence of proof); Spolar, supra note 331, at A18 (stating that race will inevitably 
be an issue in the wake of the Rodney King beating trial in any criminal case involving white 
victims and a black defendant). 
335. See, e.g., Fire and Fury, supra note 334 ("[J]ust beneath the surface of this case, there 
is a different kind of deep-seated rage, a racial distrust of the Los Angeles Police 
Department."). 
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this strategy is an effort to put the State on the defensive as much as 
Simpson, by calling into question the racial bias of a main investi-
gating officer336 and by making sweeping claims regarding the pros-
ecution's handling of vital pieces of evidence.337 
In an effort to cast doubt on the prosecution's case at every turn, 
the defense has posed questions to prospective jurors that address 
their attitudes toward interracial marriage and racial discrimina-
tion338 and toward Simpson as a celebrity.339 These past memories 
of Simpson may linger in the public consciousness despite the 
charges against him, and the defense seeks to uncover these memo-
ries and even to encourage them. 
The defense's theory of the case must make sense of the cogni-
tive dissonance many people experienced at the time of Simpson's 
arrest - the dissonance between a popular black celebrity and a 
man on trial for murder, and between his celebrity image and his 
actual life.340 Their strategy appears to be to play up this disso-
nance, until the dissonance becomes so loud that the image of 
Simpson the football player drowns out the image of Simpson the 
murderer. They hope that jurors, when faced with two such dispa-
rate images, will choose the familiar image of Simpson that pre-
vailed prior to his arrest rather than Time magazine's darkened 
image of O.J.341 · 
336. Fire and Fury, supra note 334; CNN & Company, supra note 334; Nell Henderson, 
Defense Questions Work By Police at Crime Scene; Simpson Judge Rejects Use of Videotape 
From Site, WASH. PoST, Feb. 101 1995, at A3. 
337. The defense, in keeping with its theory that Simpson is the victim of an overzealous, 
biased police inquiry, has filed several motions with the court - claiming, for example, that 
crucial blood evidence was mishandled or planted by the police or withheld from the defense; 
and that Simpson's premises were illegally searched on the night of the murders. See CNN & 
Company, supra note 334; Henderson, supra note 336 (discussing police mishandling of evi-
dence at the crime scene); Richard Lacayo, Flesh and Blood, TIME, July 11, 1994, at 26 (ex-
amining the wide array of material evidence connected to the case and the defense's reaction 
to it). 
338. See, e.g., Andrea Ford, Simpson Jury Question List Probes Range of Attitudes, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at Al, A26 (proposing that defense lawyers would like to "ferret out" 
those who might have negative feelings toward Simpson based on race, among other factors). 
339. Many of the questions posed to potential jurors focus "solely on Simpson and the 
relationship, or perceived relationship, people have with the former football star, sometime 
actor and sometime broadcaster." Spolar, supra note 331, at A18. 
340. See id. at A18; Defense Portrays the 'Real O.J. '; Opening Statement Depicts Him as 
Proud Father, Generous In-Law, WASH. PoST, Jan. 26, 1995, at Al (contrasting the defense's 
portrayal of Simpson with the prosecution's portrayal of his "private face"). 
341. See TIME, June 27, 1994, at cover. The magazine's altering of Simpson's photograph 
has not gone unnoticed in the media. See, e.g., Jefferson, supra note 332, at lF; Barbara 
Reynolds, White-male thinking still dominates news coverage, USA TODAY, July 29, 1994, at 
13A {describing the "doctored photo" as a "jarring insertion of racism into a story that now is 
bogged down with racial overtones"); Cynthia Tucker, Merchandised racism is still racism, 
DENV. PoST, Sept. 7, 1994, at B-7; Mel Watkins, Hear the One About the Comics with a 
Cause?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, at C16 (recounting a black comic's joke about how the 
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The resulting case theory is one in which race and status are 
closely linked by provoking images of an unjustly and tragically 
shattered American dream.342 The media has seized on these 
images, alternately characterizing Simpson as a traveler in a strange 
land,343 and then again as a modem-day Othello.344 In this way, 
Simpson may be seen as more a victim even than economically dis-
advantaged blacks - "those Simpson left behind on the other side 
of the tracks."345 
The defense also has paid careful attention to the connections 
between case theory and other aspects of the case. Simpson has 
altered his courtroom demeanor, humming showtunes and smiling 
for reporters in an effort to remind the public of the man it has 
known from afar for so long.346 In this way, Simpson has taken a 
leading role in the implementation of his case theory. 
In a similar vein, the pending terrorism and conspiracy trial con-
nected to the World Trade Center bombings has ethnic and reli-
gious implications for case theory. In that case, United States v. 
Rahman, the government has charged twelve Arab Muslims with 
conspiring to blow up the United Nations, the Lincoln and Holland 
tunnels, and other key spots in Manhattan, characterizing the plot 
as a "war of urban terrorism" masterminded by fanatic Arab reli-
gious fundamentalists.347 The defense has countered with several 
variations on an entrapment defense in which the defendants were 
easy scapegoats because of their religious and ethnic identities. In 
Time cover "made the brother go from Bryant Gumbel to Wesley Snipes, and didn't think 
anybody would notice"). 
342. See Lynda Gorov, Simpson's strategy unclear: Experts guessing many defenses will be 
prepared, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 10, 1994, at AlO (examining bias-related defense strategies); 
Fire and Fury, supra note 334. 
343. A newspaper report framed the case theory in this way: "He can be seen through 
the prism of race as a man who parachuted behind enemy lines, adopted the values of his 
natural antagonists and lived his life among aliens until he wound up in the middle of a 
nightmare .... " Lloyd Grove, Race and the Simpson Case, WASH. PoST, June 27, 1994, at 
Dl,D8. 
344. The caption under the picture of OJ. and Nicole poses the question " 'Ebony and 
Ivory' or 'Othello'?" Id. 
345. See Fire and Fury, supra note 334. 
346. Spolar, supra note 331, at A18 (stating that Simpson's newly invigorated demeanor 
may tie into the defense strategy that "[i]t's difficult to be harsh with someone you know and 
like"). 
347. Randolph, supra note 152, at Al; Dennis Hevesi, Jurors in Bomb Plot Trial Ques-
tioned About Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at B2. One of the twelve defendants recently 
pied guilty in the case. Id. at B2. The charges are related to the separate World 'Irade Center 
bombing case, in which four Arab Muslims were convicted of committing various acts that 
led to the bombing that seriously damaged the World Trade Center, killed six people, and 
wounded more than one thousand. Randolph, supra note 152, at Al. A fifth defendant has 
recently been arrested in the case. Hevesi, supra, at B2. 
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one version, the FBI's motive in the aftermath of the World Trade 
Center bombing was to create a plot that was doomed to fail. 
Thereby, the FBI was creating the opportunity to play the hero, as 
it was unable to do in the disastrous World Trade Center bombing. 
In another version, the government is charged with seeking to pun-
ish political views, not actions.348 Like the defense attorneys in the 
Simpson case and Colin Ferguson's pro se defense, the Rahman at-
torneys have adopted theories based on the bias in the criminal jus-
tice system and society that results in unjust prosecutions based on 
the identity of the defendants.349 
This strategy confronts head-on the reality that the widely ru-
mored reason for the bombing was anti-American sentiment and 
that the general public understood the case in terms of racist stereo-
types - terrorist Arabs out to destroy American democracy.350 
The media has been accused of "Arab-Muslim bashing,"351 perhaps 
most vividly portrayed on the cover of the New Yorker. 352 The pic-
ture featured on the New Yorker's cover on July 26, 1993, showed 
several "all-American" children playing at the beach with one lone 
348. Richard Bernstein, Defense Charges Entrapment in Terrorist Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. l, 1994, at B3 (describing the entrapment defense); Mike Darning, Trial on "Ur-
ban Terrorism" Begins, Cm. Trua., Jan. 30, 1995, at 5 (describing the political nature of the 
prosecution). 
349. William Knnstler, who was disqualified as attorney for one of the defendants be-
cause of a conflict of interest, Richard Bernstein, Judge Disqualifies Kunst/er Firm From Role 
in Bombing· Plot Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1994, at Al, planned a different defense: "[T]his 
was a political case, and the defense of the fifteen alleged conspirators had to be political; the 
case could not be won on legalities .... The U.S. Government had put Islam on trial. My job 
was to defend the practitioners of this misunderstood religion, who, like any people who are 
different, are ostracized, feared, and persecuted." KuNSTLER, supra note 324, at 338. In the 
underlying World Trade Center bombing case, this attention to perspective did not necessar-
ily translate into an expanded role for the client in case theory development. The lawyer for 
defendant Salameh argued a theory that his client was an unwitting participant in the con-
spiracy, in direct contradiction to theories offered by the other three defendants, and despite 
Salameh's refusal to admit that he was a participant. Robert D. McFadden, Defendant in 
Bombing Trial Denounces Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1994, at Bl, Bl-B2; Randolph, supra 
note 152, at Al. This defense "triggered a strong negative reaction" from Salameh at trial. 
Id. 
350. See Jeff Barge, Sedition Prosecutions Rarely Successful, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 17 
(quoting former Rahman defense attorney Ronald Kuby as saying, "[I]t's the government's 
idea for the jury to see one giant wad of Muslim terrorists forming a conspiracy stretching 
from New Jersey to Khartoum to Teheran and encompassing 800 million Muslims, give or 
take a few."); Randolph, supra note 152, at Al (quoting a !':lational Opinion Research Center 
pollster, who cited surveys "showing about 40 percent of Americans believe Islam condones 
or supports terrorism"). · 
351. See Jack G. Shaheen, The Arab Stereotype and Prejudice: A Magazine Cover Deeply 
Wounds a Community, ST. Lours PoST-DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 1993, at UC. 
352. See David Mazzucchelli; Castles in the Sand, NEw YoRKER, July 26, 1993, at cover. 
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crazed-looking Arab child about to demolish a sand-castle replica 
of the World Trade Center.353 
The New Yorker cover is representative of popular sentiment 
surrounding the bombing and its aftermath and points to the need 
for case theory to confront and dispel these images. This may be 
especially important in a case like the World Trade Center case -
or the O.J. case - when the prosecution must rely heavily on cir-
cumstantial evidence. 
While the defenses in all these cases have opened to mixed re-
views and charges of racism from people of color and whites 
alike,354 they nonetheless demonstrate that the cramped view of 
case theory in academic discourse bears little resemblance to the 
case theories that are argued in courtrooms or those that have cap-
tured the popular imagination. Journalist William Finnegan, in a 
wonderful account of his role as a member of a jury in a criminal 
case and his subsequent investigation of the details of the case that 
never came out in court, explains that the jurors "told each other 
stories" because "the disputed facts before us would make sense 
only if we could imagine the worlds around them."355 Lawyers who 
offer theories that are keyed to the world unabashedly blend popu-
lar culture with legal doctrine in order to persuade juries that their 
clients are not ciphers.356 By urging us to look at cases - and cli-
ents - through the prism of race and other identities, 357 these the-
ories capture the life experiences of clients in a way that academic 
theory simply fails to do. 
353. Id.; see also Shaheen, supra note 351, at llC. New Yorker staff later met with repre· 
sentatives from the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee to discuss future stories 
that the magazine could run in order to counter the offensive cover. Id. 
354. CNN & Company, supra note 334 (noting that the race-based strategy in the Simp-
son case could be a "very dangerous game"); Joel Dreyfuss, Rage Defense Plays Into White 
Hands, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1994, at AS4 (arguing that the black rage defense furthers nega-
tive racial stereotypes); James Lileks, Hate America? Just Call Kunst/er, PLAIN DEALER, 
Mar. 27, 1994, at 6C (accusing the black rage defense of appealing to "apologists for vic-
timhood"); Christine Spolar, Blacks Given Promise of Fair Simpson Trial, WASH. PosT, July 
20, 1994, at A3 (citing the Urban League president's warning that the defense and prosecu-
tion think carefully before injecting race into the trial); Urban Survival, supra note 327, at Al 
(criticizing the urban survival defense as racist). Others have seized on these defenses as 
opportunities to flaunt their own racism. See Tony Snow, Black Suspect is Not Alone in 
Racial Delusion, Aruz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 17, 1993, at B7 (comparing Lani Guinier's views 
about voting rights to "a highfalutin echo of Ferguson's screams about Uncle Tomism"). For 
a discussion of the ethical constraints on case theories that appeal to race, gender, or ethnic 
bigotry, see Lubet, supra note 14, at 85-86. 
355. William Fmnegan, Doubt, NEW YORKER, Jan. 31, 1994, at 48, 51. 
356. Lori Montgomery, Murder defense based on 'urban survival,' Hous. CHRON., Oct. 
24, 1994, at A15 (noting that a defense lawyer coined the term urban survival after learning 
about the concept on talk radio). 
357. Grove, supra note 343, at Dl, DB. 
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B. Enhancing Client Participation and Control 
Case theory not only assists the lawyer and the fact finder in 
understanding what happened, but also helps the lawyer explain to 
the client what happened for the client's own benefit. Of course, 
the client knows what happened in the sense that he was present 
and has told a story about the event. But what the client exper-
ienced may differ from how he may come to understand that expe-
rience. If the lawyer hears the client tell a story that raises the issue 
of race, the lawyer can walk with the client through the facts in light 
of this theory. 
The process of educating a client to the theory of his case is not 
without pitfalls, especially in light of a theory that argues for giving 
greater voice to client experience and expertise. This process, how-
ever, does not necessarily deny the validity of client experience. 
For example, Jay has a context for his particular experience from 
living his life as a black man. But he may not have thought about 
the incident systematically or imagined how it would be portrayed 
in a legal forum. Case theory can fit the pieces together and clarify 
events that were murky when they occurred. 
Rather than taking power away from a client, this approach 
might have quite the opposite result. The client might suddenly re-
alize, "Oh yeah, now I get it, this case is about race." While it may 
be unlikely that a lawyer would identify racism when a client failed 
to see it, more common is the situation when a client sees a highly 
relevant issue - like race - but neglects to raise it with the law-
yer. The client may be motivated by a number of considerations -
embarrassment, a belief that the issue has no relevance to the pro-
ceeding, or simply a desire for privacy. While each of these motiva-
tions raises different issues about the extent to which the lawyer 
should respect client choices, some degree of lawyer intervention 
seems appropriate. 
This process has value even if the theory is not ultimately 
presented in a legal forum. For a variety of reasons, Jay may reject 
telling a story about race in the courtroom but accept the race the-
ory as explaining what really happened. By the same token, we as 
his lawyers may never have a chance to tell the race story, but we 
will be better lawyers if that story gives us more insight about the 
client. If we understand his experiences, we can better understand 
the choices he makes and use this understanding to shape other as-
pects of our representation. 
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In addition to challenging the traditional concept of case theory, 
this new vision also revolutionizes the allocation of decisionmaking 
authority between lawyers and clients. Rather than choosing a case 
theory, as in the traditional model, or applying the "substantial im-
pact" or related standard, as in the client-centered model, lawyers 
would routinely involve clients in decisions about case theory. The 
client would act as the locus of decisionmaking, while the lawyer 
would facilitate the process and implement the client's decision. 
Although the traditional concept of case theory as a pivotal 
piece of legal strategy could also provide some role for clients,358 its 
legal and instrumental focus narrows the possibilities for client in-
volvement. In contrast, the new vision creates a broader role for 
client expertise in both instrumental and noninstrumental terms, 
while still acknowledging that case theory matters a great deal to 
the ultimate result. Once case theory becomes more than just legal 
doctrine, clients have more to contribute than the facts about what 
happened.359 
For example, a client may know as much as his lawyer does 
about whether a case theory based on race would persuade the 
jury.360 Whatever else lawyers may be expert at, there is little rea-
son to think that a lawyer knows more about racism than does the 
average person. "While a lawyer, through experience, may learn a 
great deal about how local juries react to different kinds of theories, 
this knowledge is not technical, nor is it exclusive. Awareness of 
racism is knowledge acquired in day-to-day life; it is hardly the ex-
clusive province of lawyers. 
Client expertise extends not only to developing a more winning 
case theory but also to assessing whether the theory satisfies other 
client objectives. Strategy, rather than being any action making it 
more likely that the client will win, becomes richer and more com-
plex. At the same time, it becomes something clients are capable of 
weighing - perhaps even more capable than lawyers. Even if law-
358. See, e.g., Skolnick, supra note 151, at 65 (suggesting that the client may not accept 
the attorney's self-designated role as sole developer of strategy and tactics). 
359. Another clinic case I supervised several years ago also demonstrates that by discuss-
ing facts - and the meaning of facts - clients can make important contributions to legal 
doctrine. In that case, the client was charged with malicious destruction of property for 
painting the words The landlord is a capitalist pig on the living-room wall of his apartment. 
The State was required to prove that our client's actions were malicious, and the students and 
I at first had difficulty framing his behavior as anything other than deliberate or malicious. 
By explaining the anger and frustration that fueled his behavior, however, the client taught 
us that his actions could instead be characterized as passionate. 
360. Even Gerry L6pez, however, does not go so far as to say that clients know as much 
as their lawyers do about every aspect of legal representation. See L6PEZ, supra note 3, at 50 
(distinguishing client practical knowledge from lawyer practical knowledge). 
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yers are better than clients at assessing the likelihood that judges 
and juries will accept a particular argument, they are less expert 
than clients in knowing whether a case theory portrays the client in 
the way he wants to be portrayed, advances an argument that mat-
ters to him on a personal or political level, or makes room for his 
voice. 
Finally, this model also values client choice for its own sake 
even if it does not lead to "better" results. in either of the above 
senses. Rather than being relegated to the netherworld of "mere" 
strategy, case theory is the piece of the case that goes most to the 
heart of who the client is by determining how his story is told. Be-
cause the client is inside the story, the client has the right to decide 
how to tell it.361 
This vision of case theory also leads to a much different lawyer-
client counseling dialogue from the one envisioned by client-
centered theorists. Rather than focusing on the choice of proce-
dural mechanism - trial, negotiation, or plea - as the key deci-
sion, the counseling dialogue would focus on case theory. Lawyers 
and clients would discuss the advantages and disadvantages of dif-
ferent case theories from many vantage points, including standard 
considerations such as which theory is most likely to prevail and 
whose testimony is necessary to support each theory. 
The conversation would also tum to other, less instrumental 
concerns, such as how the client would be presented in each theory 
and whether he likes the story that the theory tells. In choosing one 
case theory over another, a client might seek vindication by assert-
ing a particular right; he might even demonstrate that he cares more 
about vindication than he does about acquittal.362 Or a client might 
forgo an alibi defense because the alibi witness is his secret lover 
and also the spouse of his closest friend.363 A client might veto an 
insanity defense for reasons of personal integrity or choose a novel 
361. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 111, at 299 n.48 (describing Patricia Williams's nar-
rative as a "plea for letting those 'inside' the story (the slaves who were property) make the 
laws about themselves"). By giving meaning to the client's story, case theory may be even 
more personal to the client than her own testimony, which is often cited as the paramount 
client interest. Berger, supra note 148, at 48 (stating that by testifying, the client seeks "liter-
ally to confront his accusers in the personalized arena of trial"). 
362. Luban, supra note 141, at 459 n.9. In his dissent in Jones, Justice Brennan explains 
why a criminal defendant might have an interest in case theory: "He may want to press the 
argument that he is innocent, even if other stratagems are more likely to result in the dismis-
sal of charges or in a reduction of punishment. He may want to insist on certain arguments 
for political reasons. He may want to protect third parties." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 
759 (1983). 
363. See supra note 146. 
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legal defense with little likelihood of success on the chance that it 
might establish an important legal principle.364 
Lawyers and clients might also discuss procedural mechanisms, 
but not in the conventional sense. While for a lawyer the choice of 
forum is driven by the goal of achieving the best legal result, each 
forum may also provide different opportunities for storytelling. A 
client who cares about how she is portrayed by case theory, or who 
has some other goal for case theory, would want to know how case 
theory would play out in a given forum. The answer to what the 
case is about also informs the choice of a particular legal procedure. 
For example, if a client seeks vindication, then a trial is typically a 
better alternative than a plea. 
Once the collaborative energy of lawyer and client is focused on 
case theory, the question of who decides other issues assumes less 
importance because the choice of case theory makes many tactical 
decisions fall neatly into place. Once Jay decides to portray his case 
as a racial encounter, Rodriguez, Prince, and Williams become criti-
cal witnesses.365 Rodriguez can testify to the harassment he exper-
ienced, while all three men can testify about the racial overtones of 
the encounter between Jay and the guards. 
Not only might theories change in this discussion, but also facts. 
Although some clients may make up facts to fit the case theory,366 
this risk is outweighed by the contributions of truthful clients who 
know what facts matter. Case theory discussions are likely to reveal 
new factual dimensions because clients tell lawyers what they think 
is important367 and case theory reveals which facts matter. Once 
the lawyer broadens the frame of what is relevant, then the lawyer, 
364. Strauss, supra note 117, at 325. 
365. Although the decision about case theory would answer the question of which wit· 
nesses to call in many instances, this is not to say that the question has no meaning apart from 
case theory. The client might have other concerns about calling a witness and decide to forgo 
certain testimony, despite the impact on'case theory. See supra notes 144-46 and accompany-
ing text. 
366. For an illustration of this possibility, see supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. 
Although it is commonly assumed that lawyers will know when clients are lying, see, e.g., 
BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 250-51, my experience has been that I rarely know whether 
clients are lying. In the story of Mrs. G., for example, we do not know whether she 
purchased school shoes or Sunday shoes. See supra note 215. Moreover, in addressing client 
lying, commentators have overlooked the empirical evidence about the degree to which other 
actors lie. These include police officers, see Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and 
the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. CoLo. L. 
REv. 75, 95-114 (1992); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An 
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1016, 1049-51 (1987), and 
lawyers, see Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659 (1990). 
367. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 27, at 39. 
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assisted by the client, will see new facts and emphasize those facts 
consistent with case theory. 
In this dialogue, the client is truly a teacher and a contributor, 
not simply a recipient of the lawyer's noblesse oblige, as in the pro-
totypical client-centered discussion about nonlegal consequences. 
The client engages deeply in the process of developing case theory 
because of what he knows and what the lawyer does not. The client 
might educate us in ways we cannot even imagine. Once we cede 
control over case theory to our clients, we must remember that as 
lawyers we may not be in the best position to understand their 
choices. We want desperately to ascribe a "why" to their words, yet 
our understanding is limited by our own frame of reference. We 
perceive legal strategy as the reason for their actions and only re-
luctantly consider other possible strategic goals. We forget that the 
legal consequences of their actions may be entirely accidental. 
They may have inte11:ded something entirely different. 
Although we barely broke the surface of case theory discussions 
in our representation of Jay, his case suggests a number of advan-
tages that might flow from broader client participation in develop-
ing and choosing case theory. Jay could have helped us consider 
the reconstructed theory in Part II, as well as other variations of the 
race case theory, and weigh the complex questions involved in 
choosing between these theories. Indeed, he would likely have a 
different kind of insight into these issues than we as lawyers have. 
Because the characterization of the participants changes subtly in 
each of these variations, he might prefer one role for himself, and 
another for the security guards. Perhaps in the process he might 
come to a different understanding of how he viewed the incident. 
The reconstructed theory comes out swinging by painting the 
guards as racist and asking the judge or jury to find that the guards 
had a bad motive. Although it may capture the truth about the 
encounter, it asks the fact finder to choose between the worlds of 
the guards and Jay. The choice between good and evil may be too 
stark. It may cast Jay in too pure a light, when even by his own 
story he was verbally aggressive, perhaps obnoxious in tossing the 
coins, and ready to struggle with uniformed police officers. It does 
not explain away the store policy, which seems to have prohibited 
open bags, or the fact that Jay had shopped in the store before and 
not been bothered. Racism is difficult to prove and it is something 
about which we cannot always be certain.368 
368. See, e.g., Kevin Sullivan & Eugene L. Meyer, Restaurateurs Say Good Service Pre· 
vents Discrimination, WASH. PoST, Sept. 5, 1993, at B6 (discussing different perceptions 
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In one alternative, the guards were not overtly racist but uncon-
sciously so. If asked, they might honestly say, "We did not stop him 
because he was black. We stop all shoppers who don't comply with 
the policy, whites as well as blacks and Latinos." In this version, 
the guards do not recognize that they in fact applied the policy se-
lectively or that even if they initially stopped Jay for reasons unre-
lated to his race, they escalated the encounter with him in a way 
they would not have with a white man. They would not have called 
a white man "pal" or described him as pacing back and forth like a 
"caged animal." 
In another alternative, Jay perceived the encounter as racist, 
whether or not ,it was, and this belief justifies his actions. This the-
ory, while on its face complex, has much to offer. It does not re-
quire the judge or jury to choose between Jay's world view and that 
of the guards but instead asks them. to recognize that Jay's view is 
valid, based on his experience as a black man and the experiences 
of other black men in this country. In this version, we cannot al-
ways know the existence of racism, which is at times a subtle and 
hidden phenomenon. What we can know is the subjective beliefs of 
the participants involved. 
On the other hand, the risk of this theory is obvious. For many 
people, racism is either there or it is not. Statistics do not make a 
case for racism; racism exists only when there is direct evidence. 
Blacks and others are just "too sensitive" in imagining racism. 
They are really asking the rest of us to give them special treatment. 
In representing Jay, we barely touched on these race theories, 
let alone discussed their advantages and disadvantages with our cli-
ent. Yet any one of these theories opens up the possibility of new 
ways of thinking about the case in which legal doctrine serves as the 
backdrop, rather than as the primary shaper of events. We think of 
three possible theories - perhaps there are five or six variations, or 
even ten.369 These are possibilities that the traditionalists and the 
client-centered theorists cannot even imagine. 
about whether race was a factor when three black women were moved from their restaurant 
table to accommodate a party of whites). 
369. I learned this lesson well in the context of teaching in the clinic seminar offered to 
students in the Criminal Justice Clinic, the Women and the Law Clinic, and the Bridge Clinic 
- a clinic that "bridges" the issues raised in the other two clinics in the context of domestic 
violence. In that seminar, we assign an end-of-semester simulation that requires students to 
represent the plaintiff or the defendant in a civil assault and battery case. As part of that 
assignment, students are required to submit in writing a case theory of fifty words or less. 
While the only possible defense to the charge in the traditional sense is self-defense, there 
can be as many variations on a self-defense theory as there are students assigned to the 
defense role. 
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By engaging in this process, we should expect a number of sur-
prises. We might learn that the client wants nothing to do with the 
case theory as we have reimagined it. The client may not want to 
engage as much as the reconstructed model demands or reveal so 
much of himself to us and others. By putting more of himself in the 
case theory, the client lays bare more of himself and risks losing 
self-esteem if the fact finder rejects his view. This may have been 
an especially prominent consideration in Jay's case because the dis-
trict court judge had already found him guilty. 
Jay could deflect this risk by denying the validity of the fact 
finder's judgment; he could brand the judge or jury racist or simply 
label them naive. Yet this "out" may not always be enough, be-
cause the risk is not only a negative judgment in a single instance 
but a judgment that his experience of racism is false. Some clients 
might choose a less graphic case theory, even one not true to their 
experience, to avoid the pain of the fact finder passing judgment on 
their world view. 
We might also learn that we have misconceived the case theory 
from the stqry Jay has told. As much as we might want the case to 
be about race, it may not be about race at all. It is the guards and 
the shoppers who testified for Jay who deliberately interjected the 
race issue. Perhaps we were too eager to seize on their characteri-
zation and tum it around to Jay's advantage. In telling his story, Jay 
never mentions race. In his eyes, the case may be about power or 
simple stupidity. 
Nor are these possibilities mutually exclusive. ·The case could be 
about race and power and stupidity. Were the guards throwing 
their weight around because Jay was black, because he was the "ac-
cused" or the "subject," or because they were in uniform? In re-
telling the story in Part II, I proffer that the guards "punished [Jay] 
by teaching him a lesson about daring to speak out and about chal-
lenging authority." Presumably the "lesson" applies not just to 
black arrestees but to white arrestees as well. In the complex inter-
section of race and power, the variations are endless. 
In this sense, the power of race as a case theory may also be its 
greatest pitfall. A lawyer concerned about social justice wants to 
validate the client's experience of the world and, indeed, may even 
look for racism when a client does not identify it as a factor.370 An 
370. For striking accounts of the dilemma of activist lawyers, see Tigar, supra note 307, at 
198 n.56 (quoting Lucy Parsons's speech to Clarence Darrow in the play MICHAELE. TIGAR, 
HAY MARKET: WHOSE NAME THE FEw STILL SAY WITH TEARS sc. xi, I. 48 (initial perform-
ance at Thome Hall, Northwestern University (Oct. 23, 1987)) - "Your lawyer's ego wants 
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awareness of race is an important insight to possess in a case, but it 
cannot always control the case's direction. Rather than holding 
onto a race case theory with a vengeance, the lawyer must be will-
ing to back off if the client wishes. The lawyer must strike the diffi-
cult balance of recognizing the power of a race theory and being 
willing not to pursue it. 
In addition, a more complete discussion of case theory might 
also change other decisions the client makes, such as whether to 
plead guilty or go to trial. In Jay's case, the question of whether he 
might have gone to trial if we had followed a more participatory 
model of decisionmaking still troubles me. Although Jay told us he 
was pleading guilty in return for the State's dropping the assault 
and battery charge - and I do not doubt that this played a factor in 
his decision - I do not know how his interpretation of our case 
theory affected his decision. 
Earlier, when the students asked Jay whether he wanted us to 
characterize the incident as racially motivated, he said a race theory 
made him uncomfortable. The students told me Jay was reluctant 
to discuss the reasons, and I did not press them further. I now won-
der whether Jay would have plead guilty if we had further explored 
this question with him. What did his discomfort with a race case 
theory mean? What other options did he see? Why did he tell a 
story at the trial that avoided the question of race? If we had dis-
cussed these issues, Jay might have been more hopeful about his 
case or might have better understood the implications of a race 
theory. 
C. Recognizing Lawyer Life Experience 
Fmally, in this process, we might also learn that much of how we 
as lawyers shape case theory has to do with who we are.371 It is not 
that we dominate our clients, as critical theorists argue, but rather 
you to think you stand at the center of every event by which the world is changed"); Nancy 
D. Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist (May 1993) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (exploring lawyer-client control issues in the context 
of lawyers and clientS engaged in civil disobedience regarding lesbian and gay rights and 
AIDS issues). 
371. For excellent examples of how lawyers' life experiences can affect their understand-
ing of cases, see Getman, supra note 307, at 5B3 (arguing that a black female student had a 
better understanding of Native American parents' dilemma in seeking health care for their 
child than did her white counterparts); Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and 
Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal 
Education, BB Nw. U. L. REv. 695, 716-23 (1994) (arguing that law students can offer fresh 
perspectives that clinical teachers lack); Polikoff, supra note 370 (exploring conflicts arising 
from the close connection between the author - an activist lesbian lawyer and law professor 
- and her lesbian and gay clients). 
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that we are either more or less creative than our colleagues, more 
or less risk averse, more or less fearful of taking on the system, or 
have more or less life experience with the theory in question. By 
engaging with the client in these discussions, we might come to 
know more about oii.rselves, becoming better lawyers in the 
process. 
Jay's case raises especially thought-provoking issues about how 
lawyers approach case theory based on their own life experiences 
and attitudes. Both the students and I are white. From the begin-
ning of the case, I eagerly seized on the race case theory, anticipat-
ing that the client would want us to pursue this theory with abandon 
and feeling excited about the possibilities of putting the racist 
guards on trial. In contrast, the students were downbeat about the 
possibilities, even before they met with the client. They seemed un• 
comfortable talking about the case in racial terms and were quick to 
argue that the jury would never believe our theory. They viewed 
the stories of Rodriguez, Prince, and Williams as inconsistent and 
full of holes and, after interviewing them in person, reported that 
the men were not "credible" and would make poor witnesses. They 
found especially persuasive a conversation with the assistant public 
defender who represented Jay in the trial, who reported the court-
room clerk's belief that Jay's witnesses had "conspired'; with him to 
steal from the store. 
Although I pushed them hard on their assumptions, pointing 
out that the State's witnesses told stories that were inconsistent and 
irresolvable and that our theory might resonate with mer1:1bers of 
the jury who had themselves been treated poorly, they moved little 
from their initial judgment. Nor were they persuaded by my sug-
gestion that the clerk's comments could themselves reflect thinly 
veiled racism and that our own racial biases could affect our judg-
ment about case theory. They said they could not understand why 
the client had gotten so angry. 
At the time, I was frustrated by our differences and was inclined 
to think that the students were insensitive to the pervasive power of 
race. They in turn probably thought that I was overly intervention-
ist, politically correct, and dogmatic. Looking back on the case, I 
believe we were both wrong. We were separated not solely by dif-
fering sensitivities to race issues but instead by our ability to relate 
to the client's anger. 
As I observed both students in the classroom and supervision 
meetings, they were polite, mannerly, and deferential to authority. 
They attended every class, and their work was meticulous. From 
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what I knew of their backgrounds, they came from traditional fami-
lies and had set their sights on law school early on.372 Despite the 
pressures of the clinic, I had never seen them express anger or even 
annoyance, and I could not imagine them screaming or yelling in a 
public place. While I do not pretend to know their inner struggles, 
I do not think they could imagine themselves ever acting out in a 
store, no matter what the provocation. 
My experience was different. At some level, I felt I could un-
derstand the client's anger, even if it were the result of mis-
perceived racism. Although, like most law professors, I lead a life 
that is quite conventional in many ·respects, in other respects it is 
not. I am a lesbian, and like every lesbian or gay person, I have 
experienced discrimination as a consequence of my sexual orienta-
tion. In response, I have gotten angry, I have cried, and I have 
marched in the streets. I always feel like an outsider, and as a re-
sult, I have a deep appreciation for other people who may share an 
outsider's perspective. 
I also have been badly treated in stores. When I wear jeans and 
a t-shirt and store personnel are rude to me, I assume they think I 
am younger than my actual age, or that I have no money to spend, 
or both. At times, I am convinced that I have been treated rudely 
because I look like a lesbian. If someone asked me for proof, I 
could not provide it, but at a deep level I know it to be true. As a 
conseguence, I think that I respected the client's judgment, right or 
wrong, about his encounter in the store. 
When the client decided to plead guilty, the students expressed 
no concern that a man who had maintained his innocence was doing 
an about-face. Although they said they had not concluded that he 
was guilty, I believe they thought he was. In contrast, I felt re-
morseful, and still do, that by allowing him to plead guilty we had 
somehow fundamentally failed to honor his worth as a person. I 
cannot say that the connection I felt with the client was a good 
thing for our representation. My feelings may have clouded my 
judgment about the value of a race case theory or made me too 
quick to see the possibilities of this theory when even the client was 
urging us to back away. What I can say is that my experience made 
me view the case in a fundamentally different way. 
372. I also know that the students had attended parochial schools and believe that this 
background also may have influenced their perception of our client. Because I grew up in a 
Catholic community and many of my friends attended parochial schools, I have strong views 
about the impact of this kind of education, but I recognize that these views are also unfair 
biases. 
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Sexual orientation also figured· into an aspect of representing 
Jay even more clearly connected to case theory. Following my 
usual practice in the clinic, I did not meet the client or his witnesses 
until our court appearance on his behalf. Although Jay had decided 
to plead guilty before the circuit court trial date and we had con-
firmed the plea bargain with the prosecutor, the students had asked 
Prince and Rodriguez to attend court in the unlikely event that the 
plea fell through. When I met Prince and Rodriguez at the eleva-
tors outside the courtroom on the morning of court, I realized they 
were gay. Although a number of observations contributed to this 
conclusion, at bottom my intuition, not a list of "facts," led me to 
this realization. 
We all stood together with the client outside of the courtroom 
waiting for the court to call our case. As I watched Jay interact with 
Prince and Rodriguez, it dawned on me that he also was gay. I 
sensed this conclusion more than I knew it.373 I also sensed that 
Prince and Rodriguez were a couple. The case was called a few 
minutes later, and we all went into the courtroom. 
Since the case ended, I have thought a great deal about how my 
awareness of the sexual orientation of the client and his witnesses 
has affected how I look at the case. At the time I did not think of 
this awareness as a kind of case theory; I now do. While race was 
an obvious theme, sexual orientation resided in the background. 
Sexual orientation is almost always more invisible than race, yet it 
can have a profound effect on how we view what happened. Even 
when sexual orientation is not directly at issue, as it woulq be in a 
military discharge case or in a case challenging a lesbian mother's 
right to raise her child, it provides a lens for understanding what 
happened. 
Thinking about the case in terms of sexual orientation changes 
my view of the encounter between Jay and the guards and between 
Rodriguez and the guards. Of the three men, Rodriguez seemed to 
me to be the most "obviously" gay. Perhaps the guards stopped 
him out of overt homophobia, or out of a less conscious realization 
that he was somehow "different." Although Jay's sexual orienta-
tion seemed to me more hidden, the guards could have been moti-
vated by similar considerations. Thousands of gay men and lesbians 
have died as a result of individuals acting on homophobia; it is not 
373. While I am fairly confident of the accuracy of this perception, I of course do not 
know that the client or his witnesses were gay. I use the terms knowledge, realization, and 
awareness to capture my belief that they were gay. 
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hard to imagine that homophobia, conscious or unconscious, might 
lead a guard to stop someone in a store. 
Sexual orientation might also explain why Prince and Rodriguez 
came to Jay's assistance and waited at the jail for him to be re-
leased. The State's unstated but implicit explanation for their in-
volvement was that Jay and his witnesses were members of racial 
minority groups. Sexual orientation might provide an alternative 
explanation. So too might sexual orientation explain why the stu-
dents viewed Prince and Rodriguez as unreliable. 
Indeed, Jay may have reacted as he did to the guards' harass-
ment because he perceived a homophobic slur - real or unin-
tended. The term punk - the term Dirk used in hassling Jay and 
Rodriguez - is a somewhat dated reference to male homosexuals 
and is still employed by some African Americans. I was unaware of 
this connotation uQ.til Margaret Montoya, a Latina clinical col-
league, read a draft of this article and suggested this interpretation 
based on her experience in the African-American community. This 
tum of events once again demonstrates the key role that life experi-
ence can play in lawyers' 'Understanding of their clients and cases. 
The choice between a race theory and a sexual orientation the-
ory is not an either-or choice. Events may have transpired as they 
did for reasons of both sexual orientation and race - or neither. 
Many questions about the possible implications of a theory 
based on sexual orientation remain unanswered because I did not 
raise the issue with the students or the client. I did not see the 
client again once the case ended, and I made a conscious decision 
not to raise it with the students. Because the client had not raised 
the issue of his sexual orientation with us, my guess was that he did 
not wish to discuss it, and for me to discuss it with the students 
would violate his privacy. Of course, I cannot conclude from the 
fact that he did not raise the issue that he would not wish us to raise 
it, but the safest choice was to leave the issue alone, given that it 
could have no effect on the outcome of the case. 
Had we still been developing case theory at the point when I 
became aware of the issue of sexual orientation, the question of 
whether to pursue it would have been more complicated. On the 
one hand, the client should have the choice about whether to argue 
this theory. On the other hand, the theory would not likely help the 
client win his case, given societal homophobia and a jury's likely 
inclination to see the shared sexual orientation of the three men as 
evidence of bias, rather than simply as a shared experience. 
Although a client in Jay's shoes might have noninstrumental rea-
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sons to raise the question of sexual orientation, Jay was an unlikely 
candidate to assert these reasons, given his absolute silence on the 
issue. 
Moreover, there is potentially a very high cost to discussing sex-
ual orientation issues with a client who wants to keep his sexual 
orientation secret. Simply raising the issue with the client might be 
devastating if he believes that by remaining silent he can control 
who has access to this information. The client might even prefer to 
lose his case by abandoning a potentially winning issue of sexual 
orientation rather than know that his lawyer has recognized some-
thing so personal about him.374 If I could recognize this as his law-
yer, how obvious must it be to the rest of the world? 
While a theory based on sexual orientation, like a race theory, 
might be more true to the client's life experience, it may not be a 
better theory in any real sense.. Indeed, who the client is may itself 
be problematic, given the level of homophobia in this country and 
the risk of presenting this theory to a judge or jury. This risk may 
be even greater for a client who is both black and gay., While a 
theory premised on race and sexual orientation may most fully cap-
ture the client's experience, we might nonetheless abandon it. 
Perhaps the most important les~on of the story is that if we are 
to take life experience seriously in developing case theory, we must 
look beyond race to other kinds of theories that may not be so im-
mediately apparent but that are potentially relevant. Given the 
prevalence of racial issues in the criminal justice system,375 a com-
petent lawyer should always consider the impact of race, but she 
must also go further. The impact of other fundamental characteris-
tics such as gender, class, and sexual orientation may be less obvi-
ous but equally important in offering explanations in cases. Unless 
lawyers consciously look for these perspectives, they may miss 
them, even when the client's view of what happened is shaped by 
this perspective. The client does not look for .this perspective but 
simply sees the world that way. 
374. Epstein, supra note 148, at 30 (arguing tbat a closeted gay client should have the 
right to reject a self-defense tbeory tbat would require him to admit his presence at a gay bar, 
in favor of a weaker misidentificatiol!- defense). · 
375. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1739, 
1794 (1993) (advocating an ethical prohibition against racial imagery in criminal cases); 
White, supra note 10, at 1506 (noting tbe prevalence of hierarchies of race in criminal law). 
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CONCLUSION 
An understanding of case theory is a critical component of good 
lawyering. The traditional concept of case theory, however, ignores 
the reality of client life experience and provides no role for clients 
in developing and shaping case theory. 
Surprisingly, the client-centered perspective adds little to the 
traditional understanding. These writers do not seriously challenge 
the traditional concept of case theory, and while they suggest an 
expanded role for clients in litigating their cases, most of their pro-
posals overlook the key role of case theory in strategy decisions. 
In contrast, the critical lawyers' attention to voice, narrative, 
and the power dynamics between lawyers and clients says much 
that matters to case theory. Cases are about clients, not lawyers. 
They are not just about what happened but about client life exper-
iences as well. Client voice shapes the meaning of facts and 
changes the nature of what the case is about. 
Yet the critical lawyers' metaphors of power and competing law-
yer and client narratives miss much that is important to case theory. 
To realize the rich possibilities of storytelling, lawyer and client nar-
ratives must come together to capture the best of both client and 
lawyer experience. 
· As I have reconstructed case theory, it is a lens for shaping real-
ity in light of the law - a lens that explains the facts, relationships, 
and circumstances of the client and other parties in the way that can 
best achieve the client's goals. This reality comprehends client life 
experience and also recognizes the expertise that both clients and 
lawyers can contribute to developing case theory. By looking be-
yond doctrine, case theory operates as a way to view the slice of the 
world that becomes the case. The possibilities of imagination are 
almost limitless. 
